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INTRODUCTION

Fish, especially salmon, are necessary for the survival of the native peoples of the Pacific Northwest, both as individuals and as a
people. Fish are crucial for native peoples' sustenance, in the
sense of a way to feed oneself and one's family. Fish are also crucial for subsistence, in the sense of a culture or ay of life ith
economic, spiritual, social, and physical dimensions-a way to be
Yakama, or to be Tulalip. 1 Salmon, especially, are central to the
1. The term "subsistence" appears to be used differently by various speakers, and so
vrrants definition. In the context of Alaskan Native practices, David S. Case distinguishes
benveen two senses of the term "subsistence" in a uay that may be useful here. He describes the first as rooted in Anglo-European usage, the second as reflective of Native experience. The Anglo-European meaning of subsistence "connotes the bare eking out of an
existence, a marginal and generally miserable way of life;" it implicates necessity in a purely
physical sense and presumes an economics of scarcity. See David S. Case, Subsistnce and
Sef-Detemination: Can Alaska Natives Have aMore aEffeahfe Voie'?, 60 U. Colo. L Rev. 1009,
1009-12 (1989); see also DAVID S. CasE, ALAsm, NATIvs AND As mw.icr L%%s 275 (1984).
Case suggests the term "sustenance" as a more precise description of this activity. See id. at
275. By contrast, a Native understanding of subsistence is larger. "For Natives engaged in
subsistence uses, the very acts of hunting, fishing, and gathering, coupled with the seasonal
cycle of these activities and the sharing and celebrations which accompany them are intricately woven into the fabric of their social, psychological and religious life." h. at 276.
Native Americans of the Columbia River Basin express similar understandings. The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, in comments to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, describes its member tribes as "ceremonial and subsistence fishers."
COLurMBIA RIVER INrER-TtmBAL

FISH

COnMILSSION, Co.MF,nrs TO ADNuNISTRIxroR Bno'ER

ON THE DRAFT REVISIONS TO THE MErHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING A.MBIsex

WATER Q

UM.rrY

HF k.m 2 (1999) [hereinafter CRITFC Comments]. Margaret Palmer, Yakama Tribal Fisher, explains: "Fishing to me and my family is
a way of life, more than a livelihood. It was something that i.s handed down to us and
CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF Hu.AN
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belief systems, identities, and social relationships that define these
peoples. The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
("CRITFC"), formed by the Umatilla, Nez Perce, Yakama, and
Warm Springs tribes, explains:
Salmon are part of our spiritual and cultural identity. Over a
dozen longhouses and churches on the reservations and in ceded
areas rely on salmon for their religious services. The annual
salmon return and its celebration by our peoples assures the renewal and continuation of human and all other life. Historically,
we were wealthy peoples because of a flourishing trade economy
based on salmon .... Salmon and the rivers they use are part of
our sense of place. The Creator put us here where the salmon
return. We are obliged to remain and to protect this place ....
As our primary food source for thousands of years, salmon continue to be an essential aspect of our nutritional health. Because
our tribal populations are growing (returning to pre-1855 levels),
the needs for salmon are more important than ever. The annual
return of the salmon allows the transfer of traditional values from
generation to generation. Without salmon returning to our rivers and streams, we would cease to be Indian people. 2
The importance of fish, especially salmon, to the first peoples
of the Pacific Northwest is reflected in myth, in language, in treaties negotiated with invading peoples, in past and present fisheries
management practices, in contemporary restoration efforts, and in
the ongoing legal and political struggle for the survival of the
salmon and the way of life that is bound up with fish and salmon.3
Under treaties between these first nations and the United
preserved by our elders." Videotape: My Strength Is From the Fish (Columbia River InterTribal Fish Commission 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter My Strength Is From the
Fish]. According to Don Sampson, now Executive Director of CRITFC:
The reason I've been fishing is more for my own subsistence, to bring fish home.
But maybe more importantly now these days is to maintain that tradition of fishing-of going up to the mountains where my father, my elders fished before me.
So it's something that we've got to carry on-that's really why I fish. We've got to
pass it on to our children. We have to have that for them in order to be Indians-in order to survive and carry on the things that were placed here for us-and
carry on what our elders tell us and teach us.
Id. The EPA, on the other hand, sometimes uses the term "subsistence" in this sense, or
denotes as "subsistence fishers" those subpopulations whose understanding of the place of
fish and fishing in their lives echoes that articulated by Palmer and Sampson; but the EPA
sometimes uses the term quite loosely, or uses it in an ambiguous manner. See infra notes
189-94 and accompanying text. Except when discussing EPA's usage, in this paper I use
"subsistence" in line with Case's second sense, the sense also articulated by Palmer and
Sampson.
2. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, The Importance of Salnon to the Tribes
(visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.critfc.org.text/IMPORT.HTM>.
3. See infra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
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States, the first nations relinquished millions of acres of their original homelands in exchange for assurances that their rights to
smaller, retained homelands and their rights to fish on the vast
ceded lands would be respected in perpetuity as vital to the flourishing of their identity, culture, religious traditions, and tribal
economy. 4 Thus the United States, from at least the time of these
treaties, has been cognizant of the importance of fish to these peoples. Indeed, it has urged agreements that enshrine this importance and envision tribal economies dependent on fish and
fishing. The United States is, by virtue of the treaties, the guarantor of the tribes' right to fish against federal and state interference,
a right reiterated by the federal courts in modern times.'
The rivers, streams, estuaries, and other waters that support the
treaty-protected fish are now gravely threatened by, among other
things, chemical contamination. Chemical agents toxic to humans
and to other living things have been emitted, discharged, and
leaked into the air, water, soil, and sediments-largely in the
course of the majority society's pursuit of industrial and agricultural progress. Once in the environment, these chemical agents
behave in various ways: some move, some linger, some biodegrade,
some bioaccumulate. Eventually, they, or their chemical successors, may come in contact with the fish that live in contaminated
waters. These fish bioaccumulate6 many of the chemicals present
in the ambient water and sediments, eventually effecting humans
as they eat these contaminated fish and are exposed to the toxins
concentrated in the fish tissue. So, even where the treaty-guaranteed fish resource is still available, Native people are left to catch
and consume contaminated fish.
Health and environmental agencies at the state and federal
levels7 have in the last few decades come to recognize that human
4. See, e.g., Treaty with the Nisquallys (Medicine Creek Treaty), December 26, 1854,
10 Star. 1132 (1855); see also infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 337-361 and accompanying text.
6. Bioaccunulation is the process by which chemical agents that are persistent and
lipophilic become increasingly concentrated in aquatic organisms higher up the food
chain.
7. Note that tribes, a "third kind of sovereign in our federal system," may in some
instances function as "agencies" in carrying out federal environmental statutes. For example, it is well-recognized, at least, that tribes have jurisdiction to issue water quality standards, and to othenvise regulate uuter pollution and manage water resources on
reservation land. Indeed, the Clean Water Act allows tribes to be treated "as States7 for
purposes of exercising regulatory authority over waters within tribal jurisdiction. &e 33
U.S.C. § 1377 (1999); see also William C. Gallomay, Note & Comment, Tibal iter Quality
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health is threatened by consumption of chemically contaminated
fish. They have fashioned responses to this conventional understanding of the problem, guided by a handful of federal and state
environmental statutes that direct them to set environmental standards "protective of human health." These agencies now consider
ingestion of contaminated fish to be the greatest route of human
exposure to several chemical agents. 8 They are concerned that exposure to these chemical agents damages human health by various
means: some are carcinogens, some are reproductive toxins, some
are endocrine disrupters, some have multiple harmful effects. On
this understanding of the problem, health and environmental
agencies have sought either to reduce the amount of fish humans
consume or to reduce the amount of contamination in the fish-so
that the risk of negative human health effects is minimized, if not
eliminated. In either case, the problem is framed as harm to individual humans' physical health.9
Standards Under the Clean Water Act: ProtectingTraditionalCultural Uses, 70 WASH. L. REv, 177
(1995). While I recognize that tribes may function as "agencies" in this regard, the comments herein respecting "agencies" are directed in the main to federal and state agencies.
This choice reflects the fact that tribal interests are greatly affected by federal and state
agency decisions implementing the Clean Water Act and other environmental legislation
for areas currently interpreted to be within federal and state agency jurisdiction.
8. This is the case, for example, for polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), classified by
the U.S. EPA as a "probable human carcinogen," and recognized as a developmental, reproductive, neurological, and immunological toxin. See, e.g., BRIDGET BARCLAY, HUDSON
RIVER ANGLER SURVEY. A REPORT ON THE ADHERENCE TO FISH CONSUMI'rlON HEALTH ADVISORiES 5 (1993) (noting the adverse health effects of PCBs and explaining that "[w]hile peo-

ple can be, and are, exposed to PCBs in the air, water and foods in general, consumption
of contaminated fish is considered the greatest route of exposure to PCBs"); OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. EPA, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PLAN FOR STATE FISH CONSUMP.
TION AIVlSORIms. Fish consumption is also a major route of exposure for mercury. See, e.g.,
EPA: Browner Reports on Fish Advisories, M2 PREsswRE, June 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10344868; Indigenous Environmental Network, Mercury Poisoning of Native Americans (visited Oct. 7, 1999) <http://vw.alphacdc.com/ien/mercuiry.html>. In addition to PCBs
and mercury, chlordane, dioxins, DDT, and some 41 other chemicals are of significant
concern for and are covered by fish advisories. See EPA: Browner Reports on Fish Advisories,
supra.
9. See, e.g., ZYGMuNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENrAL LAW AND PoUc. NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 449 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining the premise of harm-based regulation: "In
the absence of identifiable or threatened harm, there is no warrant for regulating conduct
under most contemporary theories of social and political organization"). But cf Environmental Protection Agency.v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 202-05 (1976) (discussing the shift in
Federal Water Pollution Control Act focus from "tolerable effects" of water pollution to
"preventable causes"); Principles of Environmental Justice, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRsT NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT xiii (1991) (on file with the
Stanford Environmental LawJournal) (stating that "[e]nvironmental justice demands the
cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and radioactive materials, and
that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxfi-
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This conventional understanding of the problem, however, fails
fully to comprehend the dimensions of the harm to Native Americans of the Puget Sound and Columbia River Basin. It fails to appreciate the cultural dimension of the harm and fails to recognize
the integral role of fish, fishing, and fish consumption in the lives
of the Pacific Northwest peoples. It separates out and recognizes
but a single strand-individual humans' physical health-from an
integrated set of harms wrought by chemical contamination.
Moreover, health and environmental agencies' responses have
failed fully to appreciate the legal obligations and normative commitments that constrain their work when it affects these Native Peoples. Legal obligations arising from treaties between the United
States and the various Pacific Northwest tribes, from the federal
trust responsibility, and from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 frame agency decision-making here. Normative commitments, too, should guide agencies' responses. Emerging and wellsettled norms require agencies to respect cultural integrity, to promote a conception of equality that includes freedom from both
exclusionary and cultural discrimination, and to provide just
process.
In failing to honor these legal obligations and normative commitments, agencies' current practice raises issues of what has been
termed environmental injustice. But the contours of environmental injustice are different for Native Americans than for other affected groups, and so remedying the injustice will require
consideration of a different constellation of issues-among other
things, recognition of the unique historical and legal aspects of Native Americans' claims. This Article will explore this constellation,
focusing on agencies' use of quantitative risk assessment to set environmental standards limiting the contamination in water and sediments that support fish on which Pacific Northwest peoples
depend. This Article will discuss the differences between what is
understood by agencies to be at stake and what is actually at stake
for these Native peoples. The remainder of this Part introduces
these differences as they are raised by agencies' current responses
to the contamination of the waters and fish on which Native peoples depend.

cation and the containment at the point of production") [hereinafter Principles of Eniromnental Justice].
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The Conventional Understandingof the Harmful Effects of
ContaminatedFish

The first agency response to the problem of human exposure to
contaminated fish has been to request people to stop eating fish
believed to be contaminated. This strategy involves issuing fish advisories warning against the consumption of fish from particular
contaminated waters.' 0 Yet, fish-if uncontaminated-are an excellent source of dietary protein and other nutrients for humans.
Experts in nutrition extol the health benefits of eating fish.1 Relatively low in fat, fish efficiently meet human requirements for protein and for other nutrients, such as selenium.12 Fish are also an
attractive source of dietary protein because they generally cost less
than other animal sources of protein. 1 3 In fact, if one can dip a net
or drop a line into a bay or river nearby, one can bypass the need
to purchase fish altogether.' 4 Indeed, coastal peoples have for gen10. See, e.g., PAMELA SHUBAT, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HEALTi RISK ASESSMENT FOR THE CONSUMPTION OF SPORT FISH CONTAMINATED WITH MERCURY, PCBs AND
TCDD 1 (1993); Dawn Gagnon, SpiritualKeepers of the Penobscot,BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6,
1995, available in 1995 WL 8770065 ("As recently as this spring, state health officials warned
women of childbearing age to avoid eating fish from the Penobscot River below Lincoln,
the Kennebec River below Skowhegan, and all of the Androscoggin River due to the presence of dioxin. All others were advised to use caution."). See generally 2 U.S. ENVrL. PRO.
TECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING CHEMICAL COrTAMINANT DATA FOR USE IN FISH

ADVISORIES: RISK AssESSMENT AND FISH CONSUMPTION LIMITS (2d ed. 1997). The EPA reminds that "fish constitute the only class of foods subject to total governmental prohibition
in large geographic areas of the United States for substantial time periods because of exposure to potentially hazardous environmental pollutants." OrnCE OF WATER, U.S. ENVrL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, CONSUMPTION SURVEYS FOR FISH AND SHELLFISH: A REVIEW AND ANALY.
SIS OF SURVEY METHODS 35 (1992).

11. See, e.g., Renate D. Kimbrough, Consumption ofFish: Benefits and Perceived Risk, 33J.
ToxICoLOGY & ENVrL. HEALTH 82-83 (1991); Yvonne Smith & Laura Berg, Ancient Tradition
Modern Reality: Is There a Future for a Salmon-Based Culture?, 1 WANA CHINOOK TymOO 14
(1998).
12. See, e.g., Kimbrough, supra note 11, at 82-83; Smith & Berg, supra note 11.
13. See Kimbrough, supra note 11, at 83.
14. Delbert Frank, Sr., of Warm Springs, explains:
I used to fish at Celilo Falls before The Dalles Dam was built. We used to be able
to fish all year long. We caught lots of different kinds of fish-spring chinook,
summer chinook, bluebacks, fall chinook, steelhead, and coho. When the fish
were coming in good, I could catch one ton of salmon a day. And, it didn't take a
lot of fancy gear or expensive boats to fish. For the cost of one or two balls of
twine, about 6 to 12 dollars, I could make the fishing gear necessary for me to
catch enough fish to supply my family and many others for a whole year.
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, Celilo Falls (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://
www.critfc.org/text/CELILO.HTM>; see also, Patrick C. West, Health Concernsfor Fish-Eating
Tribes?, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 15. ("With [the fish] resource so highly valued both
culturally and economically by [the Great Lakes] tribes, we would expect to find high levels
of fish consumption-especially on the Bay Mills reservation, where high levels of poverty
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erations looked to the water for their sustenance and, for some
peoples, for subsistence. 5
Regulatory agencies are not unaware that the health benefits of
fish consumption make this first approach precarious. When fish
advisories are effective, humans heed warnings not to consume fish
from contaminated waters. 6 But these people become subject to
the serious health risks associated with protein, nutritional, and
even caloric deficiencies unless they can find substitute dietary
sources. For most individuals affected by advisories announced by
federal or state agencies, the need to find substitute food sources is
unproblematic. There are clear metrics along which substitutions
are to be made: grams of protein or kilocalories of energy. And,
apart from some losses in efficiency or reorientation of habit or
predilection, such substitution provides little reason for pause.
For a few affected individuals, however, an inability to pay for
substitute sources leaves few options. No fish may mean no dinner.
The first strategy then imposes a double bind: ignore the fish advisories and be exposed to contaminants in amounts deemed unacceptable for humans, or "abide by the advisories and forgo a meal.
For those affected individuals who rely most heavily on fish for
food-American Indians' 7 prominent among them-this doub .
bind is especially harsh. Ignoring the fish advisories may mean exposure to far greater amounts of contaminants than human systems are believed able to tolerate, while heeding the advisories may
mean forgoing not only tonight's meal, but also tomorrow morning's meal, and the midday meal after that. The limitations of even
prevail and subsistence small-skiff fishermen are common. Even for the commercial fishing sector of the economy, it has been well established that much extra fish is distributed
among crew members for subsistence consumption (as part of labor compensation) and as
part of cultural ritual and tradition.").
15. See supra note 1.
16. See BARcLAY, supra note 8, at 10-11. Note that agency reliance on fish advisories
assumes that the advisories reach the affected individuals and that these indiduals understand the advisories' import. See id. at 10; see also GiRE-T LZES INDwA, FtSi & WILDUFE
CO NnSSION, 1993 GLIFWC SURVEy OF Tmarx. SPEARm: MNrcuw" Co.%crScs at 1 (noting

that "only about half [of respondents in our study] were aware of or had looked at a State
Health Advisory for information on mercury levels in fish").
17. This is not to say that all Native Americans rely heavily on fish, or thmt those who
do rely on fish do so to the same extent or for the same reasons. It is neither possible nor
appropriate to universalize Native American cultures, histories, or beliefs. Segmnerall Ro.
ERT F. BERK-IoFER, JR., THE WrHITE MAN's NDLA: LLGEs OF THE AmiERIucaN LN-DL%N:
FroM
CoLUmus TO THE PRESENT (1978). This article focuses mainly on Native Americans of the

Pacific Northwest. See discussion infra note 27 and accompan)ing text. Even among the
peoples of the Pacific Northwest, there are differences. Nonetheless, the issues raised here
may be applicable to other Native Americans.
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"effective" fish advisory programs are thus clear to agencies concerned with protecting human health.
Recognizing the limitations of the first strategy, agencies use a
variety of regulatory measures in an attempt to minimize human
exposure to toxins contained in the fish. Under this second strategy, agencies impose water quality18 or cleanup1 9 requirements
that permit only certain "acceptable" amounts of contamination to
remain in the environment in which fish live, thereby reducing the
quantity of contaminants concentrated in the fish people eat.
When this second strategy is considered effective, environmental
standards are set at levels protective of fish-consuming humans.
Thus, the contaminating agents are no longer permitted to be discharged in quantities that would result in dangerous levels of exposure to humans, and those agents already present in the surface
water and sediments are cleaned up to levels safe for humans.
When the second strategy is effective, humans can continue to eat
fish as they had, catching them from their usual bays, lakes or rivers, in the usual quantities and kinds.
However, if not properly undertaken, this second regulatory
strategy may produce the same double bind as the first. When
agencies use quantitative risk assessment ("QRA") to set healthbased environmental standards, they often rely on standard assumptions about inputs to the risk assessment equation. For example, in setting standards for water that support fish that humans
''
then consume, agencies typically assume an "average American 's2t
fish consumption practices. However, humans consume fish in varying quantities, depending on socio-demographic and cultural dif18. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (3), 1313(d) (1994) (requiring agencies to establish residual health-based standards, in the form of total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for those bodies of water that
fail to meet water quality standards by the application of technology-based effluent limitations). For a thorough discussion of the evolving role of health-based standards in the
Clean Water Act's regulatory scheme for toxic pollutants, see Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ErNvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10528
(1991); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Qualit.y
Based Regulation Under the Clean WaterAct, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Evntl. L. Inst.) 103391 (1997);
Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs I1I: A New Frameworkfor the Clean Water Act's Ambient Standards
Program,28 ENv-rL. L REP. (EnvtI. L. Inst) 10415 (1998); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV-The
FinalFrontier,29 ENvrTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10469 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Model Toxics Control Act, WvI
s.
REv. CODE § 70.105D (1999).
20. See generally, AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN (Francis Paul Prucha, ed.

1973).
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ferences.2 1 Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest, for
example, consume vastly greater quantities of fish than non-Native
Americans. So do Native Americans of the Great Lakes," of the
Mattaponi and Pamunkey Rivers,' and of the Penobscot River Basin 4 In fact, the "average American" tends to consume far less fish
than Native Americans from coastal regions. By failing to take into
account the amount and kind of fish consumed by these Native
peoples, and thus their exposure to the toxic contaminants in fish,
the resulting environmental standards will underestimate their
risk. This second strategy thus may present the same double bind
as the first: continue to consume the same amount and kind of
fish and risk compromised individual health, or reduce fish consumption to look like that of the "average American" and risk nutritional and caloric deficiency.2 However, this is but a partial
picture of the double bind for these Native Americans.
Given even this partial picture of what is at stake, current
agency practice is deeply troubling as a matter of distributive justice. It countenances far greater health risks to some groups of
individuals than to others, and requires that Native Americans,
among others, disproportionately shoulder the environmental
harms that have attended industrial and agricultural "progress."
However, the economic and other benefits of this progress have
often been enjoyed not by the Native Americans and others who
are most heavily burdened by the resultant health risk, but instead
21. See, e.g., Patrick C. West, Invitation to Poison? Detroit Minorities and Toxic F1is Consumptionfrom the Detroit River, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF Em'¢IRONME,'TAL R%RDS: A

TImE FOR DISCOURSE 96 (Bunyan Bry-ant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (recounting evidence of
higher consumption for non-Whites than for Whites of fish caught in Detroit River) [hereWEALH.FaL~zs]; Patrick C. West eta., Minorinafter RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF EIRON

ity Anglers and Toxic Fsh Consumption: Evidenw from a Statewide Sunv of Michigan, in RC:E
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra, at 100 [hereinafter West, Ihnan
Anglers]; see also infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., GRFAT L.REs INDLAN FIsH & i.DuFE CoMMNIssIoN-, 5tlprm note 16, at app.2
at 2, 4; Patrick C. West, Heafth Concernsfor Fh-EatingTibes?, 18 E.P.A J. 15 (Mar.Apr.
1992) [hereinafter West, Health Concerns].

AND THE LNCmENCE

23. SeeBrieffor Appellant at 24, National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d

1395 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2520).
24. See ENvIRONmENTrAL DEFENSE FUND ET AL, THE PROTECrON OF SpORT

A D Stusts-

TENCE FIsING POPULATIONS IN, THE UNrrED STATES 5, 7-9 (1994).

25. For a criticism of the use of law as a tool of colonization by the dominant society
and for the point that a truly "American" jurisprudence would accept and respect Indian
values rather than require Indians to craft their claims in accordance with the white man's
legal and political values, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra ofFederal Indian Law: The
Hard Trial of Decolonizingand Americanizing the 111ite Man's hIdianJurisprndence,1986 Wts. L
RE%% 219.
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overwhelmingly by affluent, Anglo-European Americans. This maldistribution of environmental benefits and burdens is one hallmark of what has come to be called environmental injustice.26
B.

The CulturalDimensions of the Harm to Pacific Northwest Native

Peoples
For the Tulalip, the Squaxin Island, and other peoples of the
Puget Sound, the Straits of Juan de Fuca, and the Pacific Coast of
what is now Washington State,2 7 and for the Umatilla, Nez Perce,
26. Given evidence that environmental risks are borne disproportionately by Native
Americans, other people of color, and people in low-income communities, environmental
justice advocates begin by making a basic distributive claim: no single group or community
should be required to shoulder societal environmental burdens. See, e.g., Michael Fisher,
Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285,

296-303 (1995); see also Robert R.Kuehn, The EnvironmentalJustice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103, 140; CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 6.
Although distributive justice is one facet of environmental justice, advocates point out that
achieving equal distribution of environmental harms is not coextensive with achieving environmental justice. See Sheila Foster, Justicefrom the Ground Up: DistributiveInequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the TransformativePoliticsof the EnvironmentalJusticeMovement, 86 GAL. L.
REv. 775, 788-807 (1998). Reverend Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., explains:
Environmental justice advocates are not saying, 'Take the poisons out of our community and put them in a white community.' They are saying that no community
should have to live with these poisons. They have thus taken the moral high road
and are building a multiracial and inclusive movement that has the potential of
transforming the political landscape of this nation.
BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS, JR., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACIsM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 5 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993). But cf Dean B. Suagee, Turtle's WarParly:An Indian
Allegory onEnvironmentalJustice,9J. ENvrL. L. & LrmG. 461, 471 & n.1l (1994) (pointing out
"one of the key differences between Indian tribes and other 'communities of color' whose
interests are championed under the banner of Environmental Justice[:] Indian tribes are
sovereign governments" and cautioning that characterizing Indian tribes as minorities has
often worked to the detriment of tribes). See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
27. References in this paper to "peoples of the Pacific Northwest" or "Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest" are meant to include, to the extent that the analysis is relevant to their experiences and practices, peoples of the Puget Sound, the Straits ofJuan de
Fuca, and the Pacific Coast of what is now Washington state, as well as the peoples of the
Columbia River Basin. The Tulalip and Squaxin Island are mentioned in particular because one recent effort to gather data regarding fish consumption practices of Native
Americans in this region focused on the Tulalip and the Squaxin Island, who were selected
non-randomly from among what the authors referred to as "the fourteen Puget Sound
tribes... to represent the expected range of fishing and fish consumption activities of
tribes in the region." KELLY A. Toy Er AL., A FISH CONSUMPTION SURVEY OF TIIE TULALII
AND SQUAXIN ISLAND TRIBES OF THE PUGET SOUND REGION 2 (1996). The authors expressly
caution, however, that "[w]hile data from these tribes may be representative of consumption rates of other tribes, it should be understood that fish consumption rates, habits, and
patterns can vary among tribes and other subpopulations." Id.at 1. Note that seventeen
tribes in addition to the Tulalip and Squaxin Island have formed the Northwest Indian
Fisheries Commission in recognition of their similar experiences and interests in this respect: Jamestown S'Klallam, Lower Elwha Klallam, Port Gamble S'Klallam, Lummi,
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Yakama, and Warm Springs peoples of the Columbia Basin, the
harm stemming from current agency policy goes beyond the maldistribution of harm to individuals' health. When agency strategies
require these peoples either to ingest toxic contaminants in
amounts determined to be poisonous to humans or to adjust their
fish consumption practices to look like those of the "average American," the strategies pose an additional threat: injury to a culture
that is bound up with the fish. It is in an important sense beyond
the scope and ability of this Article to say what it is that is
threatened, but it is nonetheless vital to explore this facet of the
harm.
Agencies' tasks are different where Native Americans are affected, because unlike for most other individuals who consume
fish, finding replacements for fish is not simply a matter of finding
substitute food sources that satisfy palate and pocketbook.28 There
are no ready and unproblematic metrics by which a Yakama can
assess replacements for fish in his life, as there are for most nonIndians. The first peoples of the Pacific Northwest are fishing peoples. Fish and fishing are necessary not only to maintain the physical health of individuals, but also to maintain the cultural health
and integrity of the group. As Don Sampson, now Executive Director of CRITFC, explains, fishing is "something that we've got to
carry on .... We've got to pass it on to our children. We have to
have it for them in order to be Indians-and carry on what our
elders tell us and teach us." 29 When agency strategies present the
Makah, Mucldeshoot, Nisqually, Nooksack, Puyallup, Quileute, Quinault, Sauk-Suiattle,
Skokomish, Stillaguamish, Suquamish, Swinomish, and Upper Skagit.
28. This is not to downplay the economic aspects of the issues at hand. Fish are now,
and have always been, vital to the economy of Native Americans of this region. Fish are
caught for consumption by fishers, their families and friends; for distribution to other
tribal members;'and for commercial distribution. Moreover, economic development and
self-sufficiency are pressing concerns for many tribes, given the poverty experienced by
their members. See generally WHAT CAN TMBES Do? STATEGIES A.ND INs trtoN s rc AmER.cAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Stephen Cornell &Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1993);James
L Huffman, An ExploratoryEssay on Native Americans and Environmntalism, 63 U. CoLo. L
REv. 901, 914-20 (1992) (criticizing mainstream environmentalist policies that would have
Indian economic development limited to only those activities consonant with environmentalists' ideas of what living "in harmony uith nature" would require, with the result that
Indians' often desparate conditions of poverty would be made worse, rather than better);
Rebecca Tsosie, TribalEnvironmental Polity in an Era of Sdf-Delennination: The Role of Elhis,
Economics, and TraditionalEcologicalKnowledge, 21 VT. L REv. 225, 320-29 (1996) (discussing
insights from alternative models for tribal economic development and noting the connection between territorial autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and economic
self-sufficiency on the other).
29. My Strength Is From the Fish, supra note 1.
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"choice" outlined above, the depth and dimensions of the double
bind must be understood to include the threat to culture as well.
Indeed, this "choice" echoes ominously the "choices" presented to
Native Americans under now-disclaimed policies of the federal government: survival is implicitly or explicitly conditioned upon assimilation into the dominant culture, and upon a renunciation of
Native Americans' ways of living."
Such threats to the survival of first peoples have come to be
recognized by some as another facet of environmental injustice."'
To the extent that agencies have registered these concerns, they
may nonetheless fail fully to appreciate the contours of environmental injustice for Native peoples. For Native Americans in the
United States, issues of environmental justice implicate issues of
religious freedom, sovereignty, political self-determination, economic development, treaty observance, federal trust obligations,
human rights, and property rights.32 Environmental justice for Native Americans thus encompasses a different constellation of issues
than it does for other affected groups.33 It requires, among other
things, acknowledging the unique historical and legal aspects of
natives' claims.3 4
C.

QuantitativeRisk Assessment and EnvironmentalJustice

This Article explores this constellation of issues in the context
of agencies' use of quantitative risk assessment ("QRA") to set environmental standards for the water and sediments that support fish
30. See generally Williams, supra note 25; DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERI41-72 (4th ed. 1998).
31. In addition to claims advanced by other environmental justice advocates, indigenous rights advocates highlight important connections between Native sovereignty, political, cultural and economic self-determination, and environmental justice. See Tom B. K.
Goldtooth, Indigenous Nations: Summay of Sovereignty and Its Inplicationsfor Environmental
Protection, in ENVIRONMENTALJusICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 138 (Bunyan Bryant
ed., 1995); Winona LaDuke, We Are Still Here: The 500 Years Celebration, RACE, POVEWrV &
THE ENV'T, Fall 1992, at 20-21; Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 9 ("Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination for all peoples."); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular
Telescopes, Red Squirrel Piflatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing EnvironmentalLaw
in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133 (1994).
32. See Goldtooth, supra note 31; LaDuke, supra note 31; Principles of Environmental
Justice, supra note 9; Williams, supra note 31.
33. See Suagee, supra note 26.
34. See Goldtooth, supra note 31, at 139; Principles of Environmental Justice, supra
note 9 ("Environmental justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of
Native People to the U.S. government through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants affirming sovereignty and self-determination."); Suagee, supra note 26.
ALS ON FEDERAL INDLAN, LAW
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on which Pacific Northwest peoples depend. It focuses on the example of QRA because this decisional tool is highly malleable, and
agencies are required to make subjective judgments at numerous
junctures in the risk assessment process. As such, QRA presents
particularly worrisome opportunities for assumptions and judgments that discriminate against, are indifferent toward, or misunderstand Native Americans' different fish consumption practices.
Even well-intentioned agency risk assessors may have failed to appreciate the role of fish, fishing and fish consumption in the lives
of the peoples of the Pacific Northwest. In fact, by relying on standard assumptions about the "average American," agencies have
grossly underestimated the exposure of these peoples, with the
consequence that the resulting environmental standards fail adequately to protect these people.3 5
Efforts to challenge these standards in court have been to little
avail. In two recent decisions involving water quality standards for
dioxin, Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke 6 and Natural Resource
Defense Council v. EPA,3 7 the courts upheld EPA's use of a standard
assumption for the fish consumption rate ("FCR") it factored into
the risk assessment equation. This standard assumption-that
humans eat 6.5 grams of fish per day (roughly one fish meal per
month)-is intended to estimate consumption by the "average
American.""8 But, as available evidence indicated, this figure significantly underestimates consumption by the affected Native peoples who eat one or more fish meals per day. Although the EPA has
recently moved to revisit its 1980 water quality criteria 3 -- the
source of the 6.5 grams/day standard assumption-months and
years pass in the meantime in which environmental standards are
35. Governmental agencies at the federal, tribal, and state levels are responsible for
protecting relevant aspects of human health and the environment. Note that tribes, a
"third kind of sovereign in our federal system," not only set tribal environmental policy but
also may elect to implement federal environmental statutes for areas ithin cach tribe's
jurisdiction. Suagee, supra note 26, at 472-74. For example, the Clean Water Act treats
tribes in the same manner "as States" for purposes of exercising regulatory authority over
waters within a tribe'sjurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 1377 (1994); see also Galloway, supra note
7.
36. 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
37. 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993).
38. Guidelines and Methodology Used in the Preparation of Health Effect Assessment Chapters of the Consent Decree Water Criteria Documents, 45 Fed. Reg. 79,347,
App. C (1980).
39. Draft Water Quality Criteria Methodology Revisions: Human Health, 63 Fed. Reg.
43,756 (1998) [hereinafter Draft WQCM Revisions].
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set by agencies and approved by courts, and the standards remain
insufficiently protective of highly-exposed Native subpopulations.
Health and environmental agencies have also failed fully to appreciate that their decisions affecting Native American subpopulations must be framed by legal obligations arising from treaties
between the United States and the Pacific Northwest tribes, the
federal trust responsibility, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Agencies have also proceeded with apparent indifference to
the values of cultural integrity, a conception of equality that includes protection from both exclusionary and cultural discrimination, and a just decision-making process. Agencies have instead
made decisions according to standard analytical methods that seek
a "balance" between the costs of environmental protection and the
benefits of risk-producing activities. Such methods might be appropriate if the identities of the most exposed were unknown and
unknowable, if the risks were distributed equitably, and if the
stakes were the same for everyone affected. But such methods are
inappropriate where these conditions do not obtain. They are objectionable here because the risks are disproportionately imposed
on some identifiable Native American subpopulations and the
stakes for these subpopulations are different than for the general
population: not only individual humans' health, but cultural survival is at issue. In view of the relevant legal obligations and normative commitments, tradeoffs that may be permissible as a general
matter become impermissible when the highly-exposed subpopulations are Native Americans.
Accordingly, this Article has several aims. The first aim is to
urge changes to agency standard-setting practice to account for the
higher fish consumption rates of Native Americans of the Pacific
Northwest. Because the hope here is to stem the immediate injuries to those affected by the resulting standards, this is the most
urgent task for this Article. A subsidiary aim is to question the hegemony of quantitative risk assessment and its associated epistemology. In my view, agencies' attachment to this epistemology
explains some part of their failure to produce standards sufficiently
protective of all fish-consuming humans. Finally, I mean to contribute to the understanding that for some Native peoples, the
threat here is at once to individual health and to cultural survival;
this threat is occasioned not only by the standards that emerge
from agencies' standard-setting process, but by the process itself.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the quantitative risk assess-
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ment process and, after a caveat about agencies' choice of the tool
at all, explains how this process is used by health and environmental agencies to evaluate risk and to set environmental standards to
protect against risk. Part II also explains and distinguishes uncertainty and variability, important concepts for understanding QRA
inpractice.
Part III begins by offering accounts of the importance of fish to
the Pacific Northwest peoples. It explains how risk is estimated for
human exposure to carcinogens via the fish ingestion pathway. It
presents evidence of cultural and socio-demographic sources of variation in fish consumption rates, noting in particular that Native
Americans of the Pacific Northwest consume fish at considerably
greater rates than do members of the general population.
Part IV examines current practice in the agencies and courts.
First, it discusses agencies' proffered justifications for providing a
higher level of protection to non-Indian populations, and "lower
yet adequate" protection to Native American subpopulations. Second, it describes the EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions. Finally, it scrutinizes agency responses to instances of uncertainty and variability in
the risk assessment process, and argues that there has been some
confusion between the two.
Part V returns to the fish consumption evidence and criticizes
current risk assessment practice. Given the variability and indentifiability of fish consumption rates explored in previous Parts, it
argues that differential treatment of the particular highly-exposed
subgroups here, i.e., some Native Americans, is warranted on two
bases. First, it is necessitated by the mere fact that such highlyexposed subgroups exist, or have emerged from the data, in a context where the stakes are high. Second, it is also necessitated by the
identity of the subgroups that are here highly exposed. Native
Americans present a particular case, from both a normative and
doctrinal standpoint. Relevant normative commitments include
respect for cultural integrity, equality, and just process; applicable
legal obligations include treaties, the federal trust responsibility,
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, Part VI offers
specific recommendations for consideration by agencies and tribes
as they engage in the process of environmental standard-setting.
I

II. RiSK ASSESSMENT

Quantitative risk assessment has enjoyed a spectacular ascendancy in recent years. Although it has been around as a decisional
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tool since the 1970s, it is increasingly being employed by health
and environmental agencies to set health-based environmental
standards. 40 And, it is increasingly being employed not only by federal agencies, but also by state and local agencies. 41 President Clin42
ton's recent Executive Order on Regulatory Planning and Review
and a steady stream of congressional bills4 3 look to guarantee the

role of QRA in agency decision making. Indeed, congressional
and other proposals have called for greater reliance on quantitative risk assessment, sometimes encouraging layered use of quantitative analysis about quantitative analysis.44
Use of QRA is somewhat controversial. After outlining the risk
assessment method and explaining how agencies use it to set
health-based environmental standards, this Part sketches three
40. See Kuehn, supra note 26, at 103-05, 108-12; Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful EnvironmentalRisk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 409, 410 (1995) (describing
"Risk Assessment" as "all the rage," and as "a cornerstone of current administrative practice"); Curtis C. Travis et al., Cancer Risk Management: A Review of 132 Federal Regulatoty
Decisions, 21 ENvrL. Sc. & TECH. 415, 419 (1987).

41. SeeJohn D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENrL. LJ. 382, 386 (1994).
However, state and local agencies with little funding may not have the resources to devote
to a rigorous risk assessment, or to review data presented to the agency by those seeking to
go ahead with a risk-producing activity.
42. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp.
IV 1998).
43. See H.R. 690, 104th Cong. (1995) ("A bill to improve the use of risk assessment
and cost-benefit analysis by Federal agencies" would have required each of nine enumerated federal agencies to conduct risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis for all major
rules protecting human health and the environment; "major" defined as likely to result in
an annual effect on the economy of $25 million or more); S. 229, 104th Cong. (1995) ("A
bill to require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct risk
assessments and cost-benefit analysis in promulgating regulations relating to human health
and the environment, and for other purposes" would have required EPA, among other
things, to certify that its major regulations were the result of risk assessments that had been
based on the best obtainable scientific information; "major" defined as having an effect on
the economy of $100 million or more in any one year); S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997) ("A bill
to provide for analysis of major rules" would require risk assessment for major rules and
would establish principles for risk assessments; "major" defined as costing over $100 million or deemed by OMB to have a significant impact on the economy).
44. For example, some urge quantification of uncertainties in a quantitative risk assessment. See COMMITTEE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT'L RE.
SEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 184-85 (1994) [hereinafter
SCIENCE ANDJUDGMENTI; Graham, supra note 41, at 401; Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Simnulation in Environmental Risk Assessment-Science, Policy and Legal Issues, 9 RISK: 1-IIAL-rH, SAFETY
& EN 'T 7, 7 (1998). But see 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK
ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING: FINAL REPORT 88 (1997) ("The Commission recommends against

routine use of formal quantitative analysis of uncertainties in risk estimation, particularly
that related to evaluating toxicity.").
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sources of controversy. First, QRA proceeds according to a particular conception of rational decision-making. Second, QRA in practice is highly malleable. Third, the choice of QRA as a decisional
tool may work to the particular disadvantage of risk-bearing
communities.
A.

QuantitativeRisk Assessment: The Metlwd

Humans are exposed to environmental contaminants via a variety of pathways: we inhale toxic air contaminants; we drink contaminated ground water; we eat fish that swim in and bioaccumulate toxins from contaminated surface water."' Risk in this
context is the product of the toxicity of the contaminant and the
46
duration and frequency of human exposure to that contaminant.
Risk assessment attempts to measure the magnitude and
probability of the harm to human (and, more rarely, ecological)
health posed by environmental contaminants. 47 The method of
quantitative risk assessment has been described at length elsewhere
in legal and policy literature; 48 for present purposes, a brief overview follows.
1. Basic components of quantitative risk assessment.
The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has identified four basic components of risk assessment: hazard identification, toxicity or dose-response assessment, exposure
assessment, and risk characterization. 49 Hazard identification determines whether exposure to a chemical agent causes increased
incidence of adverse health effects in humans and, if so, under
what circumstances. This initial step in the process entails identification of contaminants suspected to pose a health hazard, quantification of the concentrations at which they are present in the
environment, description of the specific forms of toxicity (is the
45. See Curtis D. Klaasen &John Doull, Evaluation of Safet': Toxioloa¢ic Evaluation, in
ToxIcoLoGa THE BAsic SCIENCE OF PoIsoNs 11, 13-14 Uohn Doull et al. eds., 2d ed. 1980).
46. See id. at 14; U.S. ENmr- PROTECnON AGENC , E.xPOsLRE FcroRs HA.%NDroo
(Draft 1996).
47. See Notice of Availability and Opportunity to Comment on Proposed Guidelines
for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,961-63 (1996).
48. See ScirENcE ANDJuDGMo.ENT, supra note 44; Alon Rosenthal et al., LegslatingAcewptable CancerRiskfrom Exposure to Toxic Ctemcals, 19 ECOLOGY LQ. 269, 277-95 (1992); Sympo-

sium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Governyent, 3 N.Y.U. Ert.

L J. 251-591 (1995)

[hereinafter NYU Symposium on Risk Assessment].

49. See Nat'l Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Govemment Managing the Process 3 (1983); SCIENCE AN DJUDGE-MEN, supra note 44, at 4, 26-27 (1994).
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agent a neurotoxin, a carcinogen, a mutagen?) caused by the
agent, and evaluation of the conditions under which these forms of
toxicity might be expressed in exposed humans. Dioxin, for example, is a carcinogen, an immunotoxin, a reproductive toxin, a developmental toxin, and an endocrine disrupter.5"
Toxicity or dose-response assessment provides a quantitative
characterization of the relation between the exposure to or dose
received of the contaminant and the response in exposed humans,
i.e., incidence and severity of the adverse health effect. This step
may include discussion of variations in response, for example, differences in susceptibility of young and old people. Dose-response
assessment involving extrapolation to low doses employs different
assumptions depending on whether the agent's toxic effect is cancer or some other health "endpoint." For noncarcinogens, risk assessors attempt to identify a threshold dose or exposure level below
which there are no observed adverse effects. 51 For carcinogens,
risk assessors believe that there is "no threshold" for the dose-response relationship or that, "if one does exist, it is very low and
cannot be reliably identified."52
Exposure assessment addresses the conditions (intensity, frequency, duration) of human exposure to the agent. Exposure assessment tracks a contaminant's progress from emission or
discharge, through presence in the air, water, soil, or sediments, to
contact with humans. This step entails examining the relationship
between environmental concentrations of the agent and various
routes or pathways of human exposure (e.g., inhalation, dermal
absorption, ingestion).
Risk characterization, the final step in the process, incorporates
the results from the three previous steps. At this juncture, the risk
assessor derives an estimate of the type and magnitude of the adverse effect to an exposed individual or population, as well as the
probability of the effect occurring. For carcinogens, risk is typically
expressed as the increased probability that an individual will die
from cancer.53 Although this Article raises concerns relevant to
50. See, e.g., Karen F. Schmidt, Dioxin's Other Face: Protraitof an "Environmental1lor
mone", 141 Sci. NEws 24, 25 (1992).
51. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 60-64.

52. See id. at 65-66.
53. SeeJoHN J. COHRSSEN & VINCENT T. CovELLo, RISK ANALVsis 85 (1989). By comparison, for noncarcinogens, risk is expressed by reference to a "hazard quotient," which is
derived by dividing the estimated population exposure level by the threshold or reference
dose. If this quotient is greater than one, the population's exposure is greater than the
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toxins with health endpoints other than cancer, i.e., non-carcino-

gens, it will focus on the particular concerns of quantitative risk
assessment for carcinogens. References to "risk" will be to risk of
cancer, unless otherwise noted.
2.

Derivation of health-based and environmental standards.

As noted above, risk is the product of toxicity and exposure.
Health-based environmental standards can be derived by a simple
manipulation of the risk equation. Environmental agencies determine the amount of contaminants that may permissibly remain in,
for example, surface water so that the resulting risk to exposed individuals does not exceed some predetermined "acceptable" level.
In the case of surface water quality standards, assuming some given
level of acceptable risk, risk assessors solve for concentration,
thereby deriving a number that can be translated into an effluent
limit or cleanup level to be attained.
What constitutes "acceptable" risk requires what risk assessors
refer to as a "policy"question-to be distinguished from questions
of pure "science" or questions of mixed "science-policy."5 4 Answering this policy question is not an acontextual enterprise. Risk
thought to be acceptable in one context may not be acceptable in
another. For example, many people may find acceptable higher
levels of risk in occupational contexts than in environmental contexts; this may be so, among other reasons, because the former
risks are perceived to be voluntarily undertaken. For carcinogens,
risk levels deemed acceptable differ from agency to agency, and
sometimes differ within a single agency as it implements differing
statutory directives." In the case of environmental exposure to
carcinogens, what constitutes acceptable risk is sometimes expressed by a single value. Washington's Model Toxics Control Act,
"safe" reference dose and is therefore considered unacceptable. Se SCEF.NcE AND JtLDG.
iENT, supra note 44, at 3940.
54. See SciENcE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 18; see also KS. SHt.Ern-FnxcHi-rrE,
ScrEcE Pouicy, ETHics AND Ecoxo.uc MErTHODOLOCY 17-24 (1985).
55. The language of the various statutes that have been interpreted to allow or require quantitative risk assessment is, not surprisingly, the root of much of this difference:
Primarily narrative in form, these statutes permit a considerable spectrum ofapproaches to
risk assessment and a range of acceptable risk levels. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 48, at
269 nn.18-19 and accompanying text; Arlene Yang, Standardsand Uneertainj in Ridh Asessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENvr-. LJ.523, 530-35 (1994). Commentators disagree whether these differences among and within agencies are problematic. CompareRosenthal et al., supra note
48, at 269; and Yang, supra,at 530-35; with STEPHEN BRivER, BRENr,THE VIC3O'S CIRcLE:
TowARm EFFECIVE RisK REGULATION 39-51 (1993).
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for example, deems acceptable an increased risk of not more than
1 in 1,000,000 or 1(106).16 Acceptable risk may also be expressed
in narrative form, e.g., "protective of human health with an ample
margin of safety."57 Consequently, while it is sometimes the legislature that chooses a value for acceptable risk, it is, at other times,
the administrative agencies implementing health-based environmental standards that translate a narrative instruction into the
numbers used in the risk assessment equation. Further, because
the costs of protecting human health can in many instances be
large, these decisions are not based exclusively on determinations
of "acceptable" health risk, but instead are judgments of how much
risk is tolerable given that risk attends other costs and benefits of
risk-producing activities. 8
B.

QuantitativeRisk Assessment: Critique
1.

Invalidity of the rationality claim.

Broadly formulated, the ascendancy of quantitative risk assessment in environmental decision making is propelled by the conviction that we need to understand the problem in order to fashion a
solution.59 QRA supporters argue that agencies must establish the
existence and magnitude of an exposed population's risk in order
to make rational decisions about the need for reducing that exposure.6" Calls for quantitative risk assessment reflect the currency of
the view that policy-making ought to be "rational" in the particular
sense of proceeding according to prescribed, replicable, quantitative methods.61 The appeal, in popular terms, is to common sense,
56. SeeWASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-730(3) (a) (iii) (B) (1999); see also Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2) (A) (1994).
57. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) ("National primary ambient
air quality standards... shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which . . . allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the
public health."); Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
58. See Douglas MacLean, Social Values and the Distribution of Risk, in VALuES AT RiSK
75, 77 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986).
59. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 16-17.
60. See id; Graham, supra note 41, at 389-90.
61. Mark Sagoff contrasts this conception of rationality in regulatory decisionmaking
with a conception of rationality that promotes decisions that are "reasoned," "intelligent,"
and the product of open-minded deliberation-and that, importantly, countenances qualitative evidence, including evidence about common purposes and beliefs. MAiK Sw\ott,
THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHy, LAW AND THE ENVIONMENT,

12-14, 220-24

(1988). See also Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Evaluatingthe Expertise ofExperts, 6 RisK: HEALTu,
SAF=T & ENV'T 115, 117 (1995) (arguing that "[a]ssessments of multiattribute risks should
be the products of social, ethical, cultural and legal rationality-not merely the projects of
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to the need to make "sound" regulatory decisions. 62 Some proponents also press a less benign version of this idea. They argue that
agencies ought not to regulate unless and until they can quantify
the relationship between harms to humans from exposure to environmental contaminants and the kind and amount of these contaminants attributable to particular sources.63 This argument is
troubling in light of our present inability to do the necessary quantification and the enormous gaps in the data on which quantitative
risk assessment depends.'
Many of those who offer QRA as a decisional tool make ambitious claims about the method." Some proponents believe QRA
capable of encompassing every important value-while remaining
neutral in giving weight to the various claims of value. They argue
that values of every sort can unproblematically and comprehensively be quantified and accounted for, at least in theory. Other
proponents of QRA make more modest claims.6 6 They offer QRA
and similar analytic methods only as a means to provide and organa bounded scientific rationality."). For other possibilities, see, for example, Jeanne Nicnaher Clarke & Andrea K Gerlak, EnvironmedalRacismin the SunbdtA Cros.CulturalAnalysis,
22 EN v- MG rr. 857 (1998); Winona LaDuke, TraditionalEcologicalKnwledge and EnvironmentalFutures,5 CoLO.J. INL' EV-rt. L & PoL'V 127 (1994); Tsosie, supra note 28, at 269317.
NUFAcIrRERs Assoaw oN BEFORE
62. See WRrrmIN STATEMNENT OF THE CHEMIC-Al.. M
THE SUBCOIturrTTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOLRCES AND THE SU-no.SMITEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECuRrry, Co-MMItr-rE ON Go%,E.RNcFrT OPErUTIoNS,
STATEMENr OF THE CHE.MIQc.%. MIANuFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ON THE ASSESSMET.%r A-ND N,.N-

AGF-MENrT OF HEALTH, SAF=TY AND ENVIRONMENTA. RISK (Feb. 1, 1994). availablein 1994 WL
14167699 ("A sound environmental management strategy must begin by considering the
nature and magnitude of the risks to public health and the environment that are
presented by particular substances and activities.") [hereinafter CHEtiC,ALMNU.LFAC'TcREnS
ASSOCIATION TEsTnMONy]; Rosenthal et al., supra note 48, at 270 ("Scientific information

about the human health risks of exposure to toxic chemicals is critical to making sound
regulatory decisions.").

63. See Richard B. Belzer, The Peril and Promise of Risk Assessnent, 14 REGULtTtON. 40,
ELnI.E AP.
47-48 (1991); CrmncAL MLAUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION, RISK Ass.ssu %r, A FLt
PROACH TO PROBLF-M SOLVING, 22-24 (1996).
64. See Alyson C. Flournoy, LegislatingInaction: A.4ing the Wrong Questions in Protectlie
EnvironmentalDecisionmaking 15 HAR-. ENvri. L Rxv. 327, 329-31 (1991) (asserting that
given large uncertainty, legislation that has been interpreted to require risk assessment

amounts to a resource intensive and time consuming burden of proof on agencies); Ellen
K. Silbergeld, The Risks of ComparingRisks 3 N.YU. ENvr. LJ. 405 (1994) (Mie anti-regulatory sector has opened its post-Reagan/Bush campaign against environmental regulation
with a novel strategy ... the new attack sets in the way of regulatory action the prerequisite
of having to quantify and prioritize all risks and then to allocate the resources of government and society in a manner accurately commensurate with comparability of risL").
65. See eg., MacLean, supra note 58, at 77.
66. See id. at 77-78.
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ize information in a manner that permits more systematized
choices about the need to reduce human exposures or stem environmental contamination. They hope QRA will discipline the assessment of the tradeoffs involved and thus point to a more
efficient allocation of regulatory resources. However, because
quantitative risk assessment and related analytic methods frame
questions, characterize relationships and presuppose societal ends,
the choice to make environmental policy decisions by QRA is a
choice of particular societal priorities and assumptions about what
is basic to quality of life. Far from permitting humans to "get beyond a clash of sacred values," quantitative risk assessment and related analytic approaches simply instate one view of the sacred."7
The choice of QRA presupposes, for example, that "optimal" pollution or risk control is the end to which environmental policy aspires.68 It takes no account of beliefs that would call for limits on
anthropogenic chemical contamination even when risk does not
exceed "acceptable" levels. 69 Moreover, it excludes all experience

0
or understanding that is not amenable to quantification.7
In fact, QRA proponents' boast that it can account comprehensively for every value, while remaining neutral as to the relative
Weight of those values does not stand up to scrutiny. Cass Sunstein's work on the problem of incommensurability in law is instructive here.71 Sunstein observes that humans value things,
goods, relationships, and states of being in qualitatively different
ways7 2 and notes that these values cannot without significant loss of
7
meaning be reduced to a single metric, such as money or utility. 3

The attempt to account comprehensively for every value along a
single metric may, for some values (and valuators) in some contexts, do violence to the way that those values are actually understood and experienced. Not only would the metric fail adequately
to describe experience but also, crucially, it "would actually transform it, in a way that would make a great deal of difference ...
67.
68.
(1974).
69.

See Annette Baler, Poisoning the Wells, in VALUES AT RISK, supra note 58, at 49, 51.
See WiuLAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS? THE CASE FOR OPrINtXI. PoutION
But cf CRITFG Comments, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing for "zero tolerance").
See PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 449; Graham, supra note 41, at 389-90. But cf

CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 11-12.
70. See Williams, LargeBinocular Telescopes, supra note 31, at 1134-36, 1149-50, 1153-59,
1161-63.

71.
(1994);
72.
73.

See Cass R Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in Law, 92 MIcL. L. REv. 779
see also Symposium, Law & Incommensurability, 146 U. PENN. L. REv. 1169 (1998).
See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 782.
See id. at 784.
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because it would elide certain qualitative differences that are important in both life and law."74
Thus any risk assessment that purported to be comprehensive
would need to take into account some values that are not susceptible to the requisite quantification-at least not uithout significant
loss. However, for at least some people, to ask how much risk is
acceptable or how much contamination is optimal is to ask an
unintelligible or morally objectionable question. For some values,
then, QRA will fall short as a descriptive matter; and in the very
exercise of value description, it cannot operate from a neutral posture. The choice of questions posed in accessing risk, the terms
and methods used to answer them, and the weight assigned to answers all act to thoroughly imbue QRA with the dominant culture
system.
2. Malleability of quantitativerisk assessment.
QRA in practice is exceedingly malleable. Risk assessors must
make subjective judgments at numerous junctures in the risk assessment process. Some of these judgments are necessitated by the
present lack of the data on which QRA depends for its claimed
value as a useful arbiter.75 And, even in cases where data exist-for
example, where the value for some parameter in the risk assessment equation is known, but known to vary-current practice
leaves it to risk assessors to choose among a range of true values.76
These occasions for judgment in QRA are termed "uncertainty"
(incomplete data) and "variability" (known, but fluctuating values). Such subjective judgments imbue the process with the particular values, commitments and experience of the risk assessor and
can profoundly affect the outcome of each risk assessment.7
The extraordinary latitude for subjective judgment is one of the
main bases for criticism of QRA, by proponents and detractors
alike. The criticism that risk assessment is fraught with uncertainty
74. Id. at 797.
75. See infra notes 112-14 and accompan)ing text for explanation of uncertainty.
76. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
77. See Kuehn, supranote 26, at 138-39 (giving examples of wildly different outcomes
depending on who conducts the risk assessment); see alsoAlon Tal, Assewing the Environmental Movement's Attitudes Towards Risk Assessment, 31 Evrt. Sc. & TEcat. 470, 475 (1997)
("One experienced public interest attorney notes, 'I have never seen nor have I heard
from my colleagues of a single instance where an industry-sponsored risk assessment has
indicated that a problem exists.'").
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is by now a familiar one.7 8 Sources of uncertainty in the first step
of risk assessment, hazard identification, include large gaps in epidemiological data and in other, surrogate sources of knowledge
about whether a chemical agent is likely to have hazardous effects
inhumans.79 For example, whether an agent has chemical or physical properties that produce adverse effects in humans is known for
relatively few chemicals, compounds, or mixtures; in most cases,
risk assessors must rely on proxies, for example, a structural comparison of the unknown agents with known hazardous agents, to
make inferences about unknown agents.
In the second step, dose-response assessment, the absence of
human epidemiological data about the dose-response relationship
for most agents introduces substantial uncertainty. Risk assessors
in most cases must extrapolate from animal tests to humans.8 0 Further, for reasons of research efficiency and administrability, these
animal tests typically expose animals to much higher doses-perhaps a thousand times greater-than the doses experienced by
humans in the environment. As a result, conversion to dose-response curves for humans requires extrapolation from high-dose
experiments to low-dose scenarios for which experimental data do
not exist."1 Together, these extrapolations create perhaps the
greatest source of uncertainty in the risk assessment process. 2
The third step, exposure assessment, is also riddled with uncertainty." Often little is known about the fate (including biodegradation and bioaccumulation) and transport of
contaminants of concern from the time they are released in the
environment to the time of human exposure. In addition, there
may be wide variability in exposure and susceptibility among individuals, but often little data describing the variability. In short, risk
assessment's claimed objectivity and usefulness depends on the
availability of large amounts of data at each of the first three steps
in the process. At present, much of the necessary data simply has
not been gathered. 4
78. See Flournoy, supra note 64, at 327 n.1 (citing a considerable body of literature
discussing uncertainty in risk assessment); Yang, supra note 55, at 527-30; BRaEYE, supra
note 55; Kuehn, supra note 26.
79. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 57-58, 163 (Table 9-1).
80. See id. at 58-60, 163 (Table 9-1).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 59; see also Shere, supra note 40, at 432-40.
83. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 43-55, 164.

84. As currently written, moreover, many health and environmental regulations actually create disincentives for information gathering. If there is little or no information re-
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An example of agencyjudgment is illustrative. At present, risk
assessors are utterly unable to account completely for synergistic or
antagonistic interactions among the multiple chemicals to which
an individual is exposed. Although they are aware of likely s)ergism, risk assessors are unable to quantify these chemical interactions in a manner that would permit the interactions to be figured
into current risk assessment methods. Instead, agency risk assessors have chosen to proceed chemical by chemical, constructing a
hypothetical and unrealistic world in which humans are exposed to
single chemicals. To the extent that cumulative risks are recognized, they are calculated by adding together the separate risks of
exposure to single chemicals.8 The effect of assuming additivity
where synergism correctly describes the interaction of multiple
chemicals, of course, is to underestimate the risk of those exposed
to the mix.
Although cognizant of the present large chasms in the available
data, health and environmental regulatory agencies nonetheless
have chosen to employ the risk assessment technique in environmental decision making. This choice alone sparks criticism from
detractors; for example, some claim that risk assessment serves
largely to impede rather than improve health and environmental
regulation.86 Proponents, however, believe the present deficiencies only a matter of QRA's nascency. The response, from their
perspective, is to develop and fine-tune the tool.8 7
If it is recognized that risk assessment requires so man) subjective calls-calls inevitably imbued with the personal values and
commitments of the risk assessor-risk assessment stands to lose its
authority as a value-free arbiter. Indeed, for quantitative risk assessment to retain its authority, advocates must deny or downplay the
garding human carcinogenicity for a potential environmental hazard, for example, ie
EPA effectively assumes that there is zero risk from that substance, and does not conduct a
risk assessment. Consequently, those producing potentially hazardous substances fear any
new information may identify a negative health effect and subject a new substance to regulation. See Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,996-34,000
(1986).
85. SeeKuehn, supra note 26, at 117-21.
86. See Flournoy, supranote 64, at 334-38, 340-46; Silbergeld, supra note 64, at 406.
87. For example, they urge that uncertainty be reduced by gathering data, and that
variability be accounted for by using Monte Carlo-type analysis of probabilities. Se Graham, supranote 41; CHIxc.L MAN FACrURERS ASSOCLwiTION Trrsmtox%, supra note 62. But
note that it is precisely the time- and resource-intensive aspects of calls for more data and
greater sophistication that have lead detractors to question some proponents' motives. See
Flournoy, supranote 64; at 382-91; Silbergeld, supra note 64, at 41623.
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subjectivity of the process."8 The subjectivity of risk assessment as
practiced fuels both the claim that risk assessment overstates the
risks to society from environmental hazards, leading to over-regulation of risk-producing processes, 9 and the claim that risk assessment understates these risks, leading to underregulation of riskproducing processes.9" Either way, there is ample reason to question whether the numerous subjective judgments that accompany
risk assessment are appropriately accounted for in current practice.
3.

Implicationsfor EnvironmentalJustice.

Many of the criticisms outlined in the preceding Parts are amplified when the risk-bearing communities are Native Americans,
other communities of color, and low-income communities. 9 Some
of these effected communities have raised this point.9 2 Some commentators have joined in emphasizing the particular problems
QRA poses for these communities. 3
Some proponents of QRA had contended that once risk assessment identified and quantified the increased risks borne by people
of color and people with lower incomes, greater public health and
environmental agency attention and resources would be directed
88. See DALE JAMIESON, ETHics 477 (1996).
89. See Belzer, supra note 63, at 46 (noting that risk assessors "account for what they
cannot estimate by intentionally exaggerating what they can"); Albert L. Nichols & Richard
J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, 8
REG. TOXicOLOGY & PMsAUACOLO;Y 61 (1988); Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi,
Risk Within Reason, 248 SCIENCE 559, 562 (1990).
90. See, e.g., John C. Bailar, III et al., One-Hit Models of Carcinogenesis: Conservative or
Not?, 8 RISK ANALSIS 485, 497 (1988) (arguing that although the one-hit model of carcinogenesis that is currently in use is considered to be the most conservative model, it "may
substantially understate true risks at low exposures"); Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment
Really Too Conservative? Revising the Revisionists, 14 COLUM. J. ENVL. L. 427, 439-43 (1989)
(noting that although extrapolation from animal data is often alleged to overestimate risk,
there is reason to believe that the use of animal data may actually underestimate the magnitude of many risks to humans); Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment: The Perspective and
Experience of U.S. Environmentalists, 101 ENVrL. HEALTH PERSP. 100, 101 (1993).
91. For cautionary notes on the similarities and dissimilarities of the cases of Indian
tribes and "other 'communities of color,'" or "minority communities in the United States,"
see Suagee, supra note 26, at 465, 471. A few commentators, notably Robert Kuehn and
Kristin Shrader-Frechette, have joined in emphasizing the particular problems QRA poses
for these communities. See Brian D. Israel, Student Risk Assessment Article, An EnvironmentalJustice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 469 (1995).
92. See, e.g., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 2-3, 10-11.
93. Robert Kuehn and Kristin Shrader-Frechette have been prominent voices to this
end. See Kuehn, supra note 26; Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental
Racism and Biased Methods of Risk Assessment, 7 RisK: HEALTt, SAFEW & ENV'T 55 (1996). See
also Israel, supra note 91.
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94
toward these problems, thereby reducing risks for these groups.
QRA has not been able to deliver the objectivity that a few commentators believed would usefully reveal the disproportionate risks
borne by communities of color and low-income communities. But,
as noted above, QRA is not the objective tool proponents claim it
to be.95 While the lack of objectivity is a disappointment for those
who had looked to QRA to improve decision making, the disappointment is more than a matter of academic concern for those
who must bear the risks, as the promised redirection of resources
and reduction of risks has not occurred.
In fact, health and environmental agencies' current use of QRA
may obscure and even exacerbate the distributional inequities in
public risk, rather than revealing them. 6 Serious limitations in
both the method and use of QRA that result in risk characterizations that considerably underestimate the scope and magnitude of
the risks encountered by people of color and low-income communities. 97 For example, while quantitative risk assessment's failure to
account for the synergistic effects of multiple exposures is a shortcoming of the method generally, this shortcoming disproportionately impacts some Native Americans, people of color and people
in low-income communities, given their exposure via multiple
routes to a wider mix of chemicals-either the urban toxic soup or
the rural pesticide slurry.98 Because agency risk assessors' experiences do not reflect those of the exposed communities, it may be
difficult for them to imagine the lives of those affected. 9 Also, to
the extent that agency risk assessors' shared education, training,
and predispositions affect their observations of the world, they may

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Kuehn, supra note 26, at 140.
See supra notes 76-91, and accompanying text.
See Kuehn, supra note 26, at 140.
See id at 116-29.
Se4 eg., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 7-10; SiPnA B.%.xm & SAt Dom.s,

HoLDrNG OUR BREATH: ENVIRONMENTAL INUSTItCE EXPOSED INSOrU'HFAST Los A.NGE.FS AN
ASSESSMENTr OF CUMULATVE HEALTH RISK AND Lo-u. AIR Poucv 25 (1998). Given the cur-

rent lack of data regarding synergism and antagonism, it is difficult to say how great this
burden is; even conservative estimates, however, suggest reason for concern. Sre, e.g.,
Kuehn, supranote 26, at 119-21.
99. See, eg., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 10 ("When considering routes of
exposure, EPA must also expand its risk zssessment methodologies to include cultural
practices and lifestyles. Tribes and other relevant populations should be consulted regarding these potential exposure routes which may not even exist among the general
population.").
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not be aware of the need to reevaluate accepted practice. 100
Moreover, given the highly technocratic, resource-intensive nature of QRA as practiced, affected individuals and communities are
often the least well equipped to participate meaningfully in public
debate about inputs to the quantitative risk assessment and to challenge the numerous assumptions and judgments that are made by
agencies in the process.'' Risk producers, by contrast, are typically
well-versed in the language of QRA and typically bring this facility
to bear on agency decisionmakers. Given the considerable room
for judgments in the process and the profound effects of such
judgments on the outcome, the disparity in influence between risk
bearers and risk producers is likely to translate into less protective
rather than more protective outcomes. 10 2 Because of the exclusionary nature of the decision-making process, 10 3 the very risk-bearers whose voices are most marginalized are likely to receive the
0 4
least protection.1

Finally, as noted above, QRA rests on a set of premises, including basic ideas about how humans should live, and what is and is
not sacred. Tribes, environmental justice advocates, and indigenous rights advocates have bridled at this view of the world, and
consequently have questioned these methods.10 5 Moreover, the
potential of QRA to transform experience as it claims merely to
100. Agency risk assessors are typically "expert" practitioners of QRA and, as Clayton
Gillette and James Krier explain,
proceed within the framework of their education and training... which are replete ... with given abstractions, principles, and commitments. Experts learn
within a setting of shared conceptions that they come themselves to share, and
this necessarily shapes, in an extraordinarily durable way, their views of the world.
The 'facts' experts observe are regularly 'inseparable' from the 'values' they hold,
'particularly when the facts in question refer to predictions of likely consequences
in a highly uncertain environment.'
Clayton P. Gilette and James F. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. Rev. 1027,
1098 (1990) (quoting Lawrence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PIL. & Pun.
AFF. 66, 99 (1972)).
101. See Tal, supra note 77, at 475 ("With few exceptions, grassroots organizers lack
the resources to conduct independent [risk] analyses. [Even at] the national level, environmental groups do not believe that they can consistently wield the toxicological and
statistical expertise necessary to compete successfully in the deliberations about how risk
assessment is done.").
102. Kuehn, supra note 26, at 129-39.
103. See, e.g., Eileen Guana, The EnvironmentalJustice Misfit. Public Participationand the
ParadigmParadox, 17 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 3 (1998).
104. See, e.g., Kuehn, supra note 26, at 129-33; BANSAL & DAvis, supra note 98, at 21.
105. See, e.g., BANsA. & DAviS, supra note 98, at 27 ("Amidst all the controversy [about

risk assessment], however, let us not lose sight of the fact that our long-term goal is not
'managed' risk, but zero risk, with source reduction as the key focus.").

20001

VA IABLEJUSTICE

measure it is especially problematic in a multicultural society. In
the case of Native Americans, this imposition echoes other assimilative acts and policies of cultural discrimination." 6
The criticisms outlined above have prompted some commenta0 7 Some commentators to oppose recourse to QRA althogether.1
tors oppose even discussing how to improve QRA in practice,
because the method and its premises are fundamentally flawed or
morally wrong. 08 Given QRA's importance in decision making,
however, the most immediate task for environmental justice advocates may be to understand how risk assessment works to effect injustice in order to recommend changes in the uway that agencies
use risk assessment.
In this vein, I will turn in Part II to a discussion of agencies' use
of QRA to set human health-based standards to address human exposure to toxic contaminants via the fish ingestion pathway. An
important but underexplored criticism of QRA is that it does not
now adequately account for interindividual variability in exposure.'0 9 Because fish consumption practices vary and because
some Native Americans are among the most highly exposed, 1 0o this
failure visits especially harsh consequences on those peoples. In
the next Part, I elaborate and distinguish between "uncertainty"
and "variability," two concepts important to understanding agencies' underestimation of risk to Native Americans of the Pacific
Northwest.
106. S. James Anaya, Ethnic Group Rig,
in ETm'crni
c
A.DO GROtP RIGIrIS NOMOS
XXXIX at 228-29 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); Williams, supra note 25, at 28489.
107. See CRITEC Comments, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "CRITFC maintains that
risk assessments have no useful purpose for making regulatory decisions for persistent,
bioaccumulative toxics, known carcinogens, 'probable human carcinogens,' and substances known to cause reproductive, developmental or neurological effects: te science is
always debatable and risk assessment involves inherent uncertainties."); Headlines:Dioxin
and Precaution,RAcHE's EN'v'T & HF. .LTH Wu.v. # 653 (electronic ed. Jun. 3, 1999) (argu-

ing that risk assessment is morally problematic and ought to be rejected in favor of the
"precautionary principle.").
108. See, eg., Lois Gibbs, Risk Assesmentsfrom a Communi4, Persperthe,14 F-,IL. 1.t.
327 (1994).
109. See Israel, supra note 91, at 494-503; see also Adam M. Finkel, A Sond Opinion on
an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risk , Prescriptionsof Breahing the l'idous Circle, 3 N.Y.U.

PACr AssEssmrNT REv.

ENVTh- L J. 295, 345-48 (1994). But cf. Bansal & Davis, supra note 98, at 25-55.

110. See infra Part III. For the remainder of this Article, a statement to the effect that
"Native American or other subpopulations occupy the high end of the exposure distribution for fish consumption" refers to a hypothetical frequency distribution for exposure,
such as might be constructed by piecing together qualitative and quantitative evidence of
fish consumption from an array of independent samples.
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Each nontrivial parameter considered in the risk assessment
equation may be characterized by uncertainty; some parameters
may also be variable. If risk assessors in health and environmental
agencies select a single value for a parameter that is characterized
by uncertainty or by variability, their resulting assessment of risk
will be inaccurate in some measure. The nature of the error, however, is quite different in cases of uncertainty and cases of variability. Considerations bearing on regulatory responses to uncertainty
thus differ from those bearing on responses to variability."1 1 In order to evaluate appropriate regulatory responses, it is critical to understand exactly what uncertainty is, and what variability is.
1.

Uncertainty.

Uncertainty, in general terms, is the lack of precise, complete
knowledge of the true answer to a question. Here, the question is
1 12
the value for some parameter in the risk assessment equation.
For each non-trivial parameter in the risk assessment equation,
there may be large gaps in the knowledge necessary to determine
the correct or true value for that parameter. An agency risk assessor's choice for the cancer potency factor, for example, is riddled with uncertainty stemming from, among other things, an
incomplete understanding of carcinogenesis.1 3 Although scientists concede that uncertainty exists in any quest for "truth," and
even science's more certain understandings are constantly subject
to revision, the National Research Council ("NRC") of the National
Academy of Sciences has called the gaps in the data necessary for
quantitative health risk assessment "uniquely large."' 1 4 According
to the 1983 NRC report "Risk Assessment in the Federal Government," "[t]he dominant analytic difficulty [in decision making
based on risk assessments] is pervasive uncertainty.., in estimates
of the types, probability, and magnitude of health effects associated
with a chemical agent" as well as in estimates of other parameters
in the risk assessment equation. 1 5
111. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
112. See, e.g., SCIENCE &JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 160-87.
113. See A. Fan et al., Risk Assessment of Environmental Chemicals, 35 ANN. REV.
PHAM COL. ToxicoL. 341, 355-60 (1995).
114. See, e.g., SCIENCE &JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 161.

115. Id. at 160.
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Variability.

Variability refers to the fact that there is no single, correct answer to a question-again, in this case, the value for some parameter in the risk assessment equation. Rather, a range of values
comprises the true answer. Importantly, these different values each
describe an actual, known answer to the question. The true value
for a parameter that is variable may thus be represented by a distribution (as opposed to a single point). The term "variability" is
used to refer both to the differences in and resulting dispersion of
actual values of some quantity being measured. 1' 6 To illustrate, the
exact distance between the earth and the moon is variable, because
the moon's orbit is elliptical not circular." 7 Because of variability
the question "What is the distance between the moon and the
earth?" cannot be answered both simply, i.e., with a single value,
and correctly. The quest for a "true" answer to this question permits only two satisfactory responses: gather more data or rephrase
the question. For example, either enough data must be obtained
to give an answer of the form 'The distance ranges between
221,460 and 252,710 miles' or 'The moon's orbit is approximately
elliptical, with a minor axis of 442,920 miles, a major axis rf
505,420 miles, and an eccentricity of 0.482,'118 or the question
must be reduced to one with a single right answer (e.g., 'How far
away is the moon from the earth at its perigee?')." 9
Interindividual variability refers to differences between individuals.120 Two sorts of interindividual variability are relevant to predicting risk to humans from environmental hazards: variability in
susceptibility, that is, differences among individuals in the biologi2
cally effective dose per unit exposure to a hazardous substance;' '
and variability in exposure, that is, differences among individuals'
contact with a hazardous substance at some nonzero concentration. 2 2 While some commentators have pointed out that QRA may
116. See, eg., id. at 188-223.
117. I borrow this illustration from id. at 189-91.
118. Note that this second formulation gives a better picture of the correct answer to
the question to the extent that it gives more information about dhe actual values that comprise the range or distribution. This observation becomes important in cases of variability
where the distribution is non-standard.
119. ScIEcE &JuDGMENT, supra note 44, at 191.
120. I will use the terms "interindividual variability" and v"ariability" interchangeably
for the remainder of this article to refer to interindividual variability.
121. See SCiENCE &JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 200-03.
122. See id at 196-200.
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not account adequately for variability in susceptibility in ways that
lead to environmental injustice, 123 this Article focuses on how QRA
accounts for variability in exposure. Variability is a notable feature
of several parameters in the exposure portion of the risk assessment equation. Examples include differences in exposure per unit
of ambient concentration of hazardous air contaminants (resulting
from factors determining an individual's likely location, e.g., living
downwind of an industrial source versus living upwind of such a
source) and differences in exposure to hazardous water contaminants that bioaccumulate in fish (resulting from factors determining an individual's likely fish consumption patterns).124
In this Part, I have highlighted a few criticisms of agencies' current tool of choice for setting health-based environmental standards. QRA proceeds according to a particular rationality-one
that may not be shared by risk bearers-and QRA's malleability
renders it susceptible to judgments that do not reflect the experience of risk-bearing subpopulations. These criticisms are particularly relevant where the risk-bearers are Native Americans because
they illuminate the large opportunities that exist for discrimination
against, indifference toward, or misunderstanding of Native fish
consumption practices.
III. FISH CONSUMPTION
Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest have different fish
consumption practices and consume fish at much higher rates
than the "average American" assumed by health and environmental agencies. Indeed, many individuals of these Pacific Northwest
peoples consume fish at rates ten times that of the EPA's "average
American" and some individuals consume fish at rates more than
one hundred times that of EPA's assumed rate. 125 This significant
difference in consumption rates is perhaps unsurprising, given the
significant difference between the cultural importance of fish, fishing and fish consumption for these Native peoples and for most
Anglo-European Americans.
Although there is abundant evidence of Native Americans' relatively higher fish consumption, agency risk assessors discount
much of this evidence as "anecdotal." Because quantitative risk assessment demands quantified inputs, agency risk assessors have re123. See Kuehn, supra note 26, at 121-26.
124. See SCIENCE &JUDGMENT, supra note 44, at 196-97.

125. See infra Table 1.
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fused to count this anecdotal data. Rather, citing a lack of real
"data," they have persisted in employing standard assumptions
based on the consumption practices of the "average American." In
an effort to have their higher consumption-and thus their increased exposure-taken into account, some tribes have recently
undertaken studies to quantify what they already know about their
fish consumption patterns. The existence of this quantitative data
poses issues that agency risk assessors can no longer ignore.
This Part begins in Part IllA by relating historical and contemporary accounts of the importance of fish and salmon to the Pacific
Northwest peoples. Part III.B sets forth the portion of a typical risk
assessment equation that accounts for exposure, in order to show
how estimates of risk are affected by changes to the fish consumption rate. This Part further explains three relevant elements in the
equation: the bioconcentration or bioaccumulation factor; the fish
consumption rate; and, the diet fraction. Part HI.C recounts agencies' and courts' reluctance to hear or accept data of fish consumption practices in non-quantified form. Part HlI.D camasses fish
consumption studies relevant to Puget Sound and the Columbia
River Basin.
A.

The Importance of Fish, Fishing, and Fish Consumption to Pacific
Northwest Native Peoples

Fish, fishing, and fish consumption define the first peoples of
the Pacific Northwest. Del White, Nez Perce, explains, "People
need to understand that the salmon is part of who the Nez Perce
people are. It is just like a hand that is part of your body....".,6
The importance of fish, especially salmon, to the first peoples of
the Pacific Northwest is reflected in myth,12 7 in language, 1'2 in treaties negotiated with the invading peoples,' in past and present
126. DAN LS,,DEEN &ALLE PnmsHu, SA-LMON. ,NO His PEOPLE: Ftsii & FIShING i NEZ
156 (1999).
JA.MEs SEL-t & FxstLwy; Nca'i-1Vx.'% "TiE BiG
127. See, ag., EuGENEE S. HLN wrHiT
RivEn": MID-COLU. MBL INDIANS AND THEIR LND, 154-55 (1990) (relating how Coyote
PERCE CULTURE

brought salmon to the river people); MartinJ. Sampson, as told to Rosalie M. Whitney, The
Maiden of Deception Pass, THE Siwousa Toma POLE: Tmau. LEGEDs (pamphlet on file
with the author).
128. See, eg., HuNN ET AL., supra note 127, at 58-88, 151-52 and Table 14
129. Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen offer one account
During [1854 & 1855], Governor Stevens wTested from the Indians most of
the land of the present-day states of Montana and Idaho, as well LSthat of eastern

Washington. In all the treaties Stevens drove an extremely tough bargain, but the
Indians would not relent on one point the continued right to fish. After signing
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fisheries management practices, 130 in contemporary restoration efforts,13 ' and in the ongoing legal and political struggle for the survival of the salmon and the way of life that is bound up with fish
3 2

and the salmon.1

The traditional and contemporary observance of the First
Salmon Ceremony is one mark of the cultural importance of the
salmon to the various peoples of the Pacific Northwest. The particular practices that celebrate the arrival each year of the anadromous salmon differ from tribe to tribe. These practices have also
changed over time. Although it is perhaps not possible for nonthe Medicine Greek Treaty on December 26, 1854, Stevens said: 'It was also
thought necessary to allow them to fish at all accustomed places, since this would
not in any manner interfere with the rights of citizens and was necessary for the
Indians to obtain a subsistence .... '
The treaty, signed on a small island surrounded by salt marshes not far from
the present-day state capital, Olympia, guaranteed the Indians the right to fish at
their usual and accustomed places 'in common with' citizens of the territory. By
signing the treaty, the Indians ceded to the United States 2,240,000 acres of land,
an immense sacrifice for the right to fish.
DONALD A. GRINDE & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, ECOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICA: ENVIRONMENTAL

DESTRUCTION OF INDIAN LANDS AND PEOPLES 147 (1995); See Videotape: Empty Promises,
Empty Nets (Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 1994) [hereinafter Empty
Promises, Empty Nets].
130. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Moses, No. MUC-CrF-7/88-145
(Muckleshoot Tr. Ct. App., Apr. 19, 1989), 16 INDIAN L. REP. 6073 (discussing regulation of
the fishery and management of the resource under the Fishing Ordinance for the
Muckleshoot Tribe); HUNN ET AL., supra note 127, at 153-54; See also, Videotape: A Matter
of Trust (Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 1995) (Videotaped statements of
Delbert Frank, Sr., Warm Springs Fish and Wildlife Commission, and Allen Slickpoo, Sr.,
Ethnographer, Nez Perce Cultural Resources) [hereinafter A Matter of Trust].
131. See, e.g., COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMMISSION, WY-KAN-USfI-MI WVAKMsH-Wrr (SPIRIT OF THE SALMON): THE COLUMBIA RIVER ANADROMOUS FIsH RESTORATION
PLAN OF THE NEZ PERCE, UMATILLA, WARM SPRINGS, AND YAKAmA TRIBES (1995).

132. Billy Frank, Jr., a Nisqually, recalled his experiences growing up during the fishing wars:
'I went to jail when I was fourteen years old. That was the first time I ever went to
jail for treaty rights. The State of Washington said I couldn't fish on the Nisqually
River. So, at fourteen, I went tojail. Ninety times I went back tojail. The State of
Washington said 'you can't go on that river and go fishing anymore.' That's what
they told us Indians. 'If you go on that river, you're going tojail.' We went back
fishing and we went to jail over and over until 1974.'
The fish-ins continued until February 12, 1974, when U.S. District Court Judge
George Boldt ruled that Indians were entitled to an opportunity to catch as many
as half the fish returning to off-reservation sites which had been the 'usual and
accustomed places' when the treaties were signed.
GRINDE &JOHANSEN, supra note 129, at 150-52. See generally Institute for Natural Progress,
In Usual and Accustomed Places: Contemporay American Indian FishingRights Struggles, in THE
STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 217 (M. Annette

Jaimes ed., 1992); CHARLES F. WILIuNSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FtruRE OF THE WEST, at ch. 5 (1992); Empty Promises, Empty Nets, supra note 129.
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members to appreciate fully the significance of these practices, 3 3 a
small sampling of accounts may nonetheless permit some sense of
the cultural importance of salmon. William W. Elmendorf recorded this narrative in 1940 by Henry Allen, a Skokomish, of a
First Salmon Ceremony:
The Twana used to have a ceremony when the first salmon came.
There is a deformed-nose fish, a crooked-nose fish, a salmon ith
deformed jaws. He is the chief of fish. The crooked-nose fish
bring the salmon with them when the), run. That crooked-nose
fish is called yabu's. Duckabush (dexwyabu's) on the canal is supposed to be the best place for these.
When they caught this deformed-nose fish they had a ceremony.
They split him down the back and took out the backbone. Then
they spread the rest of the fish out and cooked him, all of him,
bones and tail and all. He was cooked by the family that caught
him. The backbone they cooked separately.
This first salmon was just for the children, the boys and girls of
the village. They laid him down and ate him on the beach where
he was cooked. When he was all eaten each child took one of the
cooking spits crossways in his teeth, and dashed into the water
and splashed around, and then threw the spit in the direction the
chief of the salmon had come from. They thanked him and invited him to come again. There was no song with this.
They laid the backbone on a log or a rock on the beach, pointing
to where he had come from. Then his soul would go back to the
home of the salmon. They just did this with the first crookedjawed salmon of any kind that came. It could be done with the
first yabu's of each kind of salmon. They ate even the skin and
the head, ate him all up. Every child in the village had to eat
some of the fish. This was to bring the run the next year.13 4
An account of a contemporary Quileute First Salmon Ceremony in 1998 is offered by Debbie Preston:
The Quileute children were the focus of the First Salmon Ceremony in LaPush this year. The strength of the Quileute cultural
programs was displayed for the elders as dozens of children sang
ancient songs and danced prior to participating in the First
Salmon Ceremony April 29. The day began Elders Week, which
133. See generallyMartin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the "FrteExerciseof Reliion,
in NATrVE A. pmcAN CULTURAL AND Rucious FREEDO.MS 19 (John L Wunder ed., 1996).
134. Wnimwi W. ELw_NDoRF, TWANA NARRATrs: NATmE HIs'roRcA AccouN'rs oF A

SA.usH CULTRE 254 (1993) (citations omitted). Elmendorf notes: in this book,
the term Twana refers to a speech community of Coast Salish Indians in tie Hood Canal
region of western Washington, between Puget Sound and the Olympic Peninsula ....
Before about 1860, the Twana were divided into nine illage communities, of which te
Skokomish was the largest." Id. at x.xix. Other Tuana communities included tie Babop,
Quilcene, Dosewallips, Buckabush, Hoodsport, Vance Creek, Tabuya, and Duhelap.
CoAST

40

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:3

celebrates and honors the elders each year. The First Salmon
Ceremony honors the First Salmon, a salmon scout for the
Salmon People. Tribal legend taught that if he is well received
and treated, he will return to his salmon people and bring them
back to tribal waters in abundance. Lillian Pullen, 87, passed her
knowledge of the ceremony on to relatives Sharon Pullen and
Rosalie Guerrero so they could conduct it this year. Pullen, a
cultural cornerstone of the tribe, assisted children with cedar
weaving and regaled them with stories and they came up to hug
her. Lillian Pullen watched with pride as her kin walked in front
of a parade of children with the salmon to the water's edge after
saying a prayer. The salmon was given to children in a canoe
piloted by Quileute tribal member Tom Jackson. After paddling
out from the dock, the salmon was returned to the river by floating the platform
of salmon on the water, then tipping it to return
135
it to its home.
The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission has offered
this description of a recent first salmon ceremony:
The Washat service, the longhouse, and the seven drums are all
part of the traditional religion of the Columbia River tribes.
Before tribal celebrations, commemorative or memorial services,
Washat prayers are offered. Water is the most essential part of all
longhouse rituals and has a deep symbolic significance for tribal
people.
One of the most important service is the First Food Feast. This
ceremony must occur before hunting, fishing, root digging, or
gathering can take place. The following is a description of a First
Food Feast held to celebrate the return of the salmon on May 1,
1994 at Willamette Falls, Oregon.
Standing shoulder-to-shoulder in two circles-women on the
south and men on the north-tribal and non-tribal participants
gathered inside the longhouse-style tent to witness the religious
service.
Drummers, in line at the front of the longhouse, began a series of
prayer-songs. To their right, Tony Washines, Yakama longhouse
leader, held a brass bell, ringing it and using it to count the song
sequences. During the service, Washat members sang, while
some danced, moving with small dignified steps. Some of the
songs thanked the salmon for giving its life to feed the people
while others reminded the Indian people of the traditional laws
that must be observed.
"When the Creator created our Mother Earth, He gave it life,"
explained Washines. "When the dawn comes on this sacred day,
the light of our Father is here. This life is a sacred inherent right
135. Debbie Preston, Frst Salmon Ceremony Binds Children, Elders (visited Sept. 21,
1998) <http://iv.nwifc.wa.gov/newsletter/salmonceremony.htm>
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of our people. These songs speak of this life from the time that
life began. We've always been alongside the animals, the trees,
the grass, and all the roots that make the medicines and foods."
He said that tribal people hold all these in great reverence, "because they too have a purpose-to nourish and strengthen our
hearts, our minds and our bodies."
While the songs were still being sung, food servers, both young
women and men, gradually brought you the food and set it in
front of all those assembled inside and outside the longhouse.
Before the meal was eaten, Washines rang the bell as a signal for
everyone to stand and join in prayer-song. The bell rang again,
and participants picked up their cups of water and drank. After
the traditional meal of salmon, deer or elk, roots, and berries,
everyone again took a drink of water.'3 6
Antone Minthom, a Umatilla, explains:
The importance of the first salmon ceremony has to do with the
celebration of life, of the salmon as subsistence, meaning that the
Indians depend upon the salmon for their living. And the annual celebration is just that- it's an appreciation that the salmon
are coming back. It is again the natural law; the cycle of life. It's
the way things are and if there was no water, there would be no
salmon, there would be no3 7cycle, no food. And the Indian people respect it accordingly.1
Whether and in what condition the fish and the peoples survive, however, is now significantly affected by the actions of health
and environmental agencies at the state and federal levels. The
manner in which these agencies respond to evidence of contamination of the water in which salmon and other fish swim implicates
the survival of both the fish and the cultures of these First
Americans.
B. Exposure Assessment for the Fish Ingestion Pathway
Risk is a product of toxicity and exposure. For carcinogens, the
"toxicity" portion of this equation is captured by a cancer potency
factor ("CPF"), a value specific to each environmental contaminant. The "exposure" portion is comprised by several components.
In order to determine human exposure via fish ingestion, risk as136. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, A Salmon Cemrnony (visited Sept.
14, 1998) <http://wv.critfcorg/text/CERMON.HTM.>; See also HUNN T ,TL,Wrt J,,%IEs
SELkM AND FAMILY, supranote 127, at 153 ( "[a] strong swimmer ias chosen to swim out

above the falls with the remains of the fish first caught, where he dove deep to deposit it in
mid-river as an invitation to its fellows to come upriver also.").
137. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, The Importance of Salmon to the
Tribes (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://wv.critfc.org.text/CEILMON.HTM>.
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sessors use some version of the following equation. 38
Exposuremg

=
contaminating/kg bodyweight/day]

(Gonc) (BFC) (FOR) (DF) (ExpDur)
(ABW) (AveTime) (UCFI)

(UGF2)

Where:
= Concentration of contaminant in water (Fg/l of water)
= Bioconcentration Factor: ratio of contaminant concentration in fish
tissue to concentration in water
FCR
= Fish Consumption Rate (g/day)
DF
= Diet Fraction: fraction of FCR obtained in regulated waters
Exp Dur = Exposure Duration (30 years)
ABW
= Adult Human Bodyweight (70 kg)
Ave Time = Average Time (75 years) [carcinogens only)
UCF]
= Unit Conversion Factor: 1000 Fg/mg
UCF2
= Unit Conversion Factor: 1000 g/l
Conc
BCF

Some of the components of the exposure portion of the risk
equation warrant further explanation because of their impact on
estimations of exposure to contaminants through the fish ingestion
pathway.
1.

BioconcentrationFactor.

The bioconcentration factor ("BCF") is a ratio of the concentration of an environmental contaminant in fish tissue to the concentration of the contaminant in the ambient water in which the fish
lives. Fish bioaccumulate many environmental contaminants, primarily in their fatty tissues. Accumulation in fatty tissue occurs because many contaminants are lipophilic, that is, they have a greater
affinity for lipids than for water. The BCF is a chemical-specific
value. For example, EPA employed a BCF of 5000 for 2,3,7,8,
TCDD (dioxin) in setting and approving the water quality standards at issue in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke and Natural
Resource Defense Council v. EPA. 1' 9
138. This example is the exposure portion of the equation for determining surface
water cleanup levels for carcinogens in the regulation implementing Washington's Model
Toxics Control Act ("MTCA"). WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-730(3) (a) (iii) (B) (1999).
139. The Fourth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of Maryland and Virginia's reliance on this EPA value for the BCF for dioxin, despite EPA's admission that "scientific
literature and research has changed significantly since preparation of the 1984 dioxin criteria document [in which EPA selected its 5000 figure]": there was evidence in the record
of more recent studies that place the BCF anywhere from 26,000 to 150,000; and a Virginia
state-specific study that arrived at a BCF of 22,000. Natural Resource Defense Council v.
EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1403 (4th Cir. 1993).
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2. Fish Consunption Rate.
The fish consumption rate ("FCR") represents the amount of
0
fish humans eat per unit time, often expressed in grams per day.14
It is typically based on fish consumption studies, which are conducted by one of two methods: "creel" and "diet recall." 14 ' A creel
study requires a shoreside researcher to weigh the fish and sometimes to identify species that a subject fisher has caught on a given
day (hence the method's name for the basket in which some fishers keep the fish they have caught) and interview the subject regarding the percentage of the catch they keep and eat, the number
of other individuals with whom they share their catch, and the frequency with which they fish at the site.14 2 The creel method is a
direct measure of the fish caught from the particular waters at
which the researcher conducted the study, although it is an indirect measure of consumption. 43 A diet recall study, on tie other
hand, requires a subject to recall the quantity and sometimes species of fish consumed during some period, ' 4 and may also ask the
subject to identify the source of the fish. Researchers typically aid
subjects' estimation of quantity or portion size, e.g., by using plastic
or foam models during personal interviews or by directing subjects
to packaging information in the case of studies requiring diaries.
The diet recall method is an indirect measure of fish consumption
source; 4 - however, it is a direct measure of fish
from any particular
46
consumed.'

EPA currently assumes a fish consumption rate of 6.5 grams/
day.' 47 This amounts to approximately one fish meal per month.
140. This expression requires that human body weight be standardized, and tpically
assumes a body weight of 70 kg. Alternatively, fish consumption may be expressed in
grams/kg body weight/unit time, thereby accounting for variation in human body weight.
tsu.*ION
141. See generally OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENiv-L PROTEcnON AcG'F-c. CO.
SURVEYS FOR FISH AND SHELLFISH: A REVmEW AND ANALYStS OF SRTV'. NMETiODS (1992) [hereinafter EPA, CoN'smum~rON SURvEvs FOR FISH]. Although the EPA enumerates five approaches to fish consumption studies, the first four ("Recall-Telephone Suney'," "RecallMail Survey," "Recall-Personal Interview," and "Diary") might all be classified as "Diet Recall" methods, in that even keeping a diary of food consumed likely requires after-the-fact
recollection. The fifth method enumerated by the EPA is the "Creel Census." Id. at 7-22.
142. See id. at 18-22.
143. See id. at 7, 18.
144. See id. at 8-18.

145. Subjects may, however, be asked to estimate the percentage of the fish they consume that comes from each of various sources. Id.

146. See id. at 7.
147. See supranote 38. Washington's Model Toxic Control Act currently assumes a
fish consumption rate of 54 g/day. However, this number is halved by application of a 0.5
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The 6.5 grams/day value is derived from a diet recall study conducted in the mid-1970s of the general population of the United
States, fish consumers and non-consumers alike. 4 Researchers
from National Purchase Diary, Inc. used standardized questionnaires to conduct a market survey of 25,165 individuals about their
consumption of marine, estuarine and freshwater fish. 14 9 The resulting data set was interpreted byJavitz, et al. in 1980, who arrived
at an arithmetic mean consumption rate of 14.3 grams/day for fish
consumers in the general population.' 5 The EPA then corrected
this number (1) to reinclude members of the general population
who did not consume fish at all, and (2) to exclude marine species,
arriving ultimately at a value of 6.5 grams/day.' 5 ' This standard
assumption is used by EPA when it sets health-based environmental
standards. It is also employed by EPA in criteria documents and in
other agency pronouncements designed to provide guidance to
state health and environmental agencies. Finally, it informs EPA
approval of state environmental standards.

"diet fraction" a concept explained infra Part II.B.3. The result is that the MTCA effectively assumes a fish consumption rate of 23 g/day. See WASH. ADNUIN. ConE § 173-340730(3) (a) (iii) (B) (1999).
148. HAROLDJAViTZ, SRI INTERNATIONAL, SEAFOOD CONSUMPIrON DATA ANALYSIS 18-34
(1980).
149. Id. at 18-20.
150. Id. at 29.
151. Missing and deleted data required considerable efforts to review the original
data set on the part of the contractor that analyzed the data, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, and the EPA. EPA ended up relying on the experience of a NMFS employee to
reconstruct the missing data identifying the species consumed and classifying the species as
marine, estuarine, or freshwater. An internal EPA memorandum recounts:
[A] rather large amount of the consumed fish and shellfish was listed as 'unclassified' or 'species not reported' in the NPD survey. Ms. Betty M. Hackley of the
National Marine Fisheries Service has worked with the survey data for years and
she feels that most of the unclassified group consists of cod, pollock, and whiting
(silver hake). Since all of these species would be considered marine, this whole
group was considered marine.
Memorandum from Charles E. Stephan, Environmental Scientist, Environmental Research
Laboratory-Duluth, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to Dr. Jerry Stana, Director,
Environmental Criteria & Assessment Office, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1
(July 3, 1980) (emphasis added). Notably, nowhere in the memorandum and referenced
correspondence is any mention of an attempt by EPA to ascertain consumption rates of
only "maximum residue fish," although EPA subsequently claimed in litigation that its "6,5
grams per day value is not intended to represent total fish consumption but, rather, that
subset of fish containing the maximum residues of dioxin permissible under state law."
National Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1403 (4th Cir. 1993).

VARIABLE JUSTICE

2000]

3.

Diet Fraction.

The diet fraction is a regulatory concept used to interpret fish
consumption data. In theory, a diet fraction estimates the percentage of the FCR that comes from contaminated or regulated waters.' 5 2 For example, if the study that produced the FCR used the
diet recall method, results may include fish caught and consumed
from waters of regulatory concern and also from other waters. The
diet fraction distinguishes these two sources. If the diet fraction is
0.8, this represents the estimate that 80% of the fish consumed
came from waters of regulatory concern and 20% from
153
elsewhere.
C. Non-quantified Evidence of Fish Consumption
Abundant evidence exists that American Indian subpopulations
consume greater quantities of fish than the general population.
For example, in 1990 the Yakama Indian Nation and the Columbia
River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission attested before the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission to tribal members' heavy reliance
on fish and attempted to draw attention to the connection between
their fish consumption and the threat to their health posed by the
pollution of Columbia River Basin fish by dioxin released into the
waters from pulp and paper mills.' 54 Patrick C. West noted in the
EPA's ownjournal the "long and well documented fishing culture"
of the Great Lakes tribes of the Bay Mills, Grand Traverse and Sault
Ste. Marie bands of Chippewa, evidenced not least in the reservation of their right to fish by treaty in 1836. He also cited evidence
of high consumption rates for subsistence fishers from small skiffs,
152. See, e.g., WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF EcOLOcy REsPIONS.w'.Ess Stuwtama oN TiIE
A.MENDMENTTS TO THE MODEL Tov.cs CONTROL ACr CLEANvUP REGcLTIOx: CHmPTER 173-340
WAC at 218 (1991) ("The 'fish diet fraction' ... is the ratio of the weight of fish/shellfish
tissue consumed from a contaminated source to the total weight of fish/shellfish tissue
consumed.") [hereinafter MTCA REsPoNsn.NEss Sut.ARv].
153. Presumably, fish caught elsewhere are not of concern to die regulator for purposes of setting standards for the subject water, irrespective of whether "elsewhere" is also
contaminated and thus a source of exposure. The use of a diet fraction is sometimes coupled with an FCR derived from a study using the creel method. Given that a creel study
provides a direct measure of fish consumed from regulated waters, this coupling does not
make sense. Application of a diet fraction or its equivalent in this situation operates simply
to reduce the measure of fish consumed-the FCR Washington's MTCA arguably makes
this error, coupling a diet fraction of 0.5 with an FCR derived from die Pierce et al. study, a
creel study. See supra note 152, at 216-19.
154. Dioxin: Yadmas Take a Stand Against Pollution,COLUMBIA RIER lN TEa-rlaL Fisti
CoM.ISSION, Feb. 1990, at 2.
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for crew members in the commercial sector whose labor is often
compensated in extra fish, and for off-reservation Indians in Michigan.' 55 Leaders of the Mattaponi and Pamunkey tribes in Virginia
told EPA regulators that their members "ate more fish than the
'one meal per month"' assumed to be the "average" by the Virginia
DEQ when it set standards, approved by EPA, for dioxin contamination in state waters, including the waters traditionally fished by
the Mattaponi and Pamunkey.156 John Banks, Director of the Penobscot Nation Department of Natural Resources, recounted to
the local press the heavy reliance of members of the Penobscot
Nation on fish from the Penobscot River, stating that tribe members "traditionally eat two or three meals of fish a week."157 Notably, this data has been brought to the attention of health and
environmental agencies."'
Until quite recently, however, studies quantifying fish consumption of Native American subpopulations have been nonexistent.
The lack of quantitative, as opposed to "anecdotal" or qualitative,
evidence has meant that the higher fish consumption rates of these
subpopulations have gone unaccounted for. According to agency
risk assessors, the risk assessment equation calls for a quantified,
peer-reviewed expression of fish consumed. 5 9
Studies quantifying fish consumption of the general population, on the other hand, have existed since the 1970s. Sometimes
studies were undertaken to provide consumer data for fish-products marketing purposes, sometimes to provide human health data
for regulatory or other public purposes. These studies currently
form the basis for agency risk assessors' standard assumptions, even
though, as EPA concedes, "early studies of fish consumption provided only limited data. Although the number of fish meals was
155. West, supra note 21, at 15.
156. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 24, Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA,
16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2520).
157. Gagnon, supranote 10 (attributed toJohn Banks, Penobscot Nation Department
of Natural Resources).
158. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVI.
RONMENTAL RISK IN INDIAN CouNTRY 16 (1992).

159. Qualitative data on this point are difficult to incorporate into the risk assessment
equation, which requires quantified inputs. This, of course, is a problem with the use of
quantitative risk assessment in the first place. See, e.g., Kuehn, supra note 26, at 126-27.
Obviously, the variable in the risk assessment equation requires a numerical value, in
grams/day. To the extent that regulators have attempted to consider qualitative data
alongside quantitative approaches, the qualitative data tend to get dwarfed by the "hard"
numbers. This is likely an example of the operation of Gresham's law. See, eg., SIEADERFRECHE'rE, supra note 54, at 189-90 (1985).
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tallied, socioeconomic or demographic questions were usually limited and... there was no effort to identify subsistence and recreational anglers obtaining their catches from polluted waters." 60 As
discussed above, EPA used data from a marketing study of the general population to arrive at the 6.5 grams/day figure that has become the standard assumption for the fish consumption rate used
by federal and state regulators for inland and coastal areas alike.
Most regulators have been reluctant to adjust standard assumptions about the FCR on the basis of "mere" anecdotal evidence,
and courts have not required them to do so. Thus the Ninth Circuit in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke 3 ' noted that the only
available evidence of the Native Americans' higher fish consumption rates was anecdotal, which EPA was free to ignore in setting
the total maximum daily load ("TMDL") for dioxin in the uaters of
the Columbia River basin under the Clean Water Act.l 62 The court
therefore upheld EPA's recourse to its standard 6.5 grams/day fish
consumption rate. EPA had acknowledged in its risk analysis document that "about 15,000" Native Americans (along ith several
hundred thousand Asian Americans and low-income individuals)
"are much more likely to catch and consume fish that has been
contaminated with dioxin from the effluent discharged from the
[pulp and paper] mills than other populations in the area." The
EPA had also acknowledged that these subpopulations consume
160. EPA, CoNsuMPtIoN SURVEYS FOR FISH, supra note 141, at 2. More recently, re-

searchers have sought to quantify fish consumption for portions of the population more
likely to consume greater quantities of fish. The target population for these studies, however, has mainly been "recreational anglers." Yet some of these studies have been sensitive
to the fact that this group might include both those who fish for purely recreational reasons and those who fish for economic reasons. See, eg., M. L%_NDOLT, Elr ,u.., POTrm %TL
ToxicA-r ExPosuRE A.MONG CONsu.MERs OF REcREPTO,ALY QLGHT FISH FROM Umt-N Et.
BAYMN-rs OF PUGET SouND: FINAL REPORT 1, 5 (1987) (study targeting "recreational an-

glers" in Commencement and Elliott Bays of the Puget Sound, which included both
shoreside anglers and anglers who fished from boats). Increasingly, however, some of

these studies have included demographic data regarding the subjects, or have even
targeted "minority" communities. See genera/ly, eg., West, supra note 21. Note howcver,

that these studies typically draw their list of subject participants from among fishers licensed by the relevant state fish and wildlife commission, and that Native Americans living
on reservation or exercising treaty-secured fishing rights need not obtain fishing licenses
from any state. See, eg., 2 EPA, EXPOSURE FAc'roRs HANDnOO, Ftsti INGcEsno. F,\crors at
tbl. 2-44. Further, diet recall studies may draw their list of subject participants from local
telephone rolls, a practice which may function to exclude native peoples. Se, e.g., Shawn
L Gerstenberger et al., ConcentrationsofBlood and HairMerruvn and Srum PCBs in an Ojibwa

Population that Consumes Great Lakes Region Fish, 35 J. ToxIcoLoGr CuNic.u. ToxicoLoc"
377 (1997) (noting that only 75 of the 217 potential study participants had telephones).
161. 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
162. See Ud. at 1524.
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"an average of between 100 and 150 grams of fish flesh each day
over the course of the year." 6 ' Yet the EPA argued to the court
that "no definitive study has established the quantity and variety of
contaminated fish consumed by these subpopulations."' 64
On similar grounds, the Fourth Circuit, in NaturalResources Defense Councilv. EPA,'65 rejected a challenge to EPA approval of Virginia's and Maryland's decisions to set water quality standards for
dioxin assuming an average fish consumption rate of 6.5 grams/
day. The Virginia standards regulated, among other sources, a major pulp and paper mill located just a few miles from the Mattaponi
and Pamunkey Reservations. EPA approved the standards despite
the fact that leaders of the Mattaponi and of the Pamunkey tribes
had explained to the EPA that their members ate more fish than
the "one meal per month" that is the equivalent of the EPA's 6.5
grams/day figure. In its brief to the court, EPA chided the NRDC
for the NRDC's "misplaced" reliance on "oral statements."' 6
EPA's brief dismissively referred to the tribal leaders' knowledge:
"the beliefs of these individuals were not based on fish consumption studies; .

.

. EPA found only anecdotal information, and no

data."' 67 The Fourth Circuit agreed. The court upheld EPA's approval of the Virginia and Maryland standards, stating that these
state environmental agencies were free to ignore such "anecdotal
evidence," which it deemed "speculative at best."' 68
In the wake of Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter and Natural Resource

Defense Council v. EPA, it seems clear that the only knowledge that
agencies and courts will permit to count is that which is quantified,
written down, and in accordance with scientific convention. The
requirement that Native Americans translate their lived experience
and community knowledge into a form that is recognized as "science" is itself an imposition of the dominant community's values,
its judgments about ways of knowing. 169 Agencies' failure to accept
this lkowledge as valid, moreover, deprives agencies of much163. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellanti at 10, Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v.
Rasmussen, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nos. 93-35973 & 93-36000).
164. Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter, 57 F.3d at 1524.
165. 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993).
166. Brief for Appellees at 31, Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d
1395 (4thCir. 1993) (No. 92-2520).
167. Id. at 31 & n.27.
168. Natural Resource Defense Counci4 16 F.3d at 1403.
169. Lloyd Burton and David Ruppert describe a similar instance in which judge William Downes of the United States District Court in Wyoming required that Native knowledge be translated into the form that was acceptable by the dominant society's
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needed information-data that have an ages-old scientific
pedigree.
Given this reluctance on the part of agencies and courts, the
practical necessity of quantifying what Native Americans know to
be the case about their higher fish consumption relative to nonIndians is clear. Fish consumption studies, however, are both expensive and time consuming to conduct. In addition, a particular
expertise in data collection and analysis is required if the study is to
be received by the scientific and regulatory community' 7 0 -an expertise that may or may not be readily at hand, either possessed by
someone in the tribe or accessible to tribal governments or other
interested groups of Native Americans.
Since the Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke decision, some
tribes of the Puget Sound and the Columbia River Basin have
worked to buttress evidence of their relatively higher fish consumption rates with quantitative studies of the sort preferred by agencies
and the courts.17 1 These studies were undertaken in large part to
address EPA's claim that it was free to ignore available evidence of
Native Americans' fish consumption patterns because this evidence
conventions, in order to be accepted and considered in a dispute over the meaning and
use of a Lakota sacred site:
In the trial court proceedings, Lakota elders approached the court clerk to ask if

it might be possible for a few of the elders to speak about Devil's Tower and its
meaning to them-in the courtroom, but in the absence of the adversarial question and answer format that the federal rules of civil procedure normally require.
What they were asking for was a chance to speak about the Tower and its important cultural meanings for Indian peoples in w-ays that are appropriate to their
own context. The court, apparently concerned that it not be perceived as overly
accommodative of the ishes of tribal spiritual advisors (as plaintiffs were asserting the [National Park Service] had been), denied their request.
Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear's Lodge or Devil s Tower? hzter-CulturalRdations, Legal
Pluralism, and the Management of Sacred Sites on Public Land, 8 CosvEta.J.L & Pcu. Po.'y
(forthcoming, 1999).
170. This is one aspect of the problem Eileen Guana terms "expertise-ism." Gauna,
supra note 103, at 31-36.

171. The CRITFC survey %asundertaken in direct response to the agency standard at
issue in Dioxin/OrganoddorineCenter See CRTFC Comments, supra note 1, at 12. Fortunately, in this instance, there was an existing inter-governmental body charged by its four
member tribes with managing and protecting the fishery- CRITFC staff includes biologists,
attorneys and other professionals. However, a similarly constituted fish commission may
not exist for every tribe or group of tribes, and the experience of these four Columbia
River Basin tribes cannot be taken to be representative of other tribes. Also, it should be
noted that in this instance, there was EPA funding for the study. The study took some
time: CRITFC entered into a Cooperative Agreement ith EPA in 1990, conducted the
survey during the fall and winter of 1991-92, and published the Technical Report summarizing the study results in October, 1994. Id.
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was anecdotal, orally transmitted, or non-quantified, and therefore
speculative. These studies have been available now for several
years. EPA, however, has only recently moved to revisit its 1980
water quality criteria-the source of its 6.5 grams/day fish consumption rate. In the latter half of 1998, EPA issued Draft Revisions to the Methodology for Deriving Ambient Water Quality
Criteria for the Protection of Human Health ("Draft AWQC
Revisions") 172
Once finalized, the Draft AWQC Revisions will update EPA's
standard fish consumption rate, along with other aspects of its current water quality criteria. Although EPA mentions, in the Technical Support Document that accompanies the Draft AWQC
Revisions,' 73 the Columbia River and Puget Sound studies, EPA
does not appear to have given much credence to even this new,
quantified data. In fact, the Draft AWQC Revisions repeat troubling aspects of current practice and introduce problematic approaches, including for example, the treatment of "subsistence
fishers/minority anglers" as a single category for calculating default fish consumption rates.'7 4 And, with the exception of Washington, states in the Pacific Northwest have done no better. 175 In
the meantime, months and years pass in which environmental standards for water and sediments that support fish remain insufficiently protective of Native American subpopulations.
D.

QuantifiedEvidefice of Fish Consumption: Puget Sound and the
Columbia River Basin

Various studies of fish consumption rates in Puget Sound and
the Columbia River Basin reveal that identifiable subpopulations
such as recreational anglers and Native Americans are more highly
exposed than the general population. Of particular note, these
data indicate marked differences among Native American sub172. Draft Water Quality Criteria Methodology Revisions: Human Health, 63 Fed.
Reg. 43,755 (1998).
173. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AMBIENT WATER QUALrIY CRITERIA DERIVATION METHODOLOGY HUMAN HEALTH: TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FINAL DRAFr

(EPA-

822-B-9-005, 1998) [hereinafter EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT].
174. See discussion infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
175. The Washington State Department of Ecology, at least, is well along in the process of revisiting its standard assumptions regarding fish consumption in light of the studies produced by the Puget Sound and Columbia River Basin tribes. See generally LEsuE
KIELL & LON KISSINGER, WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, ANALYSIS AND SELECTION OF
FISH CONSUMPTION RATES FOR WASHINGTON STATE RISK ASSESSMENTS AND RIsK-BASED STAN-

DARDS (Draft 1999).
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populations and the general population. The studies support "anecdotal" evidence that fish consumption rates for members of
Native American subpopulations are significantly greater than comparable rates for the general population in Washington and in the
United States. These studies also show that the fish consumption
rates for Native American subpopulations in the Pacific Northwest
are greater even than for other identifiable higher-consuming subpopulations, such as recreational anglers. The relevant studies are
sunmarized in Table 1, and the text below, according to the target
population of each study. Note that the results are not directly
comparable because of design and other differences among the
studies. For example, studies may or may not have included anadromous fish or shellfish; or studies may have defined differently
marine, estuarine, and freshNvater species. Nonetheless, the numbers below afford a sense of the variability.
1. Native Americans.
Toy et al. study. According to a 1995 diet recall study conducted by and of the Tulalip and Squaxin Island tribes, the 50th
percentile or median fish consumption rate for tribal members is
between 35.6 and 42.6 grams per day; the arithmetic mean is between 60.6 and 82.9 per day; the 90th percentile is between 159.7
and 221.7 grams per day; the 95th percentile is between 205.1 and
280.5 grams per day; and the maximum FCR is 391.4 grams per
day.

1 76

Columbia River Inter-TribalFish Commission ("CRITFC") study.
According to a 1994 diet recall study conducted by and of the Nez
Perce, Umatilla, Yakama, and Warm Springs tribes fishing along
the Columbia River, the 50th percentile or median fish consumption rate for tribal members is between 29 and 32 grams per day;
the arithmetic mean is 58.7 grams per day; the 90th percentile is
between 97.2 and 130 grams per day; the 95th percentile is 170
day.177
grams per day; and the 99th percentile is 389 grams per
78
The maximum consumption rate is 972 grams per day.'

176. See Toy Er At., supra note 27, at 19, tbl. 2 & tbl. A2.
177. See CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 2.
178. CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 8.
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TABLE
Study
Authors
(Date)

1: QUANTIFIED EVIDENCE OF FISH CONSUMPTION

Sample
Populadon

50th Percentile
(g/day)

Mean
(g/day)

90th Percentile
(g/day)

95th Percentile
(g/day)
205. 1 280. 5

Toy et al.
(1995)

Squaxin
Island
and
Tulalip
tribes

35.6 48.7

60.6 82.9

159.7 221.7

CRITFC
(1994)

Nez
Perce,
Umatilla
Yakama,
and
Warm
Springs
tribes
Commencement Bay
recreational
anglers
Elliot,
Everett,
Sinclair
Inlet, and
Commencement Bay
recreational
anglers
Fish consumers in
United
States

29.0 32.0

58.7

97.2 130.0

23

-

54

Pierce et
al. (1988)

Landolt
et al.
(1985)

Javitz
(1980)

2.

-

0

Max.
Value
(g/day)
391.4

972.0

Study
Method
Diet
Recall
(survey/
personal
interview)
Diet
Recall
(survey/
personal
interview)

--

Creel

-

-

95.1

-

Creel

14.3

-

41.7

-

Diet
Recall
(survey/
diary)

RecreationalAnglers.

Pierce et al. study. According to a 1981 creel study conducted
by the Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department of recreational
anglers in Commencement Bay of the Puget Sound, the 50th percentile or median fish consumption rate for these individuals is 23
grams/day; and the 90th percentile is 54 grams/day.' 79

179. See DOUG PIERCE ET AL., TACOMA-PIERCE CouNT' HEmATH DEP'T, COMMENCEMENT
BAY SEAFOOD CONSUMPTION STUDY. PRELIMINARY REPORT (1981); MTCA RESPONSWENESS
SUMMARY, supra note 152, at 217.
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Landolt et al. study. According to a 1987 creel study conducted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
("NOAA") and the University of Washington of shoreside recreational anglers in Elliot, Commencement, Everett, and Sinclair Inlet
Bays of the Puget Sound, the 50th percentile or median fish consumption rate for these individuals is 12.3 grams per day; and the
95th percentile is 95.1 grams per day.18 0
3.

GeneralPopulation.

Javitz study. According to the 1980 analysis of the mid-1970s
diet recall study conducted by NPD Research, Inc. of fish consumers in the general population of the United States, the arithmetic
mean fish consumption rate for these individuals is 14.3 grams/day
and the 95th percentile is 41.7 grams/day. 8
Two features of these subpopulation data, both of which fall
under the heading of "variability," raise important issues for environmental standard-setting. First, fish consumption rates vary considerably among subpopulations within a general population. For
example, fish consumption rates for the Puget Sound Native subpopulation, as evidenced by the Toy et al. study, are greater than
the recreational angler subpopulation, as evidenced by the Pierce
et al. study, at every point of comparison.
Of particular note is the difference between the fish consumption rates currently employed in various regulatory contexts and
the fish consumption rates for Native Americans evidenced by the
Toy et al. and CRITFC studies. Compare the EPA's standard assumption of 6.5 grams per day, a number based on the mean value
from the Javitz study, (corrected to exclude marine species, and
adjusted to include fish non-consumers) with the arithmetic mean
from Toy et al., at between 60.9 and 82.9 grams per day and with
the arithmetic mean from CRITFC, at 58.7 grams per day. Similarly, the Washington State Department of Ecology's MTCA regulation uses a standard assumption of 54.0 grams per day, a number
based on the 90th percentile value from Pierce, et al. Compare the
900" percentile value from Toy et al., at between 159.7 and 221.7
180. See LANDOLT ET AL, supra note 160; WASHINcToN STATE DEP'T OF HE-tti, TIER I
REPORT, DEVELOPMENT OF SEDLME,'r QUA=m" CRrIUTR FOR THE PROTECTON'OF Htu t
HEALrm, i-512 (1995) (dting U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnoN AF-'xc , HE.uLT RtsK AsSESSMENT OF CHE-MICL CONTAINATION RNPUGE:r SOUND SEAFOOD (1988)).
181. See HAROLD JANrz, SRI LN=RENATION A SEAFOOD ComuStmP'mON DATA. X%MtStS
18-34 (1980).
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grams per day, and the 90' percentile value from CRITFC, at between 97.2 and 130 grams per day.
Second, fish consumption rates within a subpopulation may
also vary considerably. In the non-standard distribution that characterizes the Puget Sound tribal subpopulation, for example, individuals at the median consume between 35.6 and 48.7 grams per
day, while individuals at the 95th percentile consume between
205.1 and 280.5 grams per day-roughly five times the median.
The maximum value for this subpopulation, 391.4 grams per day, is
an order of magnitude greater than the median value. Although
only a small percentage of the subpopulation comprises the upper
tail of this distribution, the individuals consuming at these values
are ingesting relatively large amounts of fish each day. Compare
this skewed distribution relative to the uniform distribution assumed by risk assessors in the absence of data showing individuals
in the upper tails: a single point such as an average or median
value no longer approximates the values at the extremes of the
distribution.
These observations about the fish consumption data-variability is large and the distribution is skewed-have implications for
current risk assessment practice. Part IV fleshes out current responses to this data in the agencies and courts. Part V then critiques current practice.
IV.

CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE AGENCIES AND COURTS

As pointed out in the preceding Part, agencies have until very
recently been indifferent to Native American fish consumption
practices. Although EPA conceded in early documents that it was
aware of higher-consuming subpopulations, especially Native
American or other subsistence fishers, EPA and other agencies did
not undertake or support efforts to gather data to quantify this
consumption. Yet, the agencies and courts involved in the disputes
in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke and Natural Resource Defense

Council v. EPA maintained that quantification was necessary and
were unwilling to hear the qualitative information brought to their
attention by Native Americans. A second, related aspect of agencies' and courts' current practice is also deeply troubling: agencies
have argued that it is appropriate to set standards that provide an
acceptable level of protection to the general population, but some
lower level of protection to Native American subpopulations. This
issue will be discussed in Part IV.A, below. Third, although the
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EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions improve upon earlier assessments of
fish consumption rates, EPA nonetheless makes numerous judgments that individually and collectively work to discount the actual
exposure circumstances of Native American subpopulations. This
issue will be discussed in Part IV.B. Finally, Dioxin/Organociorine
Center v. Clark's misunderstanding of uncertainty and variability
threatens to impede thoughtful analysis of agency responses to the
variability that has been demonstrated to characterize fish consumption rates where Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest
are among those affected by agency risk assessments. This issue
will be taken up in Part IV.C.
In scrutinizing current agency practice, one must understand
the backdrop against which agencies consciously operate. Agencies' determinations about how much risk is "acceptable," or about
who and how many merit protection are not made in a vacuum,
but in the context of other pressures and priorities. The decisions
and judgments described in this Part reflect agencies' efforts to balance the legitimate claims of the affected Native American subpopulations against considerations of cost, administrability, and
political feasibility. While I will argue in Part IV that agencies' current balancing efforts run afoul of legal obligations and relevant
normative commitments, it is nonetheless useful to recognize that
agencies have arrived at the decisions in an effort to accommodate
these multiple considerations.
A.

"Lower Yet Adequate" Protectionfor Higher-ConsumingNative
American Subpopulations
In Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter, the EPA employed its default as-

sumption for the FCR, 6.5 g/day. Relying on this standard assumption about exposure, EPA derived a water quality standard,
the TMDL for dioxin, by solving the risk equation for concentration with cancer risk held at 1(10'). If a particular environmental
standard is set, assuming the exposure of the "average American,"
to result in risk of no more than 1 in 1,000,000, that same standard
will result in greater risk to a more highly exposed subpopulation.
In Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter,this greater risk was estimated to be
23 in 1,000,000 or 2.3 in 100,000.182
182. Note that it is not the case that everybody in the general population has an equal
chance of being subject to risk that now ranges from 1 in 1,000,000 to 2.3 in 100,000. It
should be characterized this way only if the identity of the individuals at various points on
the distribution were unknown and unknowable, a point to which I return iinfra Part V.
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The Ninth Circuit accepted the EPA's choice of an FCR of 6.5
g/day by asserting that the resulting standards would provide
"lower yet adequate" protection to higher-consuming Native American subpopulations. Citing Ohio v. EPA,'83 the court held that
even if these subpopulations consume 150 g/day of fish and would
therefore be subject to excess risk of 2.3(10'), "[t]his level of risk
protection is within levels historically approved by the EPA and upheld by courts."' 8 4 The court endorsed EPA's argument that "the
one-in-a-million risk level mandated by the state water quality standards for the general population does not necessarily reflect state
legislative intent to provide the highest level of protection for all
subpopulations but could reasonably be construed to allow for
lower yet adequate protection for specific subpopulations." 8
The court's argument relied on three questionable premises.
First, it invoked Ohio v. EPA's controversial view that a risk level
deemed acceptable in one regulatory context is appropriate in
every other regulatory context. Evidence suggests, however, that a
host of considerations contribute to people's views about risk, and
that people may be willing to accept differing levels of risk in different contexts. Second, and most egregious, the court accepted the
EPA's argument that, so long as a subpopulation's risk level falls
within the range generated by Ohio v. EPA, it is "adequate" and
there is no harm even from the systematic provision of "lower yet
adequate" protection to "specific subpopulations," even where the
specific subpopulation harmed is Native American. The court was
apparently untroubled by the discriminatory effect of its holding. I
criticize more fully this second aspect of agencies' and courts' current approach in Part IV.C.
The Ninth Circuit also accepted the EPA argument that it was
reasonable to assume that only some of the fish eaten by higherconsuming subpopulations is fully contaminated whereas all of the
fish eaten by the lower-consuming general population is fully contaminated. Thus, the court claimed, "the EPA estimated that the
total consumption of 150 grams of fish by these subpopulations
would lead to no greater dioxin ingestion than would occur by consuming 6.5 grams of fully contaminated fish. On this assumption
Rather, members of the general population will be subject to a risk level of I in 1,000,000,
while members of the particular subpopulation will be subject to the greater risk level of
2.3 in 100,000.
183. 997 F.2d 1520, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
184. Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1995).
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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the subpopulations would be adequately protected." ' ,6 In support
of its assumption, the EPA pointed to "uncertainties" arising from
the absence of definitive studies "establish[ing] the quantity and
variety of fish consumed by these subpopulations," and to the fact
that many fish in the Columbia River Basin are anadromous, and
thus spend only some of their lifecycle in contaminated river w%-aters. Note that EPA did not itself take any of the existing definitive
studies regarding the contaminant loading of anadromous fish into
account, and ignored evidence that anadromous fish in fact take
up and bioaccumulate significant chemical contaminants during
their residency in estuaries.187 Further, the intimation that EPA
derived its 6.5 grams/day FCR as a result of a careful and purposeful attempt to record consumption of only that quantity of fish
that is "fully contaminated" is insupportable, given the guesswork
revealed to have surrounded the crafting of the 6.5grams/day
numberJ 8
B.

EPA's Draft Water Quality CriteriaMethodology Reuisions

EPA has recently issued Draft Revisions to the Methodology for
Deriving Ambient Water Quality Criteria for the Protection of
Human Health ("Draft AWQC Revisions"). The Draft AWQC Revisions will replace various aspects of EPA's current water quality criteria, which were developed in 1980, and are the source of EPA's
6.5 grams/day fish consumption rate.'8 9 EPA's proposed changes
to its criteria are limited to two important components of the exposure portion of the risk assessment equation, the fish consumption
rate and the bioconcentration factor (which will be replaced by a
bioaccumulation factor or BAF). EPA also proposes to change its
approach to acceptable risk. For present purposes, I will focus on
the proposed changes to the FCR and acceptable risk.
186. Dioxin/OrganochlofineCenter, 57 F.3d at 1524.
187. See generaly, eg., B.B. McCain et al., Uptake of Aromatic and CidorinatedHydratorbons byJuvenile ChinookSalmon (Oncorhyndius tshautdma) in an Urban E&tuay. 19 ARCtHWEs OF
ENvr. CONTAMNAMION & ToxicoLoGy 10 (1990).
188. See supranote 151 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit relies on a similar
argument, and intimates that EPA carefully and purposefully determined that 6.5 grams!
day reflects not total fish consumption, but instead the subset of fish consumed containing
the "maximum residue" of contaminants. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16
F.3d 1395, 1403 (4th Cir. 1993).
189. EPA is required periodically to revise its water quality criteria to ensure they are
"accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge... on the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on health and welfare... which may be expected from tie presence of
pollutants in any body of water ... ." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1) (1994).
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1. Proposed changes to the fish consumption rate.
EPA proposes a new default fish consumption rate of 17.80
grams/day. This value is the 90th percentile value for consumption of freshwater and estuarine fish by the general population
(fish consumers and fish nonconsumers).

1 °

It is derived from a

diet recall study conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture, the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals
("CSFII") for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991.191 EPA also proposes
a new default fish consumption rate of 86.30 grams/day for "subsistence fishers/minority anglers." 19 2 This value is the 99th percentile value for consumption of freshwater and estuarine fish by the
general population (fish consumers and fish nonconsumers), also
derived from the USDA's CSFII for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991.
According to the EPA, this value "is within the range of average
intakes for subsistence fishers/minority anglers." 9 ' EPA adds,
however, that it seeks comments "on alternatively using 39.04
grams/day for subsistence fishers/minority anglers, which is lower
in the range of averages."' 94 Significantly, EPA proposes to treat
together what it terms "subsistence fishers/minority anglers."
Although EPA nowhere makes clear precisely who it views to be
included in this grouping or to which studies it refers for the
"range of averages," it would appear that EPA's category includes
various Native Americans, Asian-Americans, low-income individuals, and other individuals who simply eat a lot of fish. 95
190. The EPA notes that this value also "approximates the average consumption rate
for sport anglers, nationally." Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,762.
191. The CSFII study was conducted annually over a three-day period. During this
period, participants were asked to quantify and categorize all food intake according to a list
of approximately 6,600 different food codes, of which 460 relate to fish or shellfish. The
individual consumption data was then matched with standard recipes contained in a USDA
recipe file, in order to adjust the reported quantities of food consumed to reflect the fish
component. For example, if a participant entered food code 27450551 for tuna casserole,
the USDA recipe file assumes that the prepared fish accounts for 34.12% of the recipe;
reported consumption rates are adjusted accordingly. 1 & 2 U.S. DEP'T OF AcGuCULTURE,
CONTINUING SURVEY OF FOOD INTAKE BY INDVmDUALS at tbl. A-2 (1998) [hereinafter 1 CSFII
STUDY & 2 CSFII STUDY].
192. Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,762.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. EPA, Technical Support Document, supra note 173, at 85-123. According to the

notes to Tables 2.3.9 and 2.3.10, entitled respectively "Subsistence Fishers Consumption
Data," and "Subsistence Fishers Survey Methods," "[s]ubsistence fishers include groups
(such as Florida residents receiving food stamps) that may eat sport-caught fish at high rite
but do not subsist on fish as a large part of their diet." I. at 101-02. Listed fisher groups
are: Great Lakes tribes, Columbia River tribes, Florida residents receiving food stamps,
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Several features of the CSFII study and EPA's use of this data

merit elaboration. First, the CSFII study allocated fish species by
habitat, and then generated fish consumption rates for three separate categories: freshwater/estuarine, marine, and all fish. EPA's
Draft AWQC Revisions chose to base the defaults and recommendations on the freshwater/estuarine fish only, thereby excluding
species deemed marine. Notably, EPA deemed salmon to be
marine, although they are anadromous, and thus spend a portion
of their lifecycles in marine environments and a portion in freshwater and/or estuarine environments. Salmon consumption is
thus not counted in EPA's proposed estimates of fish consumption.
EPA estimates that this exclusion has the effect of decreasing the
196
resulting FCR by thirteen percent.

Second, the CSFII study generated two further sets of fish consumption rates: those representing the entire population-fish
consumers and fish nonconsumers alike-and those representing
fish consumers in the population. EPA's defaults are based on the
first set of values, that is to say, per capita fish consumption rates.
The per capita rates were based on surveys (conducted over three
years) of a total of 11,912 individuals. The CSFIH study also generated fish consumption rates for what it termed "acute consumers,"
i.e., individuals who actually ate fish during the three-day study period each year. Of the 11,912 participants, 3,927 ate fish during
Florida Asian residents, High-end Caucasian consumers on Lake Michigan, Wisconsin
tribes, Chippewa tribes in Wisconsin, and Native Alaskan Adults. Id. at 101. The notes
indicate that the fisher groups in the tables correspond to those of the same heading appearing in the textual account of fish consumption study data. The textual account, however, does not neatly track the tables: some fisher groups, such as "Tribes of Puget Sound,"
that are listed in the text under EPA's category "Subsistence Fishers" are not included in
Tables 2.3.9 and 2.3.10; and some fisher groups, such as "Florida residents receiving food
stamps" are included in Tables 2.3.9 and 2.3.10, but are listed in the text under EPA's
category "Sportfishers." Finally, in introductory remarks, EPA distinguishes two groups,
sportfishers and subsistence fishers. I& at 85-86. Subsistence fishers eat more fish than the
general population, yet are not recreational fishers; they "may rely on catching and eating
fish in order to meet nutritional needs or because of cultural traditions." Id at 86.
Subsistence fishers are often (although not ahays) low income individuals and
may reside in either urban or rural areas. Several ethnic groups have been identified as having members who subsist on fish. Several specific groups of Native
American fishers have been identified in the Northwest and the Great Lakes Region. Asian-American fishers are a group that includes numerous populations

such as Laotian, Hmong, Cambodian, and ,ietnamese, each with differing consumption patterns and cultural traditions.
Id (citations omitted).
196. Draft WQGMI Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,804.
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the study period and so were termed "acute consumers. "197 Note
that these figures mean that for almost 8,000 participants, daily average fish consumption rates registered as "zero." The per capita
fish consumption rates were necessarily affected by the presence of
so many zero values. As EPA itself cautions states and tribes, "when
considering median values from fish consumption studies, States
and Tribes need to ensure that the distribution is based on survey
respondents who reported consuming fish because surveys based on
both consumers and nonconsumers typically result in median values of

zero. " 98 In fact, the inclusion of fish nonconsumers will have the
effect of decreasing the point estimates for all but the maximum
value. Compare, for example, the following sets of point estimates
in Table 2.
TABLE 2: FISH CONSUMPTION VALUES BY INCLUDED POPULATION

Included
Population
Per Capita19 9
"Acute
2 00
Consumers"

50th
Percentile
(g/day)

Arithmetic
Mean
(g/day)

90th
Percentile
(g/day)

95th
Percentile
(g/day)

99th
Percentile
(g/day)

0.00
85.36

18.01
106.39

60.65
206.76

86.25
258.22

142.96
399.26

At every point of comparison, the choice of per capita figures is the
choice of a relatively lower value for the FCR.
Third, the CSFII study made still another cut, generating two
sets of fish consumption estimates, those using uncooked fish tissue weights and those using "as consumed" (and usually) cooked
fish tissue weights. EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions opt for the "as
consumed" numbers. As EPA acknowledges, the uncooked weight
values generally exceed the cooked weight values by about 20%;
"[t]his obviously means that using cooked weights results in a
slightly lower intake rate and slightly less stringent AWQC."20 1 In
fact, according to the CSFII numbers, while this choice affects the
197. These figures are derived from 1 CFSII

STUDY,

supra note 191, at IV-8 and IV-16

(fibs. A-3 & B-3). Note that 8478 of the 11,912 participants were 18 years of age and older.
198. Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,802.
199. 2 CFSII Study, supra note 191, at IV-9 (tbl. A-4). These values are for all fish, "as
consumed." Recall that EPA's default is based not on all fish but only freshwater and

estuarine fish, for which the values are: mean = 5.59 g/day; 50th percentile = 0.00 g/day;
90th percentile = 17.80 g/day; 95th percentile = 39.04 g/day; and 99th percentile = 86.30
g/day. Id.

200. Id. at IV-17 (tbl. B-4). These values are for all fish, "as consumed."
201.

Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,803.
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mean or median value, it has a greater effect at the high end of the
distribution. Compare, for example, the following values.
TABLE

3: FISH

CONSUMPTION VALUES BY ASSUMPTIONS

ABouT COOKING
Assumption About

50th Percentile

Arithmetic

95th Percentile

99th Percentile

(g/day)

Mean (g/day)

(g/day)

(g/day)

0

5.59

39.04

86.30

0

7.09

49.83

111.13

Cooking
2 02

"As Consumed"
(usually cooked)
20 3
Uncooked

Finally, participants in the CSFII study were selected from the
forty-eight contiguous states only. The authors of the study note
the potential for bias toward underestimation of per capita consumption in that Alaska and Hawaii "could potentially contain a
larger percentage of subsistence fisherman [sic] and fish eaters
than the population from the 48 conterminous states .... .2"
The Draft AWQC Revisions establish a hierarchy of preferences
that urges the use of local data and offers the default values as a last
resort. EPA states that it chose the default values to protect the
majority of individuals within the relevant groups. EPA notes that
"States and Tribes are urged to use a fish intake level derived from
local data on fish consumption in place of these default values
when deriving AWQC, ensuring that the fish intake level chosen be
protective of highly exposed individuals in the population." 0 3 To
this end, EPA suggests a four-part hierarchy of preferences: "(1)
use of local data; (2) use of data reflecting similar geography/population groups; (3) use of data from national surveys; and (4) use
of proposed default intake rates."2 0 6 Inasmuch as it indicates a
preference for local data, this aspect of the Draft AWQC Revisions
is a marked improvement. It goes well beyond mere willingness to
consider local practices or thin admonitions that states and tribes
"may wish" to account for the fact that the default values likely underestimate some subpopulations' consumption.
To the extent that states or tribes undertake any of the first
202. 2 CFSII STUDY, supra note 191, at IV-9 (tbl. A4). These values are for per capita

consumption of freshwater and estuarine fish.
203. 1 CGSII SrUDy, supra note 191, at RI-9 (tbl. A-4). These values are for per capita
consumption of freshwater and estuarine fish.
204. 2 CSFII STUDY, supra note 191, at ix.
205. Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,803.

206. Id.at 43,802.
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three options, however, they must demonstrate "consistency with
the principles" of the guidance provided by EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions in order to satisfy EPA review under CWA 303 (c) .207 Thus,
were a state or tribe to use local data, the choices undergirding
EPA's default values would become recommendations for the state
or tribe as it generated its local fish consumption rates. For example, EPA "recommends" that fish consumption rates be based on
consumption of fresh and estuarine species only (although
"[c]oastal States and Tribes that believe accounting for total fish
consumption (i.e., fresh/estuarine and marine species) is more appropriate for protecting the population of concern may do so, provided that the marine intake component is not doublecounted.") ,2°8 and that fish consumption rates be based on cooked
weight values rather than uncooked weight values.20 9 Moreover, in
current practice, many states-whether coastal or inland-rely on
the default values generated by EPA.21 0 This practice continues despite EPA having recognized in 1980, as in 1998, that the default
values likely underestimate consumption of some subpopulations
and despite EPA having urged states to develop values more reflective of local consumption. 21 ' And, of course, the default values are
and will be used by EPA itself when it steps into the shoes of states
that have declined to issue water quality standards, as happened in
the case of the standards for Washington, Oregon, and Idaho at
issue in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke.212
2.

Proposed approach to acceptable risk levels.

In addition to the proposed changes to the default fish consumption rate, EPA proposes a new approach to acceptable risk
levels. EPA begins by noting that it had emphasized in its 1980
AWQC Guidelines that:
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Telephone Interview with Denis Borum, Environmental Scientist, Office of Science and Technology, Office of Water, United States Environmental Protection Agency
(Nov. 23, 1999).
211. Even if states would otherwise be willing to undertake the costs and time involved to gather local data or review data presented by relevant subpopulations, states are

aware of the reality that the EPA approval process will go more smoothly if they use EPA
defaults and data. See Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,763.
212. See id. ("The Agency intends to use these default factors to calculate water qual-

ity criteria when promulgating water quality standards for a State or Tribe under Section
303(c) of the [Clean Water] Act.").
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the maximum protection of human health from the potential

carcinogenic effects due to exposure of Chemical X through the
ingestion of contaminated water and aquatic organisms, the ambient water concentration should be zero based on the nonthreshold assumption for this chemical. However, zero may not
be attainable at the present time. Therefore, the levels which
may result in incremental cancer risk over the lifetime are estimated at 1(10-5), 1(106), and 1(10-7).213
In its discussion of the current proposal, EPA does not explicitly
endorse retention of the goal of zero contamination. - 4 Instead,
EPA recommends a range for risk level from 1 (10") to 1(106) for
the general population. While EPA adds that states and tribes are
free to choose a more protective level, such as 1(10"'), it urges,
"[c]are should be taken however, in situations where the AWQC
includes fish intake levels based on the general population to ensure that the risk to more highly exposed subgroups (sportfishers
or subsistence fishers) does not exceed the 1 (10) level."2"1 Thus,
EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions introduces two tiers of permissible
risk levels. While risk levels as protective as 1(10) (and even 1(107)) are to be secured to members of the general population, risk
levels as great as 1(10 ") are permissible for members of more
highly exposed subpopulations, including subsistence fishers. This
approach echoes that urged by EPA and accepted by the Ninth
Circuit in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter v. Clarke Presumably, EPA is

willing to countenance "lower yet adequate" protection to "some
subpopulations," including subsistence fishers, as a matter of
course.
The preceding Parts have focused on aspects of agencies' present approaches that are of pressing concern because EPA also proposes to instate them in its forthcoming water quality criteria
document. In sum, EPA proposes to define "acceptable" risk levels
according to the subpopulation affected (with "lower yet adequate"
protection acceptable for Native Americans), and to make a host of
judgments that work to underestimate the fish consumption rates
of Native American subpopulations. In this next Part, I describe
recent work by EPA and the Ninth Circuit that has not appeared
explicitly in agency proposals, but that retains the potential to mis213. Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,763. Interestingly, EPA states that
this "risk range was presented for information purposes and did not represent an Agency
judgment on 'acceptable' risk level." Id.
214. Indeed, indications elsewhere in the Draft may point in the other direction,
suggesting that EPA has abandoned this goal. See CRITFC Comments, supra note 1,at 11.
215. Draft WQGM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,762.
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inform debate. I begin by canvassing agencies' repertoire of responses to variability.
C. Agency and Court Responses to Uncertainty and Variability

As noted above, when risk assessors in health and environmental agencies select a single value for a parameter that is characterized by uncertainty or for a parameter that is variable, their
resulting assessment of risk will be inaccurate in some measure.
The nature of the error, however, is quite different in cases of uncertainty and cases of variability. So considerations that should inform regulatory responses to uncertainty differ from those that
should inform responses to variability.
Uncertainty marks so many of the inputs to a calculation of risk
from environmental contaminants that agency responses to uncertainty are familiar and have been the subject of considerable debate. Instances of interindividual variability in exposure or
susceptibility, on the other hand, have less often been acknowledged, and appropriate responses to variability have seldom explicitly been discussed 2 6 Unfortunately, agencies and courts may
have hindered understanding by failing themselves to speak with
clarity about each and, sometimes, by failing to distinguish the two.
1.

Conventional agency responses.

The issues raised by uncertainty and variability are different in
kind. The regulatory responses to uncertainty and variability have
different purposes and produce different results, despite the fact
that, as Adam Finkel explains, "the same terms and mathematical
procedures are used to deal with each and... they may at times be
'
hard to separate operationally."217
In instances of uncertainty, where agencies lack knowledge of
the true value of some parameter necessary to predict risk, the
choice of any value for that parameter will be in error. A conservative response reflects a choice between errors: it is better to overestimate risk than to underestimate risk. This approach is a familiar
response in private as well as public decision making, and is captured in common aphorisms, for example, "it is best to err on the
side of caution," and "better safe than sorry." A non-conservative
216. SeeAdam Finkel, The Casefor "PlausibleConservatism,"in SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT,
supra note 44, at 604-05 (observing that the public has not yet clearly expressed its views
about "how much protection to extend to the extremes of variable distributions,").
217. Id. at 604.
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response chooses the opposite error. The debate about appropriate responses to uncertainty continues. 18
In instances of variability, on the other hand, agencies know2 19
that there is a range of actual values for some parameter necessary
to predict risk. An agency response does not require a conservative
or non-conservative choice among errors: the values are not uncertain; they simply vary. In cases of interindividual variability, where
agencies are aware of differences among individual exposures or
susceptibilities, the response chosen instead reflects a determination about who merits protection. Should we seek to protect individuals at the median of the distribution that describes the
variability? Individuals at the 90 ' percentile? The maximally exposed individual? Although some use the term "conservative" to
describe a possible response to variability-one that determines
that everyone or nearly everyone merits protection-such usage
may engender confusion. For clarity, I will use the word "conservative" only in connection with responses to uncertainty 0 I will discuss responses to variability as they affect the determination of
which individuals or subpopulations of individuals merit
protection.
Agencies have employed four general strategies to address vriability surrounding the inputs to the risk assessment equation. The
first common response to variability has been not to acknowledge
it and thus to assume that the only value one has is representative
and thus captures the distribution..2 2 1 A second common strategy-using an arithmetic mean or median value for a quantity that
varies-looks like the first but proceeds instead from a deliberate
218. One recent suggestion, for example, attempts to address criticisms that current
responses are overly conservative: Adam F'mkel advocates employing a "plausibly conservative" default assumption for the parameter in question but permitting individuals-virtually always risk producers--to require agencies to revisit the assumption upon
demonstrating that the default is in fact in error. Id.
at 606-13. In addition to making the
judgment that, in the absence of complete information it is better to make the error of
overprotection rather than underprotection, such a strategy provides incentives for risk
producers in particular to gather information about the uncertain parameter in question.
219. This assumes that there is no uncertainty about the variability.
220. See, eg., id.
at 603 ("Conservatism is a specific response to uncertainty that favors
one type of error (overestimation) over its converse, but ...the fact that it admits that
either type of error is possible is more important than the precise calculus it may use to
balance those errors.").
221. See, &g., SciENcE ANDJuDcMrrNr, supra note 44, at 195. The NRC has termed this

strategy "[ignore the variability and hope for the best." Id. ot 191. Presumably, the agency
figures here that any variability is likely to be small, such that an estimate that ignores it %ill
not be far from the truth.
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decision that a mean or median value can be estimated reliably in
light of the variability and is a good surrogate for the variable quantity.222 Health and environmental agencies' standard assumption

with respect to body weight, i.e., that every human weighs 70 kg, is
a likely example. 2 A third regulatory strategy acknowledges the
variability and then chooses a maximum or minimum value of a
quantity that varies. 224 Risk assessors sometimes attempt to register
maximum human exposure by focusing on one spatial scenario for
exposure (e.g., the "fenceline" of a source of air pollution or the
location where the most-exposed individual resides) or one subpopulation (e.g., exercising adults or children who ingest pathologically large amounts of soil).225

In so doing, risk assessors

sometimes seek to protect the most susceptible members of the
population, which may require them to focus on responses of a
certain subpopulation (e.g., asthmatics, with respect to some air
contaminants). As with the choice of a mean value, a choice of a
maximum value is a choice to describe one situation out of the
range of actual situations. However, where the quantity that varies
is exposure, the choice of a maximum value for use in setting environmental standards will also account for other, lower exposure
scenarios. For example, standards set to protect individuals residing at the fenceline will also protect less-exposed individuals residing miles away from the polluting source. As with the choice of an
average value, a choice of a maximum value has the virtue of ad222. See id. at 192.

223. Physiologists understand the mechanisms by which humans grow and therefore
have a sense of the biological boundaries of the distribution; they can thus say that virtually
no adults are above or below the 70 kg value by more than a factor of three. Id. at 191-94.
Note that the judgment that the average adult weight is a useful surrogate for the variable
quantity for regulatory purposes has been criticized for failing to take children into account. See generally, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES INTHE DIErs OF INFANTS AND
CHILDRUN (1993). A similar criticism might be raised if a certain subpopulation, for example Asian-Americans, occupied a particular portion of the body weight distribution for the
general population. See 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESS.
MENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DEcI.
SION-MAKING: FINAL REPORT

224. See SCIENCE AND

89 (1997).
supra note 44, at 193.

JUDGMENT,

225. See, e.g., id. The reference to "dirt-eating children" is to Breyer's emphasis on
this scenario as an example of environmental regulation that "goes too far" to address the
circumstances of the highly exposed. Breyer, supra note 55, at 11-12, 75. Note that the
choice of a maximum exposure scenario may actually aggregate several choices in the face
of variability. Thus, the choice to protect children who eat large amounts of dirt might
involve the choice of a minimum value for body weight and the choice of a maximum
value for the quantity of soil ingested by humans.
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ministrative ease. However, the choice of a maximum value may
involve greater costs to the polluter being regulated.
Finally, health and environmental agencies occasionally employ
a fourth strategy, disaggregating the data to represent different
subgroups or subpopulations. In the case of interindividual variability, this entails dividing the general population into as many different subpopulations as is warranted for regulatory purposes. By
this device, although variability is relatively large over the entire
data set, the variability within each subset can become sufficiently
small. For example, if there are age-related differences in individuals' susceptibility to ionizing radiation, an agency might divide the
general population into subpopulations representing 10-year intervals, and conduct separate assessments of the risk from ionizing
radiation for each subpopulation.2 26 Or if there is a bimodal distribution with respect to susceptibility, with a minority of individuals
who are hypersusceptible relative to the majority (e.g., asthmatics,
with respect to some air contaminants), agencies might disaggregate the general population into two subpopulations (e.g., asthmatic and non-asthmatic).227

The appropriateness of adopting any particular strategy depends in part upon information about the extent of the variability
and the shape of the distribution. It also depends upon whether
laws or norms identify subpopulations of concern among the general population (does the relevant legislation require agencies to
target children or other sensitive members of the human population? do other sources of law counsel agencies to address particular subpopulations?). Notably, the NRC concluded in 1994 that
EPA's past efforts failed to deal explicitly with important sources of
variability, and relied instead on an ill-suited mix of strategies.2 8
It is important to keep in mind that whichever strategy is selected, an agency is choosing among actual, known values. In responding to variability, an agency chooses one actuality over
another actuality. In cases of interindividual variability, whether in
susceptibility or exposure, an agency chooses one individual's actual circumstances over another's.
2.

Ill-founded court and agency standards.

Agencies and courts have at times confused uncertainty and %-a226. See ScIcE AND JUDGM&NT, supra note 44, at 191.
227. 1&. at 206.
228. Id. at 194-95.
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riability. Apparently viewing the two as interchangeable, they have
permitted trade-offs between responses to uncertainty and responses to variability of the following sort: because an agency has
chosen a conservative estimate for the cancer potency factor
("CPF")-a value about which considerable uncertainty exists-it
is permissible to choose an average value for the fish consumption
rate-a value that is highly variable. For example, according to the
Ninth Circuit in Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke,22 9 because
the CPF for dioxin is conservative, it is permissible to choose a fish
consumption rate of 6.5 grams/day, which only arguably represents the average of the general population and clearly ignores the
fish consumption patterns of Native American subpopulations.
EPA and the Ninth Circuit appear to have countenanced this
trade-off, at least in part, on the theory that individuals in the
more-exposed subpopulation would still be "adequately" protected,
thanks to or as a result of the conservatism of the cancer potency

factor. This approach fails to recognize, however, that to the extent that the agency has conservatively set the CPF, it has done so
for a reason-to address uncertainty. Uncertainty in toxicity assessment arises from gaps in the available data. Thus, the quantum of
conservatism that is built into such a choice of the CPF already
serves the function that it is designed to serve. It is needed to tip
the scales of error in favor of overestimation, here, of cancer potency. It is not available to do additional work. It cannot also perform the function of reducing or mitigating the increased
exposure of those individuals who are members of highly exposed
subpopulations.
Moreover, this approach elides the differences between variability and uncertainty and obfuscates the different values and policy
choices that are involved in agency responses to each. To illustrate, suppose there were some "extra" quantum of conservatism
associated with the choice of the CPF, that the uncertainty surrounding the CPF only "truly" warranted a less conservative CPF.
The agency and the court might then have been able to find that
the unduly conservative CPF would have the same mathematical
effect on the ultimate prediction of risk as the choice of some correspondingly greater value for the FCR. Because both the CPF and
the FCR are in the numerator of the risk assessment equation, this
effect on the prediction of risk might have been the same as accounting for some individuals' higher FCRs. Of course, neither
229. 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the agency nor the court in Dioxin/OrganochiorineCentermade such
a finding of any "extra" quantum of conservatism. -3° Even if they
had, however, neither the agency nor the court would have dealt
consciously with interindividual variability. Neither would have
talked about the choices required in order to account for the fact
that we know there are actual individuals consuming fish at the
high end of the distribution and we know who they are. Neither
would have engaged the debate "about who merits being safe and
who may end up being sorry.""'
Health and environmental agencies have not to date thought
carefully and in a focused manner about how to address variability.
They have not deliberated about the choice of how much protection to afford individuals at the extreme of an exposure distribution, particularly where identifiable subpopulations occupy the
different portions of the distribution. Agencies need to think
about these questions in a different way than they think about responses to uncertainty, because the issues are profoundly different.
Agencies need to keep in mind that the debate about whether risk
assessment's response to uncertainty is "too conservative" leaves untouched important questions about its responses to variability and
2
who merits protection.1
V.

VARIABiLIY, IDENTiFIABILrY, AND THE CASE FOR DIFFERENTAL
TREATENT OF HIGHLY EXPOSED NATE
AMERICAN SUBPOPULATIONS

Large variability in fish consumption rates, and the location of
identifiable subpopulations at the high end of the exposure distribution, raise implications for current agency risk assessment practice. As discussed above, the available fish consumption data (both
anecdotal and quantified) paint a clear picture: variability is large
and the distribution is skewed. I will use the shorthand "variability"
to refer to these tandem aspects of the data. The available fish
consumption data also permit us to identify particular subpopulations, such as Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest, that occupy the high end of the exposure distribution for fish consumers.
I will use the shorthand "identifiability" to refer to this feature of
the data.
230. Saying that the CPF for dioxin is the most stringent in the world is not the same

as saying that the CPF is too conservative.
231. Fimkel, supra note 216, at 605.
232. Id-
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As outlined above, under current risk assessment practice,
agencies may choose from among four responses to variability: ignore the variability; select an average or median value from the
distribution; select a maximum or minimum value from the distribution; or explicitly disaggregate the distribution into relevant subpopulations. Health and environmental agencies typically make
numerous judgments and tradeoffs in deciding how they will respond to variability. Statutory directives may set boundaries for
these judgments; often, however, these directives give agencies
wide berth. Concerns of cost, administrability, and political feasibility clearly figure in agencies' decisions here, often properly so.
However, tradeoffs that may be permissible for the general population become impermissible where the highly-exposed subpopulations are Native Americans.
Part V.A elaborates the features of variability and identifiability
that characterize the relevant fish consumption data. Given these
features of the data, Parts V.B and V.C argue for differential treatment of the highly-exposed Native American subpopulations on
two bases. As a first cut, differential treatment of any highly-exposed subgroup is necessitated by the mere fact that such a subgroup has emerged from the data in a context where the stakes are
high. Where a highly exposed subgroup becomes identifiable as
such, agencies need to attend to their circumstances. This is so
regardless of the identity of the subgroup. Candidates for differential attention by dint of this first cut might include children, recreational fishers, or Native Americans. Although not inherently
limited to Native American subgroups, the implications of this first
cut for Native American subgroups will be examined in Part V.B.
As a second cut, differential treatment is necessitated here because
of the identity of the highly-exposed subgroup. Native American
subpopulations present a particular case that has normative and
doctrinal dimensions, only some of which are applicable to other
subgroups. The relevant normative considerations include respect
for cultural integrity, equality, and process. The applicable doctrinal constraints arise from treaties, the trust responsibility, and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The justifications for the second
cut are developed in Part V.C.
A.

Variability, Identifiability, and Fish Consumption Data
1.

Variability offish consumption data.

As the fish consumption data surveyed above in Part III.D.3 in-

2000]

I20.ABLEJUSTICE

dicate, variability in consumption rates is large, and the resulting
distribution is skewed such that there is a long upper tail. If interindividual variability for a particular parameter in the exposure
portion of the risk assessment equation were small, agencies would
not need to be concerned about accounting for the vadability and
could freely choose a mean or median value-or any value at all
within the distribution-as a reasonable surrogate for all values.
There would be no hard call to be made about who merits protection and who doesn't. As exposure evidence reveals more marked
variability, however, we move away from this easy case. Information
about the shape of the distribution becomes more important, and
the judgment calls involved in choosing a value must be much
more carefully considered.
As variability becomes large, individuals at various points on the
distribution experience quite different exposures. If variability exists but the distribution is "normal,"2 3 3 a mean or median value
might still fairly reliably serve as a surrogate for all values. In any
"normal" distribution, individual values will be symmetrical about
the mean and the probability density (i.e., the height of the curve
for a given value on the x axis) will have its maximum at the
mean. 23 4 The mean will equal the median value: half the population will lie above this value, and half below. We might be willing
to accept the choice of a mean or median value for a standard
normal distribution, because this choice does not have the effect of
"averaging away" individual characteristics or situations very far
away from those shared by the bulk of the population.27 A choice
233. It is perhaps telling that statisticians' definition of "normal" historically connoted a sense of natural, ideal, and right. &, eg., LOTaAR SAcis, ArPuED STAmncs: A
HANDBOOK OF TECHNIQUES 58 (Zenon Reynarowych trans., 1982). Although "normal" has

a purely technical meaning for statisticians today, outliers remain problematic for statisticians. The existence of individual values at the extremes of a distribution are suspected of
arising from error, and are susceptible to being dismissed or removed from consideration
in order to ensure a tidy distribution that conforms to expectations and is easier to work
MET,i.L.ui G. Coctipwav, ST,%TxsTria.
with. See, e.g., i. at 59; GEORGE IV SNEDECOR W
ODS 39-41, 4647, 135-37, 279 (7th ed. 1980).
234. SNEDECOR & COCHRAN, supra note 233, at 39-63.
235. In a "standard normal" distribution, 50% of the individual values uill lie within
0.674 standard deviations from the mean; roughly 2/3 of all individual values ill lie within
one standard deviation from the mean; and 90% of the individual values will lie within
1.645 standard deviations. SACHs, supranote 233, at 58-64. Statistical methods teach that
"[v]ery extreme deviations from the mean... exhibit so tiny a probability that the expression 'almost impossible' seems appropriate." Id. at 60. Of course, the fact that a distribution is standard normal says nothing about the value for the standard deviation, a point
which is of some relevance in the context of an exposure distribution.
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of the mean or median, of course, would mean a greater level of
protection for the average exposed individual than for the maximally exposed individual-a differential that is exacerbated as variability increases and values at the extreme of the distribution
become further removed from that of the mean (lesser exposed
individuals would be over-protected, and so are not of concern,
i.e., although their exposure scenario is not chosen as such, the
choice of a scenario more dire than theirs more than accounts for
their circumstances).
The difficulties presented by large variability are compounded
when the distribution is not normal but skewed such that it has an
extremely long upper tail. In a skewed distribution with a long upper tail, the mean and median values are no longer identical. The
mean value will be greater than the median value, because the
mean takes equal account of each individual value-including the
values at the extreme-whereas the median takes equal account of
the existence of each individual value.236 In cases of interindividual
variability, the fact that at least a few individuals will experience
vastly different-and, crucially, greater-exposures than the median or even the mean may render either version of the second
strategy inappropriate. Here, the choice of a median or mean
value may severely underestimate the exposure of (and thus the
risk to) the maximally exposed individuals. Indeed, even a 90th
percentile value may underestimate exposure to those maximally
exposed if the upper tail is extremely long.
Given the fish consumption evidence outlined above, it is clear
that marked variability characterizes an important parameter in
the exposure equation. It is also clear that a distribution that included the FCRs of the individuals evidenced by the CRITFC and
Puget Sound studies would not be normal, but skewed, with a long
upper tail. Legislative and agency policies that were formulated
assuming little or no variability and a normal distribution should
be revisited.237 Additionally, agency responses to variability that
were founded on the assumption that the identities of individuals
occupying different regions of an exposure distribution are un236. To illustrate, consider a distribution of five values, comprised: 1, 2, 3,4, and 100.
The median value is 3. But the mean is 22.
237. Of course, this is not the first context in which legislatures and agencies aiming
to protect human health have encountered variable populations. For example, legislative
directives to protect "the most sensitive" members of the population or to protect "the
individual most exposed" speak to precisely this feature of the data. See, e.g., Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (1990).
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known and unknowable should be reconsidered where this assumption does not hold.
2.

Identifiability of Native American subpopulations.

Even where agency risk assessors are aware of variability in parameters contributing to exposure, such as the fish consumption
rate, they tend not to ask questions about the identity of the individuals described by any given point on an exposure distribution.'
Unless specifically prompted to do so, a risk assessor is unlikely to
look for patterns of identity within an exposure distribution. Thus,
risk assessors may not be predisposed to recognize instances where
identifiable subpopulations occupy a particular region of an exposure distribution.
In the regulatory context, risk is generally expressed and considered in terms of incremental increases in the chance of some
occurrence (e.g., developing cancer) in an individual's lifetime.
The individual here is meant to be generic. A risk assessor's conclusion that a particular cleanup level for surface water will result
in a lifetime increased cancer risk of 1 (10) for those who eat fish
from that water is meant to refer with equal likelihood to every
individual who is an intended beneficiary of the cleanup action.Y9
How descriptive this estimate is of any one individual's risk, however, depends on how closely that individual's particular circumstances of susceptibility and exposure track the assumptions used
by the risk assessor to arrive at her estimate of risk.
Some commentators have argued that if variability exists, but
the identity of the individuals who will occupy a particular region
of the distribution is not and cannot be known, agencies might
legitimately ignore the variability. For example, some members of
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences have suggested that variability can be viewed as irrelevant "if
the variation is and will remain unidentifiable. -40
[S]ome argue that people should be indifferent between a situation wherein their risk is determined to be precisely 10 or one
wherein they have a 1% chance of being highly susceptible (with
238. MacLean, supra note 58, at 2; see also SciE~cE AND JvDacME%,r, supra note 44, at
213-17 (discussing identifiability with respect to wariation in the context of susceptibility).
239. See; eg., MacLean, supra note 58, at 75,7879 ("Risk analysts have tended to focus
only on the magnitude of the risk, however distributed ....If exacty one person will die
each year, the 1(10') magnitude indicates our ignorance in advance about who it will
be.").
240. SCMNCE AND JUDGNENT, supra note 44, at 213.
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risk = 10"') and a 99% chance of being immune, with no way to
know which applies to whom. In both cases, the expected value
of individual risk is 10.5, and it can be argued that the distribution
of risks is the same, in that without the prospect of identifiability
no one actually faces a risk of 10', but just an equal chance of
facing such a risk.2 4 '
However, the necessary condition for this situation, that the variability is and will remain unidentifiable, is unlikely to exist in the
context of exposure in health and environmental risk assessment.
Information about exposure is more readily available than information about susceptibility. Even crude or anecdotal information
about exposure indicates the probable identity of the individuals
or group of individuals in a particular region of a distribution.
And, of course, Native Americans and other groups have identified
themselves among the highly exposed and have begun to gather
and quantify their observations. With regard to fish consumption
rates, evidence that identifiable subpopulations occupy the high
end of the distribution means that agencies cannot operate as if
they do not know the identities of the most highly exposed. A
choice of the average or median value now means not only that
they have decided that it is appropriate to underestimate the exposure of actual,known individuals: among others, Native Americans
of the Pacific Northwest. Agencies can no longer claim ignorance
as to who it is that may end up being sorry when they choose to
target protection at the mean or median and can no longer take
refuge in how many this choice protects. The information on identity has shifted the debate to include not only how many but also
who. In the face of variability and identifiability, the only supportable regulatory strategies are a focus on the most exposed, or
disaggregation.
While, as a general matter, agency risk assessors may appropriately consider whether the statistical lives saved by protecting to the
level of the maximally exposed individual are worth the cost of doing so, 242 they can no longer be thought to be debating identityless,
anonymous, statistical lives. This is not, as noted, a matter of being
more or less conservative. It is a matter of deciding with full knowledge whom to protect. It involves nothing less than deciding, to
241. Id. at 213-16. Note that the view that risk is either one or zero is controversial
and does not command consensus of the National Research Council. Id.
242. See, e.g., BRnEYR, supra note 55, at 11-12, 46-47 (suggesting that the costs of protecting those maximally exposed-an aspect of the problem of regulating "the last 10 percent"-are not justified given scarce resources).
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paraphrase Annette Baler, which harms to notice and on whom we
will with good conscience impose death, or risk of death.2 43
On this understanding of the problem, I argue that in order to
make good decisions-decisions that are both scientifically defensible and just-agencies must take variability and identifiability into
account. The next two Parts advance two bases for differential
treatment of highly-exposed Native American subpopulations. Part
V.B explores a first cut: differential treatment of any highly exposed subgroup is necessitated by the fact that such a subgroup has
emerged from the data in a context where the stakes are high. Part
V.C explores a second cut: differential treatment is necessitated by
the identity of the subgroup that is highly-exposed, i.e. Native
Americans.
B.

Differential Treatment: Highly-Exposed Subpopulations

The mere fact that highly exposed subgroups exist in a context
where the stakes are high necessitates differential treatment by
health and environmental agencies. These agencies' regulatory decisions must be scientifically defensible, or at the very least not "arbitrary [or] capricious." 24 Because particular subgroups turn out
to be more exposed or more susceptible than members of the general population, agencies must recognize and attend to their different circumstances. This imperative is a matter of accurately
diagnosing and credibly responding to public health and emironmental problems. The more significant the differences in the circumstances of exposure or susceptibility between the
subpopulation and the general population, the more suspect an
agency decision that fails to disaggregate these groups for differential treatment. Agencies do not make defensible decisions if they
either fail to recognize subgroups defined by scientifically-relevant
features or collapse for similar treatment two or more subgroups;
at the very least, such choices require justification.
Health and environmental agencies' task in setting healthbased environmental standards is to protect each human's health.
The stakes indeed are high: "death, or risk of death."2" Health or
243. See Baier, supra note 67, at 49.
244. Courts' review of agency decisionmaking is generally highly deferential, guided
by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (A) (1994); see Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. Y.Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
245. See Baier, supra note 67, at 49 ("It is not merely a question of whose lives we
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environmental agencies cannot defensibly ride roughshod over important, scientifically-relevant differences, e.g., differences in exposure circumstances. Whether an individual's circumstances permit
her to be relatively insulated from environmental toxins or
whether they require her to be relatively exposed to them, an
agency's task is to set standards that ensure her a healthful environment. An agency's duty is to the most exposed as it is to the least
exposed. A corollary to this point is that no one individual's claim
to protection should turn on how many others share her circumstances of exposure.
As agencies have obtained a better picture of the affected population's exposure, subpopulations have tended to emerge-subgroups of individuals whose exposure scenario is different from the
general population's exposure scenario, and different along similar lines. In the previous Part, I termed this feature of the data
"identifiability." Identifiable subgroups whose circumstances make
them more highly exposed that the general population are of especial regulatory concern. Thus, for example, where the health
threat comes from ingestion of contaminated fish, recreational
fishers have emerged as a relevant subpopulation because the
groups' members consume fish at significantly greater rates than
the average or general population. Children and women have also
emerged as relevant subpopulations because each group's members weigh significantly less than the assumed norm: a 70kg adult
male.246 Similarly, where the health threat comes from inhalation
of polluted air, asthmatics have emerged as a relevant subpopulation because of this group's heightened susceptibility relative to
the non-asthmatic population. These subgroups are defined in
each case according to shared scientifically relevant attributes 247 -

rate of fish consumption is such an attribute for exposure to an
array of bioaccumulative toxins; age-correlated body weight is such
an attribute for exposure to developmental toxins in particular;
and asthma is such an attribute for susceptibility to the deleterious
effects of various air pollutants. To do an adequatejob, health and
should save by what measures with whose money, but whom . . . we will with good conscience kill, cause to die, or let die, and by what measures or neglect.").
246. See, e.g., Draft WQCM Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,800.
247. Agencies do not appear explicitly to attempt to define what they term a subpopulation to comport with socially, politically, or legally determined groupings. Thus,
agency risk assessors' use of terms describing groups within the larger population may or
may not track other bases for identifying socially, politically or legally relevant groups, See,
for example, discussion supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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environmental agencies need to devise a more refined, nuanced
response than would be necessary in the absence of variability and
identifiability.
These imperatives do not depend on the identity of the subgroup, but on the fact of identifiability as a subgroup. That is to say,
whether the subgroup is comprised of recreational fishers, Native
American fishers, children, women, or asthmatics, so long as the
subgroup is identifiable as such along scientifically relevant lines, it
warrants attention as a subgroup, especially where it is more at risk,
more exposed. And, it is important to note that there may be more
than one subpopulation that warrants such attention in any given
regulatory context. Here, it follows, it will not do to collapse distinctions among subpopulations, and agencies cannot as a matter of
course lump together all those who are different in some measure
or kind from the general population. This point is relevant where
exposure to environmental toxins is via fish consumption.
Although recreational fishers, Native American fishers, AfricanAmerican fishers, Asian-American fishers, and perhaps other subpopulations can all be described as subpopulations whose exposure scenarios are different from that of the general population,
there are differences as well among these subpopulations--differences that in many cases will make it inappropriate to ignore the
distinctions among them. Where there are significant differences
in the fish consumption rates and practices among subpopulations,
agencies should maintain distinctions between them.
Agencies, for a variety of reasons, do not always attend to the
different exposure circumstances of subgroups. But agencies
should be least troubled by claims for differential treatment of subgroups when the claims are grounded in scientifically relevant
characteristics of these groups, and the differences in circumstances are significant. In the case of exposure via fish ingestion,
this claim to differential treatment may be available to several different subpopulations, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the merits of these possible claims. This claim to
differential treatment is assuredly available to some Native American subpopulations.
These claims about appropriate agency responses to variability
and identifiability are controversial. One counterargument is that
the selection of a higher FCR, reflective of some subpopulations'
higher consumption rates, may not ultimately make that much of a
difference in terms of statements about risk or the resulting envi-
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ronmental standards. Unless the change in FCR is an order of
magnitude or more, there is likely to be no meaningful effect on
the outcome because the cancer potency factor ("CPF") is so large
as to dampen the effect of changes to the other parameters in the
risk assessment equation. The response to this argument is severalfold. First, the requisite order of magnitude difference in FCR will
be present for some subpopulations, especially Native Americans.
As the data outlined above demonstrate, some Native Americans in
the Columbia River Basin consume fish at the rate of 952 grams/
day, a number two orders of magnitude greater than the 6.5
grams/day currently assumed by EPA, and an order of magnitude
greater than the 86.3 grams/day proposed. Second, the argument
made in the context of potent carcinogens like dioxin is not as
plausible for other, less potent carcinogens. The CPF of 2,3,7,8
TCDD (dioxin) is [150,000 mg/kg body weight/day]' 1; the CPF of
DDT is (only) [0.34 mg/kg body weight/day]1 . 2 4 In fact, changes
to the other parameters in the risk assessment equation, such as
the FCR, will not get muted in most cases. Third, even small differences in outcome are important to affected peoples, whose health
and way of life is at stake. And, given that these individuals are the
ones likely to be exposed to numerous environmental hazards
from a variety of sources, the cumulative effect of even small
changes in outcome (in terms of risk or in terms of the environmental standard) means that even small changes cannot be disregarded.249 CRITFC adds: "EPA [in its Draft AWQC Revisions]
ignores the reality that sensitive populations may have significant
cultural practices and confounding, underlying health problems
and socio-economic conditions that may compound an individual's
or a population's risk by several magnitudes higher than calculated
''25 °
by EPA's typical risk mdthodology.
Some commentators make another counterargument: they
claim that no one individual's exposure is likely actually to be reflected by a composite of maxima for the variable parameters that
comprise the exposure portion of a risk assessment calculus. That
248. U.S. EPA, Integrated Risk Information System Database (visited Nov. 16, 1999)
<http://wv.epa.gov/iris/> (listing EPA's current CPFs or "oral slope factors"). Note that
the CPF for 2,3,7,8 TCDD is in the process of being reassessed. Other common examples
include aldrin, with a CPF of [17 mg/kg/body weight/day]', benzo-a-pyrene, with a CPF of
[7.3 mg/kg/body weight/day] 1 , and chlordane, with a CPF of [0.35 mg/kg/body weight/
day]-.
249. See, e.g., BANsAL & DAVIS, supra note 98, at 57.
250. CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 8.
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is to say, while an individual might be among the most highly exposed, i.e., fall at the 90th or 95th percentile of the distribution,
for one component of exposure, that same individual is unlikely
also to be among the most highly exposed, i.e., fall at the 90th or
95th percentile, for every other component that goes into calculating exposure. For example, in the context of air pollution, they
argue that no one individual is likely to live at the fence-line and to
live there for his or her entire lifetime and to spend the bulk of the
day out of doors.25 Therefore, it is unnecessary (and so a misdirection of scarce resources), to base environmental regulatory standards on a maximum value, rather than a mean or median value,
for every variable quantity that contributes to exposure; instead,
there is room to choose a maximum value here, but a median or
mean value there. These commentators cite statistics depicting
how frequently the "average American" moves his or her residence,
and how much time the "average American" spends indoors to support the argument that the maximum value for each of these three
parameters affecting exposure to air contaminants is unlikely to describe any single individual. "
This argument may have merit when applied to transient nonIndians. In the context of exposure via fish ingestion, this argument may have merit when applied to "the typical U.S. consumer
eating fish in moderation from a variety of sources."" But it fails
when applied to many Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest.
For many Native Americans in this region, actual individuals' exposures are described by a composite of the maxima. Actual individuals do live in the same place 254 and fish from the same spots2 and
251. See, eg., B x_., supra note 55, at 46-47 (suggesting that EPA's "strictly mechanical assumption that the individual is exposed to emissions at a point 200 meters from te
factory, all day, every day, for 70 years" is unrealistically "conservative");John D. Graham,
Improving Chemical Risk Assessmen, 14 REG. 14 (1991).
252. Se eg., BASAL & DAVIS, supranote 98, at 27; BMIR, supra note 55, at 46; Graham, supra note 251, at 15.
253. Upon release of its 1996 summary of state-issued fish advisories, the EPA made
precisely this assumption about the "average American," while acknowledging that practices different from the typical consumer were likely to lead to increased exposure:
The typical U.S. consumer eating fish in moderation from a -uriety of sources and
The populaeating a variety of species is not believed to be at increased risk ....
tions with the highest potential of increased risk are those who routinely eat freshwater fish from a single location or region that is knom to be impacted by
contamination.
U.S. ENVrL PROTECION AGENCy, NOTE TO CORMSPONDFNTS: EPA IssuEs 1996 FItS ADvisoRY DATA (1997).
254. In fact, most of the peoples of this region have occupied the same places from
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consume relatively large quantities of fish per day for a whole lifetime. Indeed, many feel that they could not do otherwise. 6 Yet
"stakeholders" in regulations applicable to the Puget Sound and
portions of the Columbia River Basin made precisely this rhetorical
case for employing a (low) diet fraction to account for the percentage of fish consumed from contaminated waters: "[A diet fraction
of 0.5] is unrealistically high. Who in the world would expect their
25 7
fish diet to come from the same contaminated source?"

A final defense of the current agency practice raises the specter
of the slippery slope and asks how far agencies should be expected
to go in recognizing particular subpopulations' exposure circumstances. Should agencies take account of every group's notion of
its special circumstances? At what point do gradations in the default FCR values become unwieldy? This slippery slope counterargument may be animated by both a concern about cost and a
concern for administrability. In some cases, these concerns will
time immemorial. See, e.g., Landeen & Pinkham, supra note 126, at 51-54 (recounting Nez
Perce oral history and other historical evidence of the creation and location of the Nez
Perce people (Nee-Mee-Poo or "The Real People") and quoting, in a sidebar, Allen Pinkham, who explains "[t]he Nee-Mee-Poo have occupied this country since time inimemorial."). While non-Indian owned land is typically held for relatively brief periods for
transitory habitation or for investment purposes, American Indian land tenure is marked
by intergenerational habitation by connection to and direct dependence on the land for
food and water. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Protectingthe Attributes ofNative Sovereignty: A
New Trust Paradigmfor FederalActions Affecting TribalLands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
109, 133-34.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 357-82 (W.D. Wash.
1974); Jay LaPlante, Celilo Falls: Flooded Forty Years Ago but Not Forgotten, 2 'WANA CHINOOK
Tvloo 8 (1997); Terri C. Hansen &Jon Lurie, Ecocide in Indian County, NEws moi INDIAN
CouNTRY, Aug. 15, 1955, at 14, available in 1995 WL 15435941.
256. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, The Importance of Salmon to the
Tribes, (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://wwvv.critfc.org.text/IMPORT.HTM> ("Salmon and
the rivers they use are part of our sense of place. The Creator put us here where the
salmon return. We are obliged to remain and to protect this place."). Margaret Palmer, a
Yakama tribal fisher explains:
I don't feel like it's within our rights, as the tribe as we are, to go to a different
area and live off of something that maybe God has blessed them with. This is our
blessing. This is the way we see it. This is where we should stay. I don't believe
that I would leave the area. I believe that I would stay where I'm at-by the water.
It's our lineage.
Videotape: My Strength Is From the Fish, supra note 1. Nor as a practical matter could the
Puget Sound and Columbia River tribes simply go elsewhere. The tribes' aboriginal and
treaty-based claims to land and resources are tied to specific places; the legal protections
that flow from these claims cannot simply and readily be re-established elsewhere. See
Wood, supra note 254, at 133-34. The particularized skills and knowledge that tribes have
developed over centuries are also place-specific and not transferable to other locations.
See, e.g., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 10.
257. MTCA Responsiveness Summary, supra note 152, at 226 (emphasis added).
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carry the day. In the case of subpopulations, such as Native Americans, whose FCR is significantly greater than the FCR for the general population, however, the concern for scientific defensibility
outweighs these concerns.
In summary, differential treatment of highly-exposed subgroups is necessitated by the mere fact that such subgroups exist,
or have emerged from the data, in a context where the stakes are
high. This is so regardless of the identity of the subpopulationalthough here it turns out that the Native American subgroups
have an especially strong claim for differential treatment because
their exposure circumstances are indeed significantly different
from the circumstances of the general population. This claim is
the first cut at a response to variability and identifiability.
C. Differential Treatment: The ParticularCase of Native American
Subpopulations
I turn now to the second cut: of the identifiable subgroups that
are candidates for differential treatment, some may require agency
attention because of their particular identity. Here, various moral
and legal commitments may come into play. Agencies must address the intersection of variability and the fact that a particular
identifiable subpopulation-Native Americans-occupies the high
end of a variable exposure distribution. I will argue that agencies
have inadequately considered the relevant normative commitments respecting cultural integrity, equality, and process, and have
not registered the applicable legal obligations arising from treaties,
the federal trust responsibility, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. While some facets of these claims may be relevant for
other subgroups, Native American subgroups present a unique
case.
1. Normative dimensions.
Agency discretion should be informed by respect for cultural
integrity, freedom from both exclusionary and cultural discrimination, and principles of just process. Agencies employing QRA to
set environmental standards confront numerous occasions for
value judgments that profoundly affect the outcome of the standard-setting process. Risk assessors make judgments based on their
personal experience, commitments, and training, but they should
also consider other values. Both emerging and well-settled norms
regarding ethnocultural groups in general, and Native Americans
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in particular, are a legitimate source of values for agencies' work
affecting Native Americans' resources and ways of life. There are
good reasons to recognize and have regard for groups and the host
of claims that each might make as such. Our world is one of nations, peoples, clans, clubs, and other groups.25 8 These existing
groups are, to varying degrees, important to the well-being of their
members. Groups serve as the locus of social relations, pursuits,
and aspirations that have value to their members and to society as a
whole.259 Some groups, especially peoples or ethnocultural
groups, 260 are absolutely central to the well-being of their members. Such groups shape to a large degree members' judgments
about the opportunities and responsibilities of life, and they influence profoundly members' perceptions of themselves and others.
The provide an anchor for members' self-identity and offer to
261
members the security of ready belonging.
As a general matter, it seems fair to recognize differences in the
roles that various sorts of groups play in members' lives. Where a
group plays a more central role in the lives of its members there
seems to be a better case for entertaining the group's claims to
differential treatment that enables it to flourish.262 We might be
amenable to a broader array of claims from such groups-ranging
from exemptions,
266

2 63

to assistance, 2 64 to representation, 2 65 to self-

government.
A club or association, such as Trout Unlimited, or the Ultimate
Players Association, might advance relatively modest claims, flowing in the main from the associational values that such groups
serve. A grouping-such as the trout-fishing public, or ultimate
players worldwide-might advance even fewer claims because of
258. Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PinL. 439, 440
(1990).
259. See, e.g., id. at 447-50.
260. I recognize that these terms, and the bases for distinction that they entail, are
controversial. See, e.g., Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka, Introduction to ETHNIcrn AND GROUP
RIGHTS, supra note 106, at 3; Thomas W. Pogge, Group Rights and Ethnicity, in ETH-NITY AND
GROUP RIGHTS, supra note 106, at 187, 187; Anaya, supra note 106, at 222.
261. See Margalit & Raz, supra note 258, at 442-47.
262. See id.
263. Jacob T. Levy, Classifying CulturalRights, in ETrHNIc
AND GROUP ictrHTs, supra
note 106, at 22, 25-27.
264. Id. at 29.
265. Id. at 43.
266. See Margalit & Raz, supra note 258, at 445-46 (contrasting membership in a
group-what I have termed a "grouping" such as the fiction-reading public-with membership in groups that are more constitutive of individuals' identities).
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the weakness of the association. Thus, the contraction of claims is
justifiable because one can in some sense be a member of these
groupings without even being aware that one belongs; membership
is not "high profile"-it is not one of the primary means of identifying who members are.
Moving in the other direction, a people or an ethnoculturalgroup,
such as the Umatilla, Native Americans, might advance broad and
robust claims to differential treatment that would enable the group
to flourish. The relative expansion of claims here stems from the
centrality of such groups to the lives of their members. -67 Such a
group is characterized by a common and pervasive culture that encompasses many varied and important aspects of life; that mediates
experience, informs values, conveys knowledge, and forges identity; and that "determines the boundaries of the imaginable ...
[and] the limits of the feasible." -c Those who grow up among
members of such a group will be marked by its culture. Its influence will be profound and far-reaching (though perhaps not indelible), affecting the tastes one develops, the options one appreciates
as being open, and the attitudes one espouses. Membership in
such a group is, in part, a matter of mutual recognition, of informal or formal acknowledgment by other members that one belongs. Membership is important for and constitutive of one's selfidentity; membership is highly visible, and is one of the primary
facts by which people are identified, in light of which other people
form expectations about who one is or what one is like. Being a
member is more a matter of belonging than achievement
(although continued recognition of one's membership may in
some instances and senses be conditioned on one having undertaken or having declined to undertake certain activities or achievements). One cannot, for the most part, choose to belong or to
qualify for membership, one belongsw-and is perceived by others to belong-because of who one is.
These characteristics are often interrelated. Some of them may
describe groups other than peoples or ethnocultural groups. Together they not only describe peoples or ethnocultural groups, but
also reveal the importance of such groups to their members and to
society as a whole. Within the United States, Native American peoples exhibit, as groups, the panoply of features described above.
There are thus good reasons to view the claims of these groups
267. See Margalit & Raz, supra note 258, at 444.
268. Id. at 449.
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differently than similar claims of other groups, say Trout Unlimited
or the trout-fishing public.
In addition, other values that should animate our policies-cultural integrity, equality, and fair process-call on us to think differently about the claims of Native American groups than about the
claims of other groups. This differential treatment is warranted
both as between Native American groups and clubs or associations
linked by recreational predilection; and between Native American
groups and other ethnocultural groups.269 I sketch below three
justifications for differential treatment of these peoples: cultural
integrity, equality, and process, and note that they are supported
by emerging and well-settled norms.2 7 0 I then suggest implications

for regulating agencies where variability is large, the distribution
skewed, and Native American subgroups are identifiable and
among the most exposed.
Protectionof cultural integrity. Differential treatment for Native

American groups is necessary to protect their cultural integrity.
Emerging norms in the United States and elsewhere value a diver1t
sity of cultures and support the protection of cultural integrityY
As S. James Anaya observes, "[a] mong the important values that
are embraced by enlightened societies and now featured in international human rights law is the value attached to the integrity of
diverse cultures. ' 27 2 This interest in cultural integrity necessarily
entails a different regard for those groups defined chiefly by distinctive cultural attributes than for other non-ethnocultural
269. See generally VINE DELoRIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969). Differentiation among peoples or ethnocultural groups may also require differentiation among
groups classified generally as Indian, although the fact of their classification as such by the
dominant society is relevant. See STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN
INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 74-76 (1988); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Pro-

tection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759, 804-05 (1991).
270. However, I do not attempt to examine these grounds in any comprehensive fashion, nor endeavor to flesh out the consequences of their recognition more generally as a
basis for differential treatment. My aim here is more modest; and it is limited to the context at hand.
271. Anaya, supra note 106, at 223-24. For evidence of these norms in tribal law, see,
for example, In reK.A.W., No.JV-86-9, 1992 WL 752134 (Comanche Child Ct. Feb. 5, 1992)
(citing Comanche Child Welfare Code § 1-1-2(c)); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal CourtJarisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT. L. Rxv. 7, 24-28 (1996). For evidence of these
norms in United States federal law, see, for example, Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994); Native American Language Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1990); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994); Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
272. Anaya, supra note 106, at 223.
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groups.2 73 Professor Anaya gives this example:
Taos Indian Pueblo, a culturally distinctive community of long-

standing and continuing profound significance to its members, is
clearly valued within the larger society differently from the Taos

ski club. Indeed, one can easily observe that, on grounds of cultural integrity, we tend to attach greater importance to groups

that comprise or generate distinctive cultures more than to other
types of groups. Taos Indian Pueblo is understandably considered 2a7 more
important nucleus of human interaction than the ski
4
club.

The growing recognition of the importance of cultural integrity
justifies various sorts of protections for the groups characterized by

common or pervasive cultures. Protection in this context should
be understood to include not only guarding the bare survival of a
culture, but also ensuring a more robust notion of cultural flourishing and development. Protection of cultural integrity should
also be guided by a contemporary recognition that culture is not

static2 7l 5 and that what is required to safeguard cultural integrity
2
will likely be different for different cultures.

76

Members of any cultural group-even a majority or dominant
cultural group-have an equal claim to respect for cultural integrity. But because the integrity of cultural groups in the numerical
minority, or otherwise in a nondominant position, are more likely
to be vulnerable to breach than cultural groups in a majority or

dominant position, a focus on the protection of minority cultural
groups is justified.2 77
273. See id. at 223.
274. Id.
275. For recognition that cultural integrity is a dynamic rather than a static concept,
see, for example., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Midu. 1979) (recognizing that "[t]he mere passage of time has not eroded, and cannot erode the rights guaranteed by solemn treaties that both sides pledged on their honor to uphold."); United
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 357, 402 (WVD. Wash. 1974) (recognizing that
"[t]he treaty tribes may utilize improvements in traditional fishing techniques, methods
and gear"); Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Maaliah 11aling.Questions and Ansuers
(visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://wv.mifc-wa.gov/whaling> (discussing planned use of traditional cedar canoes, a harpoon, and a .50 caliber rifle in a whale hunt). But c.f L Anede
Obiora, Bridges and Barricades:Rethinking Polemics and Intranzsigece in the CampaignAgainst
Female Circumcision, 47 CASE
. Rxs. L RE,. 275, 282 (1997) (,urning
that
"[m]ulticulturalism can be based on a static, ahistorical concept of 'ethnic culture' [that]
...feeds off assumptions of monolithic communities and incorporate stereotypes about
cultures").
276. See Anaya, supra note 106, at 225-26.
277. This is so, according to S.James Anaya, at least to the extent that "there is some
significant difference between its cultural attributes and those of the larger or dominant
population." Anaya, supra note 106, at 224.

86

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:3

Robert Williams argues that the cultural understanding of Native Americans and of the dominant majority is legitimate for each
group's own members.2 78 He points out that the sets of rules generated by and for each group ought to be respected as appropriate
for that group, and that problems arise where one group seeks to
impose its culture, rules and vision on the other. The goal of both,
he argues, should be to find a way to respect each.27 9 This is not to
say that respect for cultural differences and protection of cultural
integrity will not introduce complexities. Actions in furtherance of
one culture will often have effects that curtail the furtherance of
another or otherwise impose some costs. Attention to the kinds of
effects or costs imposed by such actions is crucial-some kinds of
costs may not be tolerable, while others may be countenanced. Respect for the cultural integrity of the peoples of the Pacific Northwest requires sensitivity to the importance placed by these peoples
on fish and fishing, even if this respect entails some costs to members of the dominant society. However, here the costs to members
of the dominant society are likely not to infringe upon their important interests.
Because of the importance of fish, fishing and fish consumption to the cultural integrity of Native Peoples of the Pacific Northwest, we should evaluate the claim of this group to health and
environmental protection differently from the claim of say, a fishing club or, perhaps more to the point, a grouping of recreational
fishers. In order to respect the cultural integrity of the Tulalip, the
Yakama, and other native peoples, we therefore need to attend to
their different claims, and to the different role of fish, fishing and
fish consumption in their culture-broadly understood in its religious, linguistic, aesthetic, political, economic and other social
spheres.
Remediation of exclusionary and cultural discrimination. The second ground for differential treatment of Native American claims is
equality. The pursuit of equality in many instances requires us to
consider the particular history and circumstances of ethnocultural
groups. When members of a group have suffered discrimination
precisely because of their distinctive ethnocultural or racial attributes, measures to remedy the discrimination are justified, and indeed required. Note that historical discrimination may have both
278. Williams, supra note 269, at 822.
279. Id.
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past and continuing effects, both of which must be affirmatively
counteracted. Moreover, groups' different histories have been accompanied by different kinds and mixes of discrimination that
must be taken into account. Professor Anaya has identified two
types of such discrimination-exclusionarydiscriminationand cultural
discrimination.9s°

Exclusionary discrimination involves impeding group members' full realization of the benefits and privileges commonly enjoyed by members of majority or dominant groups, or imposing
burdens not suffered by the majority or dominant society. Often,
members of minority or nondominant groups suffer impediments
or limitations precisely because of their identity as group members,
e.g., because of the groups' distinctive cultural, racial or ethnic attributes.28 ' Discrimination of this sort might also involve efforts to
exclude some groups from full participation in societal decision
making, even as those excluded bear the brunt of decisions made
in the forum that excludes them. In the United States, the past
and continuing experience of African-Americans provides a prominent example of exclusionary discrimination, but other groups
have also been subject to this sort of discrimination, including Japanese-Americans, Native-Americans, and women (on the basis of
gender) .282

Exclusionary discrimination is widely viewed as problematic. It
is not consonant with well-settled norms in the United States and
elsewhere; it serves as the justification for many familiar efforts to
address inequality. The understanding of discrimination as exclusion drives various positive expressions of these norms, including
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and
civil rights legislation. There is, moreover, an emerging consensus
that this sort of discrimination can result in inequalities in the distribution of risks from environmental harms. 2a
280. Anaya, supra note 106, at 227-29.
281. See, eg., Ud. at 227.
282. See, eg., iUL("[Exclusionary discrimination] is manifested prominently in the experience of black Americans, who initially found themselves within the U.S. polity as slaves
and who, even after emancipation, were denied rights of citizenship and access to social
benefits on an equal basis with the dominant white population.").
283. Thanks to the work of community activists, environmental injustice can no
longer be ignored by governmental or even private entities. In 1992, for example, ,anEPA
Environmental Equity Workgroup published a report to the administrator stating that "the
relative risk borne by low-income and racial minority communities is a special concern,"
and concluding that these populations "experience higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish, and agricultural pesti-
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This type of inequality typically requires remedies designed to
allow members of minority or subordinated groups to do those
things which members of the majority or dominant group can do
already. Realization of equality, on this view, may in some instances require society to honor claims to "assistance rights"-special provisions to enable a minority or subordinated group to
overcome obstacles to engaging in common practices. 8' These
provisions are likely to impose some sort of cost on the majority
society. But these costs are arguably outweighed by the injustice
that would result were the subordinated group denied access to the
activities in question.285 This argument is strengthened by the recognition that beyond being common things that members of the majority group can already do, in many cases, these are important
things that members of the majority can already do. Indeed, it
seems that the more important the activities at issue, the stronger
the claim to a remedy, even if there are attendant costs.
This strain of discrimination and the claims to equality that flow
from it help illuminate some specific aspects of the case at hand.
Native American groups have a claim to the full realization of the
benefits ordinarily enjoyed by members of majority or dominant
groups. The majority-or those who consume fish in line with the
dominant culture's practices-already enjoys a level of public
health benefits, i.e. protection from risk in excess of 1 in 1,000,000
at a descriptive FCR. Members of the subordinated culture seek
only to realize the benefits ordinarily enjoyed by the majority.
However, the benefits of state health and environmental protection are distributed such that only the dominant society can safely
engage in the common but vital activity of eating fish. These benefits should also be dispensed so as to enable subordinated groups
to engage in this common, vital activity.
cides in the workplace." 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEG'rION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGROuP RE.
PORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 3 (1992). See generally EN'IRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT (1992). But cf. Robert D. Bullard, Conclusion:Environmentalism with Justice, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RAcIsM" VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS

195, 195-201 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) (criticizing EPA's report as a public relations
ploy that fails in numerous instances to consider the evidence, particularly that presented
by grassroots advocates). In 1994, President Clinton issued an Executive Order specifically
addressing environmental justice: Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
284. Levy, supra note 263, at 29-32; see supra note 276 and accompanying text.
285. Levy, supra note 263, at 29-30.
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The subordinated group should not be made to suffer some
version of "lower yet adequate" protection. Recall that the Ninth
Circuit in Dioxin/OrganochlorineCenter cited approvingly EPA's argument that "the one-in-a-million risk level mandated by state
water quality standards for the general population does not necessarily reflect state legislative intent to provide the highest level of
protection for all subpopulations but could reasonably be construed to allow for lower yet adequate protection for specific subpopulations."2 6 The discriminatory reading implicit in the court's
argument is that the legislature, in stipulating a risk level of 1 (10'),
meant 1 (10') only for non-Indians and meant to allow higher
levels for the Tulalip, the Yakama, and the Umatilla. Even assuming that the court in Dioxin/OrganochiorineCenterfairly represented
agencies' and courts' approval for a range of risks in all regulatory
contexts, it is not fair to represent this as societal approval for sorting within this range according to identifiable subpopulation, especially where the identifiable subpopulation is one that might be
recognized as having legitimate claims rooted in equality. In particular, it is difficult to imagine an apology for EPA's construction
that is consistent with the understandings of what equality requires
with respect to Native Americans. Once the identity of the subpopulation getting "lower yet adequate" protection became apparent to EPA, arguments that might have been plausible in the
absence of identifiability are no longer valid.28 Tradeoffs that
might have been appropriate for EPA to consider with respect to
even other higher-consuming subpopulations, say recreational fishers, become inappropriate here.
Discrimination of a different sort works to suppress or obliterate cultural bonds, by stifling expression of nondominant or minority groups' cultures. Often this practice is sustained on the
premise that the dominant or majority culture is superior.- This
type of discrimination involves efforts by the dominant society to
acculturate or assimilate the subordinated group without their consent, and where abandonment of the group's cultural identity is
286. Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1995).

287. Recall, for example, the argument that if the identity of the subpopulation getting "lower" protection were not known or kno-able, then everyone in the entire population has, in theory, an equal chance of being the one protected to a level of 1(10') and of
being the one protected only to a level of 2.3(10"). Sce supra notes 236-.237 and accompanying text.
288. See Anaya, supra note 106, at 228.
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not internally desired.2 8 9 The absence of consent or a desire to be
assimilated sets groups like native peoples apart from immigrant
groups that "have in some way consented to subordinate their cultural expressions to those predominating in the receiving society."29 ° The experience of Native Americans in the United States
provides a clear and prominent example of this sort of discrimination.2 9 ' By definition, Native Americans are not immigrants, and
so could not be said to have given even tacit consent to the suppression of their cultural identity.2 92 Yet there is an undeniable
2 13
history of efforts to colonize, exterminate, and assimilate them;
these efforts have profound past and continuing effects. 2 9 4 Notably, these efforts have often been aimed at denying or denigrating
the land- and resource-based facets of Native Americans'
cultures.2 95
Cultural discrimination is increasingly understood to be a problem; it is not consonant with recognized norms in the United States
and elsewhere. The understanding of discrimination as cultural
suppression arguably fuels various positive expressions of these
norms with respect to Native Americans in the United States. For
example, the EPA's regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 might plausibly be understood to include some
sensitivity to the different bases for Native Americans' claim to
equality and, specifically, to the role played by cultural discrimination. The EPA regulations define "American Indian or Alaskan native" as "[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples of
North America, and who maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition. 2 9 6 Moreover, an under289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
See GETcHEs Er AL., supra note 30, at 41-72; Anaya, supra note 106, at 228-29.
See Anaya, supra note 106, at 228-29.
See generally ROBERT A. WILLAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN 1FS-TERN LEoGAL
THOUGHT: THE DIscOuRSEs OF CONQUEST (1990).
294. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 106, at 229 ("The cultural suffocation historically experienced by Native Americans... along with other multiple effects of colonialism, have
left [them] with deep wounds which manifest themselves in social, political, economic, as
well as cultural spheres.").
295. See, e.g., id. at 228-29; Growth of Gambling on Tribal Land Starts Trek Back Home by
Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, at A10.

296. 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1984) (emphasis added). Although the EPA regulations include "American Indian or Alaskan native" among the enumerated ethnic/racial groups
covered by the prohibition on discrimination "on the basis of race, color, national origin
or, if applicable, sex," this does not necessarily mean that there is an identical basis for
recognizing the claims of each of these sorts of groups. The inclusion of sex discrimina-

200

VARIABLE JUSTICE

standing of discrimination as cultural suppression may undergird
recent governmental cognizance of environmental injustice. President Clinton's Executive Order on Environmental Justice, for example, singles out for agency attention the differential
circumstances of subsistence populations with respect to fish
consumption.297
Cultural discrimination may require several different remedies.
Among these is a claim akin to what Professor Levy terms "exemption rights"--claims by the subordinated culture to be treated differently or exempted from considerations applicable to the
majority culture, in order for members of the subordinated culture
to be able to exercise cultural rights and to carry out cultural duties. Claims for redress might legitimately include other rights as
well.298 In any event, as Professor Anaya argues, "As indigenous
peoples now seek to rebuild their communities and cultures and to
recapture their destinies, usually within the framework of the [nation-states] in which they live, their claim for remedial measures is
2 99

strong."

This second strain of the equality justification further illuminates the case at hand. Remedying cultural discrimination against
Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest will require agencies to
acknowledge and address the double bind that is imposed when
risk assessors use fish consumption data that is not descriptive of
Native Americans' fish consumption practices. Agencies must recognize that a ready, unproblematic metric for dietary substitutions
does not exist, and that contaminated fish do notjust occasion nutritional deficiencies (although they do this too), but also result in
cultural suppression of Native Americans, with attendant effects in
economic, social, religious, political, linguistic and other spheres.
This recognition provides the rest of the response to the question
arguably begged by the formulation above, i.e., members of the
subordinated culture seek only to realize the benefits ordinarily ention on explicitly different terms ("if applicable") provides further evidence for the understanding of the varied bases for a claim to equality under Tide VI that I suggest. The Equal
Protection Clause might be understood to be sensitive to the different bases for Native
Americans' claim to equality, but the Supreme Court, especially, has given a complex and
evasive read to the matter. See, eg., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). S&egenerally
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Stricky" RaciaL" A Response to "Indians as Peopls', 39
UCLA L REv. 169 (1991); David C. Williams, Soetines Stuped: A Response to PNofessor
Goldberg-Ambros 39 UCLA L Rxv. 191 (1991).
297. See Exec. Order No. 12,898 (1995).
298. See Levy, supra note 263, at 25-29.
299. Anaya, supra note 106, at 229.
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joyed by the majority, that is, protection from risk in excess of 1 in
1,000,000 at a descriptiveFCR The stipulation that agencies protect
each group at its own descriptive FCR is necessary, particularly in
the case of the Native peoples of the Pacific Northwest, to avoid
cultural discrimination.3°°
Additionally, what constitutes "a descriptive FCR" can only be
determined by the affected people, because they are the only ones
in the position to judge the question.0 1 Just as the representatives
of the majority culture may appropriately determine that a descriptive FCR for the general population is one that affords protection
to the practices of the 90th percentile of the CSFII study, so a Native American tribe may determine that a descriptive FCR is one
that affords protection to the practices of its members. Indeed, a
tribe might appropriately determine that, in order to exercise their
cultural rights and carry out their cultural duties, it is necessary to
ensure protection of those tribal members consuming fish at the
very highest rates-to determine that it is especially important to
ensure protection of these individuals.3" 2
Remedying cultural discrimination also means understanding
that the claims of Native Americans have different origins than
those of other higher-consuming groups, including groups that
have been subject chiefly to exclusionary discrimination. Although
these groups' legitimate equality interests may indeed warrant differential responses by health and environmental agencies, the bases for and implications of their claims will often be different than
those of Native Americans' claims. Many of the considerations that
bear on Native American subpopulations will simply be inapplicable, even to other higher-consuming ethnocultural groups. In par300. Although this discussion is focused on fish consumption rates, the arguments
are applicable to all of the factors that go into representing this group's fish consumption
practices in a risk assessment. For example, agencies must attend to the need to remedy
cultural discrimination as they make the various judgment calls that go into selecting an
FCR, as well as a bioaccumulation or bioconcentration factor.
301. See, e.g., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 8.
302. In its comments on EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions, CRITFC gives the example of
a recent study that documents the fish consumption rate for "traditional members" of the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation at 540 g/day, and notes that " [t]lhe Umatilla study represents the subset of tribal members who most closely adhere to treaty provisions." CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 8 (citing S.G. Harris and Barbara Harper, A
Native American Exposure Scenario, 17 RisK ANALsis 789 (1997)). The 1994 CRITFC study
documents a maximum consumption rate of 972 g/day and also documents additional
findings with respect to members' ceremonial consumption of fish. As CRITFC points out,
this sort of data is most appropriately interpreted by the relevant tribe, and an FCR most
appropriately selected by the tribe. Id.

2000]

00VARABILE JUSTICE

ticular, other groups will not share the justification for remedial
measures originating in the suppression of the fishing cultures of
some Native American groups. Thus, when agencies think about
how to respond to variability, it is not appropriate for them to
lump together Native Americans' circumstances with those of
other higher-consuming subgroups, such as African-American or
Asian-American subpopulations. Yet this is exactly what EPA's 1998
Draft AWQC Revisions do in proposing one default for all "subsistence fishers/minority anglers." Although the fish-consumption
patterns and different exposure circumstances of these and other
minority subgroups do warrant particular attention by EPA and
other agencies,30 3 the justifications for this particular attention and
the responses necessitated are not the same for each of the groups.
In sum, in order to think about equality for Native Peoples in
the United States, it is necessary to recognize the tandem bases for
their claims to equality. Inequality stems from both exclusionary
discrimination and cultural discrimination. Any attempt to ensure
equality without attending to both aspects would be incomplete.
Although efforts to remedy inequality thus understood will likely
impose costs on members of the majority or dominant culture,
these costs are outweighed by what is at stake. Agencies regularly
countenance tradeoffs, permitting incremental decreases in environmental and health protections in order to avoid consequent increases in the regulatory costs. These tradeoffs are arguably
appropriate where the subpopulation whose health is thereby compromised, e.g., recreational fishers, has no particular claim to differential attention based on the past and continuing effects of
exclusionary or cultural discrimination, or based on a cultural attachment to (rather than nutritional preference or other predilection for) fish and fishing. Where, as here, these claims are
apposite, such tradeoffs become inappropriate.
Selecting an FCR that permits "lower yet adequate" protection
for identifiable Native American subpopulations is an affront to the
relevant two-part understanding of what equality requires. Accepting greater risks and lower protection for identifiable Native
American subpopulations is profoundly inconsistent with this conception of equality. The approach taken by the agencies and sanc303. See, eg., West et al., supra note 21, at 111-12. Note that CRITFC's comments to
the EPA suggest not only that EPA consult tribal policy leaders to determine the FCR based
on tribal data, but also that EPA take this approach "for local studies on other subsistence
and highly exposed groups." CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 8.
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tioned by the courts is not consonant with the norms that ought to
guide the decisions at hand.
Finally, differential treatment for Native Americans is warranted
to ensure the claims of these groups to just or due process. Two
aspects of this claim are especially salient here. First, members of a
minority or subordinated group have a legitimate claim that they
ought not be made to bear the brunt of decisions made in a forum
that systematically excludes them. Second, there is a normative
claim that a majority or dominant group should not be able to
speak for a culturally different minority or subordinated group, a
claim that might be captured by an anti-paternalism principle. Together, these arguments should inform thinking about process
where the interests of Native American groups are at stake.
The first concern is sometimes framed as the more familiar
claim for "meaningful participation" by a minority or subordinated
group in decision making that affects their legitimate interests.
Norms favoring just or due process are widely held and well integrated into the legal fabric of many societies, including the United
States. 30 4 But it is important in the case of Native Americans to
recognize the ways in which this first claim may be different than
claims for participation made by other stakeholders and even by
other minority groups. The claim here is not solely one that inclusion would remedy; it does not originate in a desire to be brought
into the fold." °5 Rather, it is important to note the additional
dimensions introduced by the fact of cultural difference. What is
necessary here is more than simply the inclusion of Native Americans in a process already cast by the majority or dominant culture.3 °6 The entire process itself might need to be recast in order
not to suppress or transform Native Americans' different cultural
experiences.
The second claim that a majority or dominant group should
not be able to speak for a culturally different minority or
subordinated group is necessitated in the United States by a history
and practice of cultural suppression, rooted in a conviction that
anglo-european culture, being civilized and Christian, was superior
304. In the case of the United States, see, for example, U.S. CoNsr. amends. V, XIV.
In the case of tribes, see, for example, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wiley, No. 94-17260,
23 INDIAN L. REP. 6037, at n.4 (Colv. Tr. Ct. Jan. 31, 1996); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal
CourtJurisprudence:A Snapshot from the Field 21 VT. L. Rxv. 7, 43 (1996).
305. Anaya, supra note 106, at 228 (noting that efforts to enhance the participation of
minorities in the larger society are often accompanied by cultural discrimination).
306. See Gauna, supra note 103, at 13-16.
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to native peoples' cultures, being savage and heathen. 3 7 From
these repugnant notions sprang the edict that it wras the right and
duty of the anglo-european culture to impose its views on and
subordinate native cultures, and to "look out for" them because
they could not look out for themselves. The profound impact of
these justifications and practices on Native peoples continues
today.
This second basis for a claim to process also colors norms accepted in the United States and elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine
what measures would be required in order to prevent the dominant society from speaking for culturally distinct Native Americans
in the context at hand. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact
that the process has indeed been cast, and it takes place in the
agencies, if not the courts, of the conqueror. 0 However, certain
prominent features of the process stand out as working against this
goal. The use of QRA as a decisional tool, among other things,
might thwart this goal. 0 9 As noted above, to the extent that QRA
imposes a particular epistemology, and to the extent that Native
Americans' experiences are only heard by agencies and courts if
they are framed according to the cultural understandings of the
majority, cultural discrimination is perpetuated and just process
denied.
As a pragmatic matter, some Native American tribes have
sought meaningful participation or interaction in environmental
decision-making processes at the state and federal levels. These
tribes have sought to have a voice in decisions that affect them. Of
course any understanding of tribes' legitimate claims in this regard
must begin by recognizing that tribes are sovereign governments.
Recent executive commitments have formalized the federal government's understanding that, because tribes are sovereign governments, participation and interaction must occur in a manner
befitting a government-to-government relationship. Cognizance of
the particular justifications for Native Americans' claims to process
should inform all agencies' thinking about their interaction with
tribes.
I have set forth some of the normative dimensions of Native
307. See generally, WiLta-s, supra note 293.
308. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) ("Conquest gives a
tide which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.. .. "); wealsoWilliams, supra note 25,
at 293-94.
309. CRITFO Comments, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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American groups' claims to differential treatment by health and
environmental agencies. The value that we attach to just process,
cultural integrity, and equality justifies special attention to the particular case of Native Americans, including those of the Pacific
Northwest. I turn next to the doctrinal dimensions of the claims of
these groups to differential consideration by health and environmental agencies, and argue that agencies are legally bound by
these legal obligations to provide differential treatment. Important among the relevant sources of law for the first peoples of the
Pacific Northwest are treaties with the United States, the federal
government's trust responsibility, and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In particular, the treaty and trust obligations must be
understood to provide the legal framework within which environmental agencies' decisions-including those decisions employing
QRA as a tool-take place, rather than the other way around.
2.

DoctrinalDimensions: Treaties, Trust, and Title V.

The claims of indigenous peoples in the United States are different than the claims of other groups because, in many instances,
they are governed by treaties, the federal trust responsibility, and
Title VI. Specifically, treaties in many cases constrain important
aspects of the relationship between the state and Native American
tribes. For the Pacific Northwest tribes, the Stevens-Palmer treaties
speak directly to the tribes' right to continue to fish as they had.
The trust obligation, on contemporary understandings, requires a
heightened attention by the federal government to the values of
cultural integrity and self-determination of Native Peoples within
the United States. The trust obligation applies to treaty and nontreaty Native Americans alike and it operates in the interstices of
treaties and other laws, including environmental laws, to impose
on federal government the highest duty of good faith. Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color or national origin in programs, including state environmental programs, receiving federal financial assistance. Under
EPA's regulations implementing Title VI, the relevant states are
prohibited from using criteria or methods of administering their
environmental programs which have the effect of subjecting American Indians to discrimination or impairing the objectives of their
programs with respect to American Indians. Together, these three
doctrinal sources constrain in important and unique ways health
and environmental agencies' decisions affecting Indians and their
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resources. 3 10
Treaties between First Nations and the United States. In many
cases, treaties between American Indian nations and the United
States impose relevant legal obligations on both federal and state
environmental agencies. Such treaties are recognized as binding
legal documents under the law of nations, under United States
constitutional law, and under the legal systems of the Native nations. 31 1 According to United States constitutional law, treatiesincluding Indian treaies-ate the supreme law of the land.3 12- According to the laws of the Native nations that entered into treaties
with the United States and its colonial predecessors, treaties "were
typically regarded as foundational texts of lasting juridical significance for ongoing relations among diverse peoples, and continue
to be regarded as such."3 1 3 On both understandings, a principal
attribute of treaties is their binding character, such that material
terms of the agreement may not be unilaterally abrogated.3 1 4 Similarly, on both understandings, a concept implicit in treaties and
treaty-making is that described by the maxim pacta sunt servandawhich is to say, parties to a treaty implicitly covenant to keep their
word and to adhere to the agreement in good faith.3 15
For many American Indian nations in the Pacific Northwest,
treaties speak to relevant aspects of their historical and ongoing
relations with the United States. These treaties, collectively re310. This treatment is limited; it does not exhaust the relevant sources of law that
might bear on agency action here. Notably, it excludes obligations under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and under various international legal commitments. With respect to the latter, see generally S.JAms AmES
,%INIot.os PEoP.ES 1'%
INrERNAnoNAL lw (1996).
311. See generally, FRANCIS PAUL PRCcHA, AMERIC'N INDLvNS TRi-xEs: THE Htsror" OF
ROBERT A. WiLuA.is, LINKING AR.ss Toc;Emm A.tEu.mN
'#AND
P.4cE, 1600-1800 (1997); S.James Anaa, In tie Supre

A Pou-c.L Axo, tA.Y (1994);
INDIAN TREArYVisiONs OF L

Court of the American Indian Nations Lone Wolj PrincipalChief of the Kiowas, el aL, 7 Writ Ks.,.
J.L PuB.POL'Y 117, 129-31 (1997); cf FRAtxs PAUL PRMc-%, A.ErICAN Li,
D,%xs TiRtvr-is:
THE HISTORY OF A Porrlc A. A O tALy (1994).
312. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, has the power to make
treaties. U.S. Cosr. art. H, § 2, cl.
2. Under the Supremacy Clause, treaties are superior
to any conflicting state laws. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV,cl. 2.; see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518 (1832).
313. Anaya, supra note 311, at 130; see also Frank Pommersheim, Representing Nalive
People and Indian Tribes: A Response to ProfessorAllegretti, 66 FoRrnLit L RE%% 1181, 1183
(1998).
314. See, eg., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PVBUuC 1N-rra.%.o.'zA Lw 616 (4th ed.
1990); Anaya, supra note 311, at 130.
315. See Anaya, supra note 311, at 130-31.
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ferred to as the Stevens-Palmer treaties, support an interpretation
that not only recognizes Indians' reservation of their right to take
fish "at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations," but also
includes some guarantee that there be fish for taking (and consuming), that is, that the fishery habitat be protected from degradation or contamination. The Treaty of Medicine Creek, between
the United States and various Puget Sound tribes, for example,
provides "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory." 316 Other 1854-55 treaties

include virtually identical language. 17
By the early 1900s, however, the United States Supreme Court
had already had to address encroachments on this treaty-guaranteed right to take fish, ruling that neither private parties nor state
regulation could exclude Indians from harvesting a share of fish at
their usual and accustomed fishing areas.318 In the 1970s district
1
court Judge George Boldt found in United States v. Washington"

that, among other things, the tribes' express reservation of fishing
rights recorded in these treaties included the right to share equally
with non-treaty fishers "the opportunity to take fish at 'usual and
316. Treaty with the Nisquallys (Medicine Creek Treaty), Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisquallys, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855). Indian parties included the Nisquallys, Puyallup, Stellacoom, Squawksin, S'homamish, Steh-chass, T'Peeksin, Squi-aitl, and Saheh-wamish. See
id.
317. Treaty with the Duwamish, Jan. 22, 1855, U.S.-Duwamish, art. V, 12 Stat. 927
(1859); Treaty with the S'kllallams, Jan. 26, 1855, U.S.-S'kllallams, art. IV, 12 Stat. 933
(1859); Treaty with the Makah, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah, art. IV, 12 Stat. 939 (1859);
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, U.S.-Yakimas, art. III, para. 2, 12 Stat. 951 (1859);
Treaty with the Walla Walla, June 9, 1855, U.S.-Walla Walla, art. 1, 12 Stat. 945 (1859);
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, U.S.-Nez Perce, art. III, para. 2, 12 Stat. 957
(1859); Treaty with the Tribes of the Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, U.S.-Tribes of the
Middle Oregon, art. I, para. 3, 12 Stat. 963 (1859); Treaty with the Qui-nai-elts,July 1, 1855Jan. 25, 1856, U.S.-Qui-nai-elts, art. III, 12 Stat. 971 (1859). See generally PRucttA, supranote
311, at 250-55, & App. B.
318. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). In Winans, the Court ruled that
the treaty language guaranteed to the Indians an implied right of access across private
lands to reach treaty fisheries, and also prohibited an arrangement where non-Indians
used state-licensed fishing wheels that prevented Indian treaty fishers from harvesting a
share of fish at their usual and accustomed fish stations. The Winans Court also enunciated a crucial principle for understanding the Stevens and other treaties: that they were
.not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of
those not granted." Id. at 381. For a recent recapitulation of courts' interpretation of
Indian fishing rights under the Stevens treaties, see Allen H. Sanders, DamagingIndian
Treaty Fisheries:A Violation of TribalPropertyRights?, 17 PuB. LAND & REsoURCEs L. Rxv. 153,
154-59 (1996).
319. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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accustomed grounds and stations.'" 3 21 Judge Boldt issued this

opinion after more than three years of intensive study had revealed
an erosion of Indian fishing rights by state regulation and by vai-

ous sources of non-Indian encroachment.3 2-1 Among the important
and foundational principles enunciated by Judge Boldt is that
American Indians' fishing rights differ from those of other citizens
because of the treaties.3 22 Judge Boldt also affirmed the importance of fish to the Indians and recognized the treaties' role in
securing the place of fish and fishing in the lives of the treaty
tribes. The court noted that "[t]he evidence shows beyond doubt
that at treaty time the opportunity to take fish for personal subsistence and religious ceremonies was the single matter of utmost
concern to all treaty tribes and their members.""
Courts construing Indian treaty-secured fishing rights have supplied additional interpretations relevant to health and environmental agency standard setting. Courts have emphasized that
treaty-protected rights to fish cannot be "balanced away" by competing interests or concerns.3 2 4 As held in United States v. Michigan, these rights "may not be qualified by any action of the
5
3

state." 2

2
Moreover, in the second phase of United States v. Washingtoa'

320. Id. at 343; see also Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
321. SeePRucHA, supra note 311, at 404.
322. Id-; see also Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 678-79 (1979) (holding that treaty language securing a "right of taking
fish... in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee
Indians access to their usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for
individual Indians, along with non-Indians, "to try and catch fish").
323. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974). But ef.
FishingVessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 688-89.
324. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976); United States v.
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413 (9th Cir. 1983); Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 717-18 (9th
Cir. 1983); New Mexico v. Aamodlt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1113 (10th Cir. 1976); see also United
States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 281 (WX.D. Mich., 1979) ("IT]he right of the ...tribes
to fish in ceded waters of the Great Lakes is ...distinct from the rights and privileges held
by non-Indians and may not be qualified by any action of the state.., except as authorized
by Congress."). Accord, United States Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor,
Memorandum from Michael J. Anderson, Associate Solicitor, Diision of Indian Affairs,
Subject: Indian Treaty Hunting and Fishing Rights and the Endangered Species Act (Nov.
8, 1994) ("Acknowledgment that treaty rights are to receive the highest protection possible
leads to the conclusion that non-treaty impacts on treaty resources must be minimized to
permit the fulfillment of treaty promises." (citing United States %.Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
381 (1905) ).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Midzigan, 471 F. Supp. at 281.
326. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (Phase 11)
vacated by United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
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the district court, in an opinion that was vacated on other grounds,
held that "implicitly incorporated in the treaties' fishing clause is
the right to have the fishery habitat protected from man-made
despoilation .... The most fundamental prerequisite to exercising
the right to take fish is the existence of fish to be taken. '327 While

the vacated opinion has no precedential force, the logic behind
the court's interpretation remains unassailable.328 Other courts
have since found that the treaty-secured right to take fish requires
ensuring
certain ecological conditions necessary to support the
9
fish.

32

The Stevens-Palmer treaties, so interpreted, should be under30
stood to constrain environmental agencies' standard-setting.
Where federal or state3 3 1 agencies 332 use quantitative risk assess-

ment and rely on fish consumption rates and other exposure factors that underestimate Native Americans' exposure, they arguably
permit contaminant levels in excess of levels that would adequately
support the tribes' treaty-protected right to take fish. The EPA in
its Draft Ambient Water Quality Criteria Methodology Revisions
notes the applicability of "tribal rights under federal law (e.g., fishing, hunting and gathering rights)" to agencies' determination of
327. Id. at 203. See generally Peter C. Monson, United States v. Washington (Phase 11):
The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream, 12 ENvTL. L. 469 (1982).
328. Cf CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 1-2, 4 (noting that courts have concluded that "the treaty right to take fish would be meaningless if the fish resource were
permitted to diminish because of industrial development and pollution"); Sanders, supra
note 318, at 167-71 (noting that "[t]he argument for an implied treaty right of habitat
protection draws upon the special rules of Indian treaty construction and the historical
evidence ... that they would always be able to rely on their fisheries for their economic,
subsistence, and cultural needs ....

.").

329. See, e.g., Kittitas Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, 763
F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court's order authorizing the watermaster to
ensure sufficient water flow for the protection of salmon nests within the Yakima River
system, because it was necessary to protect the Yakima Nation's treaty-secured fishing rights
under one of the Stevens-Palmer treaties); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding that Indians are entitled to the water necessary to protect their treaty-secured fishing rights).
330. Cf CRITFO Comments, supra note 1, at 1-2, 4 (arguing that courts have directed
agencies to exercise their authority in a manner that will protect, rather than degrade,
treaty-protected fish habitat).
331. Treaties entered into by the United States are binding on both federal and state
governments. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61
(1832) (declaring void a Georgia statute that purported to alter a treaty right of the Cherokee Nation).
332. It is well-established that agencies can neither violate nor abrogate treaty rights.
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDEPAL INDLAN Lw, 217-28 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1982).
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fish consumption rates and other exposure factors affecting waters
supporting, inter alia, treaty-protected fisheries.3 ! "Federal law"
here presumably is meant to include Indian treaties, although it is
remarkable that EPA nowhere specifically refers to its treaty obligations. Nor does EPA elaborate its understanding of the implications of such "tribal [fishing] rights under federal law."
Given that a treaty right is implicated, it is not appropriate to
lump together for treatment Indians and non-Indians.3 4 Moreover, although agencies may ordinarily attempt to balance competing considerations, e.g., trading off increased protection of human
health against the monetary costs of such increase, agencies cannot
balance away American Indians' treaty-protected fishing rights. Finally, agencies should keep in mind the implied covenant of good
faith when they exercise discretion or make the many judgments
required by QRA. In order to uphold the Stevens-Palmer and
other treaties-which agencies are bound to do-agencies should
ensure that the effect of their many judgments is to sustain Native
American nations' treaty-protected rights to take fish.
The federal trust responsibility. The federal trust responsibility
imposes on the federal government a set of obligations that, properly understood, require environmental laws to be interpreted and
environmental standards to be set in a manner protective of Native
American property, resources, and culture. The trust responsibility
is a substantive elaboration of the standard of conduct for the fed35
eral government vis vis Native American tribes and individuals;
as such, it is one of the "cornerstones" of federal Indian law. 33
The duty imposed is that of the "most exacting fiduciary."3 37 The
trust responsibility binds federal administrative agencies, including
the EPA and other agencies that regulate human health and the
333. "EPA further notes that risk levels and criteria need to be protective of tribal
rights under federal laws (e.g., fishing, hunting and gathering rights) that are related to
water quality. Subrights may raise unique issues and will need to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis." Draft WQCNI Revisions, supra note 39, at 43,773.
334. See eg., Department of Interior Memorandum, supra note 324, at 8 (arguing
against lumping assessment of Indian and non-Indian activity, where treaty rights are implicated, in context of fishing and hunting rights and the Endangered Species Act).
335. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Fulfillingthe Jiseutie's Trust Responsibiliy Toward the Native Nationson EnvironmentalIssues: A PartialCritiqueof the Clinton Administration's
Promisesand Performanc, 25 ENvm. L. 733 (1995) [hereinafter Wood, NativeNations];Mar)
Christina Wood, IndianLand and the Promise of Native Soverggnty: The Tust DoarineRevisited,
1994 UTAH L Ruv. 1471 [hereinafter Wood, Indian Land]; Wood, mupra note 254.
336. See COHEN, supra note 332, at 221.

337. Id. at 226 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
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environment. It requires that federal action with respect to treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative reg338
ulations, be "construed in light of the trust responsibility.
Because the trust responsibility exists independent of and in addition to treaty obligations, its applicability is not limited to treaty
tribes. 339 According to contemporary understanding, the object of
the trust relationship is furtherance of American Indian self-determination and cultural integrity. 34 ° Mary Christina Wood has argued further that tribal sovereignty and a viable Native separatism
should serve as the benchmarks for measuring the trust responsibility.3 4 1 She identifies four attributes of sovereignty that "warrant

protection as beneficiary interests under the trust doctrine: (1) a
stable, separate land base; (2) a viable tribal economy; (3) self-government; and (4) cultural vitality" and should thus serve as focal
points for trust analysis.342
Although in the past the United States Supreme Court has supported an absolutist version of the congressional plenary power
over the American Indians as a corollary to the duties of trusteeship, contemporary scholarship suggests that the trust doctrine
continues to exist free of its insidious racist moorings. Professor
Anaya notes: "[t] he idea of a guardianship or trusteeship between
the U.S. federal government and Indian nations is not itself objectionable, if the sources and objects of that relationship are adjusted
to contemporary values of Indian self-determination and cultural
'
integrity."343
Professor Anaya then explains the derivation of the
trust responsibility as "an exegesis of the course of U.S.-Indian relations and international law." 344 He points out that the normative
elements of the trusteeship have changed as the dominant thinking in each of these arenas has itself changed over time.3 45 Thus,
he observes, norms in the international context now include con338. COHEN, supra note 332, at 220-21.

339. See, e.g., Wood, Native Nations, supra note 335, at 742.
340. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 311, at 131-34; D. Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra
note 269, at 843.
341. See Wood, Indian Lands, supra note 335, at 126-33.
342. Id. at 113, 133-222.
343. Anaya, supra note 311, at 131.
344. Id,at 138; cf.Wood, Native Nations, supra note 335, at 74243 (arguing that
"Nearly all native peoples in the United States ...share a common loss of land and resources to an immigrant majority population with colonialist impulses. The trust doctrine
represents that measure of legal responsibility on the part of the majority society to protect
what the native population retained.").
345. See Anaya, supra note 311, at 132-38.
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temporary conceptions of the long-recognized special duty to ensure the just treatment of indigenous peoples. Even within the
United States, constitutional understandings of the trust have been
rearticulated to impose some sorts of constraints-albeit limitedon the exercise of federal power vis a vis American Indians.
In the context of federal actions affecting tribal land and resources, tribal leaders and other commentators have argued that
the duty imposed is an affirmative one. Ted Strong, then Executive Director of CRITFC, casts the duty as one requiring both federal protectionof trust resources and federal assistancein tribes' own
efforts to protect those resources:
The United States' trust responsibility toward American Indians is
the unique legal and moral duty of the United States to assist
Indians in the protection of their property and rights. Too often,
the federal government has construed protection to mean control ....

In the spirit of the law, we seek federal assistance to

6
defend against injury to our trust resources.
Professor Wood similarly emphasizes that the trust obligation in
this context includes a duty "to protect tribal lands, resources, and

3 47
the native way of life from the intrusions of the majority society."

In order to comply with trust obligations, federal environmental agencies, including the EPA, must abide by several established
principles. For example, it is "well settled" that the trust responsibility applies to decisions regulating off-reservation sources and activities that impact tribal lands.3 48 Further, many tribes by treaty
retained property rights in off-reservation resources, such as the
fishing rights retained by the tribes of the Pacific Northwest. The
trust responsibility requires the EPA to protect these tribal property rightsA 9 As the district court recently held in Northwest Sea
Farmsv. U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, a case involving Lummi fishing
rights under the Treaty of Point Elliott, "-[i] n carrying out its fiduciary duty, it is [federal agencies'] responsibility to ensure that In346. Wood, Native Nations, supra note 335, at n.38 (citing HearingsBefore the Columi'ia
River Fsheries Task Force, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (OcL 28, 1992)
(statement of Ted Strong, Executive Director)).
347. Id at 742 (emphasis added).
348. Id. at 744.
349. See id&at 744. Donald Sampson, Chairman of the Umatilla Board of Trustees
reiterates this obligation in the specific context of the several threats to the fish of the
Columbia River Basin: "Each... federal agenc[y] ha[s] a trust responsibility to protect
these resources for the tribes. And what this means is that they've got to protect and recognize the rights to fish and the right to have those fish in the streams. ...
A Matter of
Trust, supranote 130.
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dian treaty rights are given full effect."3 5 0
In addition, agencies should not attempt to accommodate the
general public's interests if to do so would jeopardize or compromise tribal resource rights. 351 Moreover, while the EPA is often
given considerable latitude in implementing the various environmental statutes with which it is charged, it must exercise its discretion in light of its trust obligations. 'Judgment calls" resulting in a
denial of Indian rights are not permissible under the trust.3 52 As
Professor Wood explains,
[The] trust responsibility can be thought of as an interstitial body
of law that, when applied in concert with applicable statutes, imposes on agencies a duty to protect tribal interests in carrying out
general statutory mandates.... The trust responsibility provides a

parameter to guide [agencies'] discretion when Indian rights are
affected. In the environmental context, the trust obligation to
protect tribal resources should often translate into a higher level
of ecological protection than that which might result when solely
non-Indian interests are affected.35 3
Finally, in order to fulfill its fiduciary obligations, the EPA may
need to actively ensure that tribal interests are being heard and
considered in decision-making processes that affect these
interests.35 4
350. Northwest Sea Farms v. United States Army Corp of Engineers, 931 F. Supp.
1515, 1520 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (emphasis added).
351. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 255-57
(D.D.C. 1972). The court found defective the Secretary of the Interior's regulation allocating water to the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District that would otherwise have flowed into
Pyramid Lake, which lake was on the tribe's reservation and constituted the tribe's principal source of livelihood, among other things, because the Secretary misunderstood the
obligations imposed by the trust.
[T]he Secretary's... approach to the difficult problem confronting him misconceived the legal requirements that should have governed his action ....
The Secretary's duty was not to determine a basis for allocating water between the District
and the Tribe in a manner that hopefully everyone could live with .... [T]he
tribe had asserted well-founded rights .... It was not [the Secretary's] function
to attempt an accommodation .... The Secretary was obliged to formulate a

closely developed regulation that would preserve water for the Tribe .... Difficult as this process would be, and troublesome as the repercussions of his actions
might be ....

Id. at 256-57; see also CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting Northern Cheyenne
Tribe v. Hodel, 12 INDIAN L. REP. 3065 (D. Mont. 1985)).
352. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tibe, 354 F. Supp. at 256-57 (holding that the Secretary's judgment call "calculated to placate temporarily conflicting claims to precious water
...

was simply not legally permissible [and] ...fail[ed] to demonstrate an adequate recog-

nition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe.").
353. 'Wood, Native Nations, supra note 335, at 743-45.
354. See, e.g., Northwest Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1524.
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Thus, by virtue of the federal trust responsibility, federal agencies setting or approving health-based environmental standards for
water and sediments on which fish-and, in turn, Native Americans-depend, have an obligation to protect higher-consuming
Native American subpopulations as part of the duty to protect Native Americans' resources and way of life. This obligation requires
the EPA to reevaluate standard interpretations of health and environmental statutory directives when such interpretations affect Native Americans and to employ a fish consumption rate and other
exposure factors that are reflective of Native American consumption. The trust obligation further prevents federal agencies from
seeking to accommodate conflicting interests affecting issues such
as water quality where to do so would compromise tribal resources,
including resources necessary to support treaty-secured rights to
fish. In addition, agencies employing QRA to set environmental
standards arguably must refrain from making a host ofjudgment
calls that together work to deny protection of Native American
rights to take and consume fish. Finally, federal agencies may need
to take more affirmative steps to ensure that tribal interests are being heard, considered, and protected; in the case of EPA, this responsibility should inform its criteria documents and other
guidance, its approval of state standards, and its issuance of
standards.
Together, obligations flowing from treaties and trust give rise to
a legitimate claim by Native Americans of the Pacific Northwest to
extraordinary consideration. Specifically, these Native Peoples can
properly seek exemption from the balancing that agencies apply to
other outlier subpopulations. Full recognition of treaty rights and
the trust obligation means "giving full consideration to and accounting of the tribes' treaty right to take fish and to takefish that
are safe to eat. '55 Although that path will likely impose societal
costs, these costs are exactly what the majority society in the United
States should be understood as having undertaken, and should uphold in good faith.
Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits state environmental agencies from administering their programs in ways that discriminate against American Indians. Specifically, it prohibits recipients of federal funds
from discriminating "on the ground of race, color, or national ori355. CRiTFC Comments, supra note 1, at 5.
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gin.''5 56 Most state agencies charged with setting health and environmental standards receive federal financial assistance and thus
fall within the ambit of Title VI.317 The EPA has promulgated implementation of regulations applicable to these recipients. 58
EPA's regulations specifically include "American Indian [s]" among
the covered classifications based on race, color, or national origin. 5 9 Although Title VI provides both administrative 360 and judicial avenues for complaint, the ability of a group to bring an action
to enforce agency compliance with Title VI's directives is not fully
developed. The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered whether a private right of action is available under regulations
implementing Title VI.3 61
In the context of general Title VI claims, the Supreme Court
has to date established that Title VI itself reaches only intentional
discrimination and "that actions having an unjustifiable disparate
impact on minorities [can] be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI. ' '3 62 The
Third Circuit, at least, has taken this second part of the Court's
statement, together with other evidence, to support an implied private right of action for private plaintiffs suing to enforce EPA regulations implementing Title VI, in which case plaintiffs need not
prove discriminatory intent but need demonstrate only disparate
356. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988) ("No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
357. For a catalog of programs through which EPA provides financial assistance to
states, see 40 C.F.R. § 7 app. A (1999).
358. 40 C.F.R. § 7 (1999).
359. Id. at § 7.25 (defining an "American Indian or Alaskan native" as "[a] person
having origins in any of the original peoples of North American, and who maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition").
360. EPA has recently issued guidance outlining investigative procedures for administrative complaints challenging permits on environmental justice grounds. See United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Guidancefor Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oeji/
titlevi.html>. For discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing environmental justice through administrative complaints, see Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental
Justice and the EPA: The Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 9J. EsvrL. L. & LmcG. 309 (1994); Fisher, supra note 26, at 313-16.
361. Although the Court had granted certiorari in a case that promised to raise these
questions, Seif v. ChesterResidents Concernedfor Quality Living, 118 S.Ct. 2296 (1998) (mem.),
the Court dismissed the case on plaintiff-respondents' suggestion of mootness, but ordered
that the Third Circuit decision be vacated, 119 S.Ct. 22 (1998).
362. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985).
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impact 3 63 This lesser showing is supported by the EPA's Title VI
implementing regulations, which state, in relevant part:
(a) As to any program or activity receiving EPA assistance, a recipient shall not... on the basis of race, color, national origin or, if
applicable, sex .... (2) Provide a person any service, aid or benefit that is different, or is provided differently from that provided
to others under the program .... "
(b) A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering
its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex,
or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex. 30
Even if the relevant court of appeals (and, ultimately, the
Supreme Court) recognizes a private right of action to enforce the
EPA regulation, several questions about the contours of a plaintiffs
case remain. 66 Depending on how these questions are resolved,
state agencies may face private complaints alleging that the agencies' health-based environmental standards have a discriminatory
effect on American Indians. And, in any event, complainants may
challenge such state agency decisions via administrative avenues3 67
Finally, as noted above, Title VI itself has already been interpreted
363. See generally Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Scif, 132 F.3d 925
(1997). Note, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States has ordered that this
opinion be vacated. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
364. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a) (1997).
365. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997).
366. Notably, the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on a plaintiffs burden of
proof in Title VI suit. Federal courts have, however, routinely imported the Title 'l evidentiary structure. See, eg., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the
plaintiff must first make a prima fade showing of disparate impact. The defendant can
rebut the plaintiff's prima fade offering by demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the dispute practice. The plaintiff may nonetheless prevail by presenting a less
discriminatory alternative that would serve the defendant's legitimate interests. This analytical fiamework presents numerous difficulties and uncertainties for enironmentajustice advocates challenging environmental standards; these obstacles arise at eacl juncture
of proof. For example, a plaintiff must scale considerable evidentiary hurdles given the
fact-intensive, statistical nature of disparity analysis. See, eg., Fisher, supra note 26, at 32225. If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima fade case, tie agency must then advance a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, but in the case of agency defendants it is
unclear what the analogue is to the "business necessity" rebuttal standard familiar from
Tide VII cases-what constitutes "agency necessity?" Another important question is how to
define the "benefit" that is conferred by health and environmental program or standards.
Because one portion of the EPA's implementing regulation requires a recipient to confer
equally the benefit of its program, whether there is a disparity may turn on how the benefit
gets defined. Definition of the benefit conferred has proven elsewhere to be a malleable
enterprise. See, eg., Choate, 469 U.S. at 292-93.

367. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1997).
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by the Supreme Court to reach intentional discrimination-and it
could be that "intent" in this context will be given a broad reading.
Taken together, these various means of redress under Title VI constrain agency standard-setting.
Title VI imposes several obligations relevant to state environmental agencies' efforts to set standards for the water and sediments on which fish and American Indians, especially in the Pacific
Northwest, depend. 6 Under subpart (a) of EPA's implementing
regulations, state environmental agencies setting health-based environmental standards may not provide a lesser benefit to Indians
than is provided to others under the standards. Under subpart
(b), a state agency may not "use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination" because they are Indians, "or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives
of the program with respect to" American Indians.
Together, these provisions prohibit states from securing protection to a risk level of 1 (10) for the general population but only to
a risk level of 1 (1 0.4) for Native American populations (as EPA's
Draft AWCQ Revisions would permit). Such an approach would
surely qualify as the provision of a lesser benefit to Indians than is
provided to others. These provisions also require state agencies to
hear and consider Native Americans' data regarding their fish consumption practices to ensure that the agencies' methods do not
have the effect of discriminating against Native Americans by misunderstanding their practices-including the cultural importance
of these practices-and thereby underestimating their consumption. Further, these provisions require state agencies to employ a
fish consumption rate and other exposure factors that are reflective of Native Americans' actual consumption, so that agency judgment calls and methods do not have the effect of impairing the
accomplishment of standards that are protective of fish-consuming
humans.
3.

Synthesis.

Agencies charged with regulating waters that affect treaty fishing rights must acknowledge that treaty fishing rights are affected
by the standards they develop and by their choice of a fish consumption rate. As a starting point, at least for regulations affecting
368. See, e.g., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 6.
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tribes' usual and accustomed fishing places, agencies must take
care not to compromise tribal members' treaty-guaranteed right of
taking fish. Current interpretations, however, which key healthbased environmental standards to the practices of the general population, seem to guarantee a health-compromised fishery for the
tribes. Setting environmental standards so as to ensure either the
availability of either poisoned fish or no fish at all is tantamount to
abrogating the promise to secure for the tribes the right of taking
fish. Furthermore, agencies' customary balancing (e.g., trading
less protection in favor of lower cleanup costs), is arguably inappropriate given treaty fishing rights' unique resistance to balancing
against other priorities. Thus, agencies must respond to variability
and to the fact that the identifiable subpopulation at the high end
of the exposure distribution is comprised of members of treaty
tribes. They can do this by using the maximum value for a variable
quantity, or disaggregating the relevant subpopulations' data.
Federal agencies must also shoulder their trust responsibility,
which would presumably affect their many roles, including setting
standards (as in Dioxin/Organichliorine Center), approving states'
standards (as in Natural Resource Defense Council), or setting forth
guidance or criteria documents. As noted above, the treaties and
the trust obligation are this interstitial body of law that, properly
understood, applies in concert with statutory and other legal obligations to inform federal agency discretion. Obligations flowing
from treaties and trust constrain agency discretion and circumscribe permissible responses, such as choosing cut-off values or balancing cost and safety. Thus, however else agencies may strike the
balance between cost and safety, they are not free to do so in a -ay
that compromises their extraordinary obligations to American Indians and their treaty-secured fishing rights. The trust responsibility informs federal agency action affecting all tribes, treaty and
non-treaty alike. It guides agencies charged with regulating waters
fished by even non-treaty tribes, requiring agencies to protect the
Native way of life from further incursions by the majority society.
Civil rights requirements must also be addressed. Title VI governs state agencies receiving EPA assistance and, under the terms
of the EPA's implementing regulation, applies to any "American
Indian." Thus, Title VI again must guide agency actions beyond
those affecting treaty-covered "usual and accustomed areas."
Under Title VI, in order to avoid providing to American Indians a
"benefit that is different, or is provided differently from that pro-
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vided to [non-Indians] under the program," and in order to avoid
"us[ing] criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect of subjecting [American Indians] to discrimination"
or "have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program," state agencies will
have to reconsider their present approaches.
In addition, because every relevant EPA action should be informed by its trust responsibility, EPA oversight of states' compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI, vis Avis
American Indians, should itself be imbued with the particular
heightened obligations of the trust. In all, the trust responsibility
ought to be seen to inform any discretion that remains with the
federal agencies as they determine how to fulfill treaty obligations
or how to comply with civil rights requirements. It should operate
in the interstices to ensure a robust interpretation of the treaties
and civil rights requirements rather than a crabbed one. Moreover, members of the majority society in the United States should
be understood to have undertaken costs and countenanced limitations on their own interests by dint of treaties and trust.
Executive commitments, including the Clinton Executive Order on Environmental Justice, and the Presidential Memorandum
on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments, should guide questions that remain about
what exactly is required of agencies. Among the executive commitments contained in the Executive Order are those specifically addressed to the injustices experienced by Native Americans because
of their fish consumption practices. 69
Also included in the Executive Order are commitments addressed to the injustices arising from inadequate opportunities for
Native Americans and other affected communities to participate
meaningfully in the regulatory process. The Presidential Memorandum recognizes the "unique legal relationship" between the
United States government and Native American tribal governments
and directs executive departments and agencies that undertake activities "affecting Native American tribal rights or trust resources"
369. CRITFC's then executive director Ted Strong has made this connection:
In light of the [CRITFO fish consumption] survey and EPA's recent conclusions
on the toxicity of dioxin and related compounds, we believe that the health of
tribal members is not adequately protected by existing federal and state policies
.... We urge an investigation of the industrial permits issued .. .for possible
violation of President Clinton's Executive Order on Environmental Justice ....
Hansen & Lurie, supra note 255.
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to do so "in a knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of tribal
sovereignty." 370 Specifically, the Memorandum directs the head of
each department or agency to ensure that "the department or
agency operates within a government-to-government relationship
with federally recognized tribal governments." 371 These executive
commitments, together with the legal obligations outlined above,
may require agencies to not only seek distributive justice, but to
also move beyond the distributive paradigm to accommodate the
procedural and other components of environmental justice.'"
What, then, would fulfillment of these various legal and other
obligations require of agencies? Would it mean that an agency
must choose a FCR number representative of the 90th percentile
of tribes' fish consumption data where waters fished by tribes will
be affected, because that agency has in the past typically targeted
protection at the 90th percentile of the general population? Or
would it mean that even a 90th percentile value from the tribes'
fish consumption data may exact too heavy a toll in light of the
unique protections applicable to tribal reliance on fish and the extremely skewed distribution for fish consumption revealed by the
tribes' data? And how should agency regulators integrate the different requirements applicable to federal and state agencies with
respect to treaty and non-treaty tribal members?
In some particulars, given the data that undeniably now exist,
room for agency exercise of discretion has been considerably diminished. However, room for debate remains in translating the
requirements outlined above into agency modes of operation.
Here, as elsewhere, it will be important to work with the tribes in a
sensitive and respectful manner, on a government-to-government
basis. My goal in this Part has been to emphasize the many obligations under which agencies should understand themselves to labor
and to point out that the effect of the mix of these obligationslike the mix of some toxic chemicals-may be synergistic rather
than merely additive.
VI.

RECOMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY AGENCIES

AND TRIBES

Agencies should proceed with caution when using quantitative
370. Memorandum on April 29, 1994, Governmcnt-to-Government Relations With
Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994).
371. Id.
372. CRTEC Comments, supra note 1, at 6.
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risk assessment, in full cognizance of its limited utility as a decisional tool, given the enormous gaps in the data on which QRA
depends for its usefulness and its inability to live up to its touted
neutrality. To the extent that health and environmental agencies
continue to employ quantitative risk assessment, environmental
justice concerns obligate them to charige the way that they use it.
In particular, when agencies set standards affecting native peoples
who exhibit variability and identifiability in fish consumption patterns, attention to the scientific, normative and doctrinal considerations outlined in the previous Part suggests the following practical
measures. The recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive
but are directed to the problems in toxicity regulation addressed
by this paper. I offer these suggestions as possibilities to be considered by agencies and tribes as they approach these issues together.
A.

Respectful Interaction and Genuine Participation

In order to do a decentjob of setting health-based environmental standards that affect Native Americans and their resources,
agencies must ensure respectful interaction with and meaningful
participation by the affected tribes and their members. Respectful
interaction entails sensitivity to the tribes' cultures and recognition
of rights to tribal self-government. For federal agencies, at least, it
involves an awareness of operating within a government-to-government relationship. Meaningful participation means more than tribal oversight of or input into a pre-ordained regulatory approach.
Rather, tribes and their members should be allowed to contribute
3
in important ways to framing the questions in the first place.

73

Health and environmental agencies can pursue several strategies to
ensure such interaction and meaningful participation by native
peoples who are likely to bear the burden of unjust decisions.3 71
First, agencies need to involve risk-bearing tribes and their
members early in the decision making process. Good administrative practice would advise involving early on those who might be
affected by a decision.375 When those affected include members of
373. See Williams, supra note 25, at 1157-64 (observing that "our environmental law,
colonized by the same system of values which colonized Indian tribes, does not even bother
to ask").
374. For additional recommendations to improve risk assessment's accessibility and
procedural fairness, see Kuehn, supra note 26, at 160-66; Israel, supra note 91, at 516-19.
375. For criticism of the belated and limited involvement of the public and, particularly, of those who must bear the risks under the "decide-announce-defend" approach to
environmental problem solving, see Kuehn, supra note 26, at 160-61 & nn.300-03.
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Indian tribes, the respect due to tribal governments commands
early efforts at involvement 76 Early inclusion of the tribes is also
necessary so that all involved may help set the ground rules and
determine the contours of the discussion. Members of the affected
tribe may introduce questions of distributive justice and raise other
issues that balance the cultural and normative assumptions of agencies' typical highly technical standard-setting process. 3 7 Early involvement is particularly important where the experience of
affected individuals is unlikely to be shared by the dominant culture, and thus less likely to be considered by agencies in framing
the questions before them. Even well-intentioned regulators may
be unequipped to imagine exposure situations radically different
from their own or from those described by data about the "average
American."3 78 Finally, regulators may make decisions early in the
process that virtually foreclose later efforts at reconsideration.3 7 9
Early involvement is also important given that those affected likely
possess knowledge and information necessary to informed, scientifically defensible decision-making-ss
Second, agencies should be more receptive to information in
"anecdotal," non-quantified, or other non-traditional forms. Qualitative information is often crucial to evaluating the problem. For
instance, the anecdotal data presented to the EPA at the time it set
the dioxin standard challenged in Dioxin/OrganocldorineCenterprovided important data unavailable in quantified form. This qualitative data revealed inadequacies in EPA's 6.5 grams/day FCR clearly
376. In the case of federal agencies, for example, the Presidential Memorandum on
Government-to-Government Relations With Native American Governments directs:
Each executive department and agency shall consult, to the greatest extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with tribal governments prior to taking
actions that affect federally recognized tribal governments. All such consultations
are to be open and candid so that all interested parties may evaluate for themselves the potential impact of relevant proposals ....
... Each executive department and agency shall assess the impact of Federal
Government plans, projects, programs, and activities on tribal trust resources and
assure that tribal government rights and concerns are considered during the development of such plans, projects, programs, and activities.
Memorandum on April 29, 1994, Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,951 (1994).
377. See generally, ag., Gauna, supranote 103.
378. CRITFO Comments, supra note 1, at 4.
379. Se, eg., Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
380. See Phil Brown, 11n the Public Knows Beler PopularEpidemio "', Chlalleng-s the
System, Ewvmomffxr, Oct. 1993, at 17, 19.
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relevant to EPA's pursuit of a representative FCR. Qualitative information is also often crucial to interpretation of available quantitative data. This input will also counter-balance the fact that where
the agency decision-making process is highly technical and information intensive, as in QRA, whoever provides the inputs (data)
controls the outputs. Agencies are typically inundated with reams
of information from risk producers,38 ' most of it in the language of
regulators, lawyers, and toXiCologistS,3 8 2 much of it already quantified and packaged for ready use in agency risk analyses. Agencies
typically receive far less information from those affected by risk;
what little they receive may speak colloquially, anecdotally, or qualitatively. Agencies need to be willing to hear and consider information that comes to them in this form.38 3
Third, agencies should take affirmative steps to ensure that Native American voices get heard throughout the process. This may
require a range of "non-neutral""8 4 agency efforts: agencies should
actively solicit both formal and informal input from the affected
tribe; agencies must acknowledge and accept tribes' expertise and
knowledge (e.g., resource management departments and tribal
members); agencies should take steps to become sufficiently conversant with tribes' history, culture and concerns so as to permit
themselves to interact with tribal members in sensitive and respectful ways; 38 5 agencies should provide financial resources for tribes to

develop the institutional capacity to meet their own environmental
management objectives; 38 6 agencies might hold or jointly sponsor
workshops with tribes that facilitate the mutual exchange of infor381. For the point that both access to agency decisionmaking and the process itself
are biased in favor of risk producers, who are typically sophisticated, well-organized, and
well-financed, see Gillette & Krier, supra note 100, at 1064-88.
382. See id. at 1098 (noting that experts are likely to share a common language and
world view due to their education and training).
383. For arguments that public access to risk debates ought to be expanded in order
to take advantage of the "rich complexity of nontechnical risk evaluation," see Ellen K
Silbergeld, The Risks of ComparingRisks, 3 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 405, 419-21 (1995).
384. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCLALJUsrcE 3-5 (1997); Foster, supra
note 26, at 802.
385. SeeWilliams, supra note 25, at 1157-64 (noting differences in this regard between
Zuni and San Carlos Apache "tribes," describing complexities of politics and conflicting
religious belief systems among Apache bands comprising the San Carlos Apache reservation, and noting that tribal governments are not necessarily representative of tribes on
traditional or religious matters).
386. See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 26, at 492 (pointing out that "[w]hatever else environmental justice means, in Indian country the concept must include recognition that
tribes need a lot more federal assistance to build effective environmental regulatory
programs").
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mation or that enable tribal members to educate themselves on
those technical issues with which they are unfamiliar;38 and agencies may need to develop protocols to ensure protection of sensitive tribal information from general disclosure. 38 On some fronts,
relatively small efforts would yield high returns. For example,
agencies should hold public meetings at a time and place that permits risk-bearing tribes and their members-not only the risk-producing stakeholders-to attend and participate. 3 9 This would
require that meetings be scheduled to avoid conflicts with tribal
ceremonies or other significant events; it might require that some
meetings be held, upon invitation, in community centers or in
other gathering places on or near affected tribes' reservations.
In any event, agencies should ask members of the affected
tribes what methods would best work for them-the optimal approach will likely differ from tribe to tribe. Agencies and legislatures also need to provide funding to enable affected tribes and
their members to participate fully in the complex decisions that
result in unequal distribution of risk. Tribes and their members
often will not have financial resources commensurate with the resources that risk producers typically devote to influencing the administrative decision making process. Some statutes and
regulations already devote funds for public interest group, citizen,
or tribal participation.39 0 Existing grant opportunities, however,
387. Community advocates often educate themselves on the technical issues, becoming "self-taught 'experts'." Robert B. Bullard & Beverly H. Wright, The Qutst forEnironental Equii,: Mobilizing the Black Community for Social Change, R cE, PovERT" & Ev'T, July
1990, at 3, 16.
388. See SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND SECRETARY OF CoMERcE, Jowr SEcRETAR, L. OR.
DER ON A.ERCAN LNDIAN T~iB.AL-RIGHTS, FEDERAL-TmiU-.

TRUSt RErsPONsIILTES, A_-D TlE

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT at Principle 5 (1997) (providing that the Departments shall strive
to protect sensitive tribal information that has been disclosed to or collected by the Departments); ,VHrE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE AND U.S. FLsH & WIL.UFE SERv.CE, REcIos 2,
STATEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
rHFE MoUNvaN APACHE TRID ,AND TnE US
FISH AND N,.DLIuFE SERVICE: PROTOCOL FOR INFORMATION MLA GE-T
(1994) ("As set

forth in the Statement of Relationship, and pursuant to the trust obligations of the United
States to the Tribe, both the Tribe and the Service desire to establish protocols to facilitate
sharing of information while ensuring that Tribal proprietary, commercial, and other confidential information is protected....").
389. As Los Angeles community member Robin Cannon reported, in order to attend
the public meetings on the proposed LA. City Energy Recovery Project, "I was using my
vacation time to go to hearings during the work day." Cynthia Hamilton, wlnien, Home and
Community: The Struggle in an Urban Environment, RACE, PoVEwn" & EV'T, Apr. 1990, at 3,
12.
390. The EPA's Technical Assistance Grant program, for example, proides grants of
up to $50,000 to community organizations for technical assistance in interpreting information at federal Superfind sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) (1988); 40 C.FR. §§ 35.4000-.4130
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provide only modest sums and may be limited to specific contexts,
such as CERCLA cleanups.
Fintlly, agencies should facilitate the informed deliberation
that needs to attend regulatory choices involving exposure variability and identifiability by indicating clearly and openly that these
considerations are at stake. When, for example, the EPA proposed
in the regulations at issue in Dioxin/OrganochliorineCenter v. Clarke to

employ an FCR that at best described the 50th percentile of the
general population, the EPA should have alerted the affected tribes
and public that this was an explicit choice of lower protection for
actual, known individuals in Indian and other higher-consuming
subpopulations. A related but more general point is that agencies
should not gloss over the many subjective judgments they make in
risk assessment and risk management. Moreover, where the identifiable subpopulation is Native American, agencies should acknowledge that their choices are constrained in accordance with the
normative and doctrinal considerations outlined in the previous
Part.
B.

Appropriate SubpopulationData

First, agencies need to employ the fish consumption data that
has been gathered. For example, it is absolutely unacceptable for
the EPA and state agencies in the Pacific Northwest to continue to
ignore the CRITFC and Toy et al. studies. EPA and other agencies
have claimed an inability to adjust their standard assumptions without quantified data about Native American fish consumption. Now
that quantified data is available, there is no longer any reason for
delay.
Second, agencies need to facilitate continued data-gathering.
In the case of fish consumption, health and environmental agencies are aware that there is considerable variability among subpopulations; and they know or suspect, based on anecdotal
evidence, the identity of the subpopulations that occupy the high
end of the distribution. Given recent decisions in the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits rejecting agency mandates to regulate to protect a
(1995). Some argue that these grants need to be available earlier in the cleanup process.
See Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Colorand Hazardous Waste Cleanup:Expanding PublicParticipation in the Federal SuperfundProgram,21 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 671, 680 (1994); Kuehn, supra
note 26, at 163. Others suggest that the complicated application process for TAG grants
creates barriers to access. See generallyRICHARD L. HEmBRA, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFricE, EPA's SUPERFUND TAG PROGRAM: GRANTS BENEFIT CITIZENS BUT ADMINISTRATIVE BARU.
ERS REMAIN (1992).
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subpopulation without supporting quantitative data, the existence
of such data becomes important for agencies interested in ensuring both scientifically defensible and just regulatory decisions.
To be valid, quantitative subpopulation data will not result from
a one-size-fits-all approach. Because fish consumption rates, as well
as species and parts consumed, may vary considerably with local
ecological and cultural circumstances, agencies may need to see
that relevant subpopulation studies account for the different consumption patterns of various tribes affected by decisions under
their jurisdiction. Specifically, agencies will need to fund and
otherwise assist data gathering by the subpopulations they have reason to believe consume higher quantities of fish, as affected subpopulations will often have insufficient financial resources to
support with quantitative studies what they know to be true.39 '
While acting to ensure that appropriate subpopulation data is
assembled, agencies should attend to protection of Native American subpopulations' health in the meantime. Recent studies, together with anecdotal evidence, should give agencies a sense of the
wide variability in the fish consumption rate, and direct them to
subpopulations that occupy the upper regions of the distribution
for fish consumption rates. As a bridge strategy, an agency regulating waters affecting Indian fish consumers (e.g., in a state such as
Virginia or Maryland) now can at least look to the CRITFC and Toy
et al. studies for fish consumption values that are more likely to be
representative of tribal consumption than the national per capita
default values. Although, given differences among tribes, this approach is somewhat precarious, it is an improvement over recourse
to a default keyed to the general population. 9 VII.

CONCLUSION

Agencies have before them an opportunity and an obligation to
set environmental standards for regulating toxicity in fish that better reflect an understanding of what is at stake for Native Americans. Agencies possess quantified fish consumption data showing
subpopulations to consume significantly greater quantities of fish
than the general population. Because these data clearly identify
Native Americans as among the most highly exposed, agencies
391. See, &g., CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 9.

392. EPA's Draft AWQC Revisions support this approach as the second in the hierarchy of preferences, with the first preference being the use of local data. St supra notes
201-07 and accompanying text.
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know what group will be left underprotected by a choice of an average or mean fish consumption rate, and will be exposed to risks
two orders of magnitude greater than risks deemed "acceptable."
Agencies also have at hand testaments to the importance of
fish, fishing, and fish consumption to the Pacific Northwest peoples. Eloquent evidence that what is at stake for these Native American subpopulations is different than what is at stake for the
general population or for recreational anglers is provided by contemporary tribes' educative efforts and by the tribes' priority in reserving their fishing rights in treaties a century and a half ago. If
agencies are to respect cultural integrity, they must make decisions
in light of the understanding that "fish, especially salmon, ... [are]

not only a major food source for tribal members, [but] an integral
'' 93
part of the tribes' cultural, economic, and spiritual well-being.
Finally, agencies should embrace their obligations under treaties between the United States and the First Nations, under the
federal trust responsibility, and under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Whether they choose QRA or some other decisional
tool, agencies must ultimately ensure that their decisions comport
with the government's overarching obligations to affected Native
Americans. The rights and resources secured by these obligations
are not susceptible to standard-fare balancing; agencies are not
free to trade encroachment on tribes' treaty-secured rights for
some savings in economic costs or political capital.
To the credit of all involved, agencies have begun to register a
concern for environmental justice. Agencies' understanding of
what environmental justice requires with respect to the multiple
forces that together threaten Native Americans' ways of life at this
point appears to be rudimentary; the contours of environmental
justice here are indeed complex. Recent executive commitments
to address the concerns of subsistence fishers and to interact with
tribes on a government-to-government basis are steps in the right
direction. But, as this Article's exploration of environmental standard-setting demonstrates, there is much work yet to be done.

393. CRITFC Comments, supra note 1, at 2.
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